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 ABSTRACT 
Critiquing Economic Frameworks in Sustainable Development: Health Equity, Resource 
Management and Materialism 
Anisa Khadem Nwachuku 
 
This collection examines mainstream economics discourse as it relates to three topics 
in sustainable development: health equity, sustainable non-renewable resource management 
and development approaches. The themes of the three papers are as follows: 
Political Dimensions of Health Equity in Mozambique - In order to promote equity in health, 
analysis should look beyond the standard economic definitions used to identify underserved 
and vulnerable populations. 
Human and Social Capital, Compensation or Cost?  Reexamining the Hartwick Rule - In 
order to achieve sustainable non-renewable resource management, planners must go beyond 
the current economic theoretical framework and consider the direct impacts of extraction on 
human and social capital. 
The Materialism Paradigm – Neither Sustainable, nor Development - The way economists 
have understood prosperity is materialistic and development is exporting this welfare-
reducing paradigm. 
The synthesis of the series - The frameworks used in economics to address a variety of issues 
in sustainable development have limited efficacy and would benefit from insights originating 
outside the discipline. 
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really sure you belong, made me feel I had a place. My Doctoral Sponsor, Bob Fullilove, saw 
in me what I had for too long been unable to see in myself. You gave me my wings and 
                                                 
a Professor Christoffel, you once told me I couldn’t, but oh, I just did! 
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valuable sounding board for ideas and learning, and it is against her judgment that I will not 
be able to help but measure whatever I have yet to confront in the field of development. 
I would like to thank the Bahá’í community of Maputo, Mozambique, Ryan and Leyla 
Haidarian, Mark and Jenna Lowe, and Alizah Salario for their gracious hospitality and 
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At present the light of reconciliation is dimmed in most countries 
and its radiance extinguished while the fire of strife and disorder 
hath been kindled and is blazing fiercely…Be ye warned, O men of 
understanding. It ill beseemeth the station of man to commit 
tyranny; rather it behoveth him to observe equity and be attired 
with the raiment of justice under all conditions…The Great Being 
saith: The man of consummate learning and the sage endowed with 
penetrating wisdom are the two eyes to the body of mankind. God 
willing, the earth shall never be deprived of these two greatest 
gifts…O my friend! In all circumstances one should seize upon 
every means which will promote security and tranquillity among 
the peoples of the world. The Great Being saith: In this glorious Day 
whatever will purge you from corruption and will lead you towards 
peace and composure, is indeed the Straight Path. 
Please God, the peoples of the world may be led, as the result of the 
high endeavours exerted by their rulers and the wise and learned 
amongst men, to recognize their best interests. How long will 
humanity persist in its waywardness? How long will injustice 
continue? How long is chaos and confusion to reign amongst men? 
How long will discord agitate the face of society? 
This humble servant is filled with wonder, inasmuch as all men are 
endowed with the capacity to see and hear, yet we find them 
deprived of the privilege of using these faculties. This servant hath 
been prompted to pen these lines by virtue of the tender love he 
cherisheth for thee. The winds of despair are, alas, blowing from 
every direction, and the strife that divideth and afflicteth the 
human race is daily increasing. The signs of impending convulsions 
and chaos can now be discerned, inasmuch as the prevailing order 
appeareth to be lamentably defective. I beseech God, exalted be His 
glory, that He may graciously awaken the peoples of the earth, may 
grant that the end of their conduct may be profitable unto them, 
and aid them to accomplish that which beseemeth their station. 




This collection examines mainstream economics discourse as it relates to three topics 
in sustainable development: health equity, sustainable non-renewable resource management 
and development approaches. The themes of the three papers are as follows: 
First Paper- In order to promote equity in health, analysis should look beyond the standard 
economic definitions used to identify underserved and vulnerable populations. 
Second Paper- In order to achieve sustainable non-renewable resource management, 
planners must go beyond the current economic theoretical framework and consider the 
direct impacts of extraction on human and social capital. 
Third Paper- The way economists have understood prosperity is materialistic and 
development is exporting this welfare-reducing paradigm. 
The synthesis of the series- The frameworks used in economics to address a variety of issues 
in sustainable development have limited efficacy and would benefit from insights originating 
outside the discipline. 
The first paper, Political Dimensions of Health Equity in Mozambique, is a descriptive 
“snapshot” and “movie” analysis based on the methodology developed by the World Bank.1 
Here, it serves as an identification exercise to demonstrate that the conventional approach to 
stratifying populations in health equity analyses according to income or economic sector 
(rural versus urban) is incomplete in some cases. In Mozambique, an additional potential 
stratifier presented itself during the course of qualitative analysis – political affiliation. The 
quantitative analysis in this paper is the first and (to the author’s knowledge) only kind to 
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adapt existing tools of descriptive equity analysis to a non-economic variable such as political 
affiliation. Because health equity policy is primarily concerned with the identification of 
underserved populations in order to target services to those most in need, the descriptive 
analysis presented here is intended to demonstrate that there are dimensions of inequity 
originating outside the economist’s framework that are useful for health policymakers’ 
purposes. There is some additional analysis provided on the history of politics in 
Mozambique, and is intended to serve as contextualization of the policy space and public 
perception of the relationship between politics and development. It is not to imply a causal 
relationship between political affiliation and health outcomes or distribution of health 
resources, more to point out the sensitivity of this topic in Mozambique for health equity 
programmers who may operate in this space. 
The second paper, Human and Social Capital, Compensation or Cost?  Reexamining 
the Hartwick Rule, revisits the approach in environmental and resource economics to non-
declining utility. The assumption at the foundation of this approach is that non-renewable 
resource extraction can only have a desirable effect on other forms of capital, and this 
requires investing the resource rents in those other forms of capital. This paper takes a case-
study approach to demonstrate that in several countries, extractive activities have had an 
immediate destructive effect on human and social capital. The sustainability criterion 
identified by economists would therefore not be achieved by leaving these initial impacts 
unaccounted for.  
 xi 
 
The third paper, The Materialism Paradigm – Neither Sustainable, nor Development, 
is a multidisciplinary review of literature on materialism, frameworks in economics, 
development strategies and incentives, applying a robust body of literature from across 
several disciplines to the context of development. In drawing insights from multiple scholars 
across seemingly disparate discourses, this paper makes an attempt at transdisciplinary 
synthesis: “While the twentieth century was an era of increased disciplinary specialization, 
the twenty-first may well turn out to be an era of transdisciplinary synthesis. Its motto might 
be: When different disciplines focus on the same object of knowledge, their models must be 
mutually reinforcing and consistent where they overlap.”2 The paper creates a space for 
literature streams from anthropology, ecology, economics, education, philosophy, political 
science, psychology and public health to “speak” to each other in order to create “mutually 
reinforcing and consistent models” on a topic where they all overlap – sustainable 
development. The coherent insight that has emerged indicates that the current approaches to 
development, framed in particular by economics, are materialistic – not recognizing the 
capacity for human beings’ preferences to change – and fail to guarantee human prosperity. 
 A clear theme that emerges from this series is the importance of emphasizing human 
development, particularly health. The first paper indicates the danger of using economics as 
the universal starting point for identifying health inequities, and situates the discourse 
instead in terms of the most underserved populations. The second paper places human and 
social development, of which health is a critical factor, as a clear priority in the context of 
industrial development, not an afterthought. The third paper looks at approaches to improve 
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human development directly, and is based on an analysis that takes health as an intrinsic 
value. 
In some ways, this series is actually a critique from the vantage point of public health. 
First, there is widespread recognition in the public health community of the 
multidimensional aspects of human health and its non-economic determinants. Second, there 
exists an awareness of the complexity and even tension between the pursuit of economic 
growth and resource exploitation on the one hand, and human well-being and health on the 
other. Health is widely regarded as requiring its own agenda and cannot be considered a by-
product of some other process. Third, there is an unambiguous belief in the intrinsic value of 
health and other non-explicitly-material pursuits. Moreover, a cornerstone of health 
intervention rests on the faith that people’s knowledge, attitudes and practices can be 
altered.  
 Lester Thurow once said: "Economics cannot do without simplifying assumptions, but 
the trick is to use the right assumptions at the right time. And the judgment has to come 
from empirical analysis (including those employed by historians, psychologists, sociologists 
and political scientists) of how the world is, not of how our economics textbooks tell us it 
ought to be."3 The ideas presented in this collection are perhaps more obvious and intuitive 
than they are radical or novel – we have merely lost sight of the reality informing them in 
the midst of our desire to perfect elegant models and theories intended to give some sense of 
control over a world which they do not adequately represent. These papers, borrowing 
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heavily from multiple disciplines, are therefore attempts to articulate those deficiencies in 
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The promotion of equity has become a recent focus of development strategies and has 
had a notable impact on public health policy in particular. It is also considered a priority of 
development aid in post-conflict settings. As a country noted for its health disparities, 
Mozambique has adopted a government policy of equity in health programming. The 
approach of donors and the Mozambican government has been to frame health equity 
strategies in strictly non-political terms, with a focus on inequality between economic 
groups. Given the salience of politics in Mozambique, this paper explores health outcomes 
stratified along lines of political affiliation. The findings use qualitative data to motivate 
quantitative analysis, and suggest that in the absence of political considerations, the current 
health equity discourse is insufficient in identifying the most neglected populations in 
Mozambique. This inadequacy of policy has, in fact, resulted in underserved populations 
being systematically “missed” by health equity strategies.  
Considering political affiliation as a correlate of the distribution of health and 
development has an ex ante grounding in Mozambique’s political history. Although the 
actual causes of disparity are unclear, this should not present an obstacle to more effective 
health equity strategies which, ideally, should target the health status of the most needy. 
 
Background 
Mozambique is a former Portuguese colony in southeastern Africa, and like other 





strife and division.1 Mozambique’s conflict is not typically attributed to ethnic tensions, 
despite the country's highly diverse ethno-linguistic heritage and religious practice. A young 
democracy, it emerged from almost twenty years of civil war to hold its first elections in 
1994.2  
Mozambique won its independence in 1975 under the leadership of the Mozambique 
Liberation Front (FRELIMO), formed in 1962 by exiled Mozambican activists. Under the 
stewardship of FRELIMO, Mozambique became a pawn in the Cold War, adopting a Marxist-
Leninist doctrine from the late 1970s through the 1980s. A political entity was formed in 
1976 to oppose FRELIMO and protect the interests of whites in southern Africa. The 
Mozambique National Resistance Movement (RENAMO) was set up by white Rhodesian 
officers immediately following Mozambican independence, and was later backed by the 
South African apartheid regime after the collapse of Rhodesia.3 In all three Mozambican 
elections, the president has been a member of FRELIMO, and the majority of the 
parliamentary seats have gone to FRELIMO candidates. Although its popularity has waned, 
RENAMO is still a substantial political rival, winning more than one-third of the 
parliamentary seats in the 2004 elections.4 
Today, Mozambique’s population of 22.1 million people experience a 21% 
unemployment rate, and 81% of Mozambicans work in the agricultural sector.  The country 
suffers from significant natural hazards including severe droughts, cyclones, and floods in the 
center and south of the country.  Also, increased migration to urban and coastal areas has 





However, the country has made significant strides recently in terms of development, 
thanks to the interest of countless donors in investing in a successful post-conflict African 
democracy. Mozambique is a Millennium Challenge Corporation country, has produced the 
second of its Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PARPA), and a National Development 
Strategy (Agenda 2025). Under the direction of the World Bank and the United Nations, it is 
also aggressively pursuing the Millennium Development Goals. 
 
The Focus on Equity 
Several prominent institutions in the development community have recently taken 
notice of the importance of promoting equity in development in general, and in health 
specifically. The World Bank’s World Development Report of 2006 (WDR2006) was 
dedicated to the topic of equity in development. In prioritizing this issue, the report outlines 
the importance of equity to development endeavors as a whole: “equity has a central place in 
the interpretation of development experience and in the design of development policy—and 
[this] place has been inadequately understood and undervalued in much current 
thinking…When societies become more equitable…the development process itself may 
become more successful and resilient.”5 This not only signals a new focus for development 
policy, but also a fundamental acceptance that successful development approaches depend on 
an equity-based framework. 
In addressing health equity specifically, the World Bank states: “Greater equity in 





global health inequalities and be beneficial to poor and rich countries alike,”5 suggesting that 
the promotion of equity in health may in fact be a policy imperative beyond development. 
Similarly, the World Health Organization has said that improving equity in health, both 
internationally and intra-nationally, “constitutes one of the greatest challenges of the new 
century. Failure to do so properly will have dire consequences for the global economy, for 
social order and justice, and for civilization as a whole.”6  
In fact, promoting health equity may be instrumental in achieving the very purpose 
of sustainable development: “inequalities in health often translate into inequalities in other 
dimensions of welfare. And these inequalities are reproduced over time,” 5 In other words, 
health disparities have implications for the ability of not only the present generation to meet 
its needs, but they also “compromis[e] the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs.” 7 
 
The Role of Aid 
Understanding the role of aid in addressing equity is important for policy-making, 
particularly in a post-conflict setting. In Mozambique, the presence of external resources has 
already been linked to internal strife: “The generous scale of aid in itself presents a valuable 
resource to those in power. The ruling elite can plunder aid, or more exactly use aid in order 
to achieve and maintain power through patronage. Thus, aid itself could be something to 
fight over…The dilemma is that a sudden withdrawal or reduction of donor aid is itself one 





will compound the underlying problems of governance.”8 In this context, aid should support 
equality-enhancing development policies, which have significant, far-reaching effects: “How 
to prevent and end conflict, deal with its humanitarian debris, and help countries recover, is 
now the most important set of issues facing the donor countries and their development, 
foreign policy, and military institutions…[one way] in which aid can contribute to 
preventing conflict [is to] focus aid on reducing inequality…as a means to dampen social 
tension and violence…the reduction of inequality itself must be a goal for aid.”9 This suggests 
that equity-based aid plays a dual role in Mozambique. It promotes development, but it is 
also an investment in conflict prevention, and hence, sustainability. 
Using aid to reduce health disparities is not only desirable; it is actually feasible in 
Mozambique. In 2004, the net ODA to Mozambique was approximately USD$1.2 billion, 
which amounts to 23% of GNI 10, and more than half of the national budget.8 This makes 
Mozambique the world’s eighth most aid-dependent country with a national income to aid 
ratio four times that of the average for sub-Saharan Africa.10 This tremendous influence of 
aid in Mozambique’s development implies that development policies supported by donors 
can have an acute effect on overall equity. Health policies should not merely avoid 
exacerbating current disparities, they should actively be equity-promoting: “In the absence of 
a concerted effort to ensure that health systems reach disadvantaged groups more effectively, 






The Discourse on Health Equity in Mozambique 
Mozambique’s health disparities have been widely documented. Despite spending the 
highest percent of GDP on health (4%) in the region, improvements in public health “are 
uneven across the country, and the health status of citizens is among the lowest in the 
world.”12 This has been reflected in current policy as an attribution primarily to an economic 
reality—that it is the poor and rural who are disproportionately sick and efforts to improve 
equity should therefore target these groups. However, In a study of 50 developing countries 
(from which Demographic and Health Survey data had been collected), Mozambique had the 
highest total health inequality, second only to Liberia.13 That means that “Mozambique 
stands out with a high level of both between- and within-[income] group inequality.”14 
Furthermore, quantitative analysis shows that even after controlling for poverty incidence 
and population density (as a proxy for rural-ness), degree of political affiliation with the 
ruling party is still a significant positive predictor of health outcomes.  
Mozambique’s major policy strategies consistently demonstrate an acute awareness of 
the disparities in the country’s health outcomes. In fact, the framework for health equity had 
been laid from the beginning of Mozambique’s poverty reduction strategy formulation: 
“Expanded and improved quality and equity in access to health care will be an important 
component in the global strategy to fight poverty among the most vulnerable sectors of 
population [sic].”15 The programming that followed has been dominated by economic 
definitions, whether in terms of rich-poor or urban-rural dichotomies in Mozambique. The 





improving quality and creating more equitable access to health care,” and states that 
“expansion should only take place for reasons of equity.”16 The two principal documents 
providing the basis for this agenda are the World Bank’s Better Health Spending to Reach the 
Millennium Development Goals and the Government-wide Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper, PARPA. The PARPA is “broadly endorsed by the Bank and Fund Boards as the basis 
of concessional assistance from the two institutions”17, and “is the key policy document on 
the basis of which donor support has been forthcoming.”10 This makes it the most significant 
power-locating document of development policy produced in Mozambique. 
The PARPA I (2001) states that of the programs paying “special attention to the needs 
of underprivileged segments of the population,” the key axis for the sector targets “the 
population of rural areas, and those who live in absolute poverty.” It also frames the purpose 
of the health sector as “playing a role in the redistribution of income and wealth,” 
“contribut[ing] to the creation and preservation of human capital, as a key element in a 
strategy for accelerated economic growth and poverty reduction,” and “contribut[ing] also to 
higher productivity.”18 This locates health equity policy in an almost exclusively economic 
framework. b The PARPA II (2006) maintains this rhetoric: “Therefore, the central objective 
of the health component of PARPA II is improvement of the state of health of the general 
public, particularly the poor…That means, first, that siting of facilities must be done on the 
basis of equity, which makes it possible to channel funds directly to the poorest”.19 The 
                                                 






World Bank’s report on Better Health Spending to Reach the Millennium Development 
Goals in Mozambique does not mention equity directly, but does identify what the Bank sees 
as the country’s spending challenges: “(i) the poor, while suffering from worse health 
problems, benefited less from the health spending; (ii) the rural families have suffered from 
the declining financial support to primary health care services.”20 Again, the policy focus is 
primarily economic in nature. 
Even documents with minimal donor input, not linked to aid, whose primary purpose 
is to articulate the consensus-based perceptions of the state of Mozambican development, are 
consistent with the policy discourse on the importance of equity. As in the externally-
reviewed strategies, the theme of equity pervades the country’s internally-produced National 
Development Strategy, but again, only in economic terms: “consequent increase of social 
inequity – between the few rich and the many poor - and regional asymmetries - between 
the few cities and the many rural areas forgotten in both time and history.”21 The 2005 
National Human Development Report on achieving the Millennium Development Goals also 
states: “The provision of quality health care in an equitable manner is a powerful weapon in 
the fight against poverty. In order that it may be more effective, it should be directed to the 
most vulnerable population groups, which in the case of Mozambique includes…those who 
are below the poverty threshold, most of whom are to be found in the rural and peri-urban 
areas.”22 This statement specifically defines economic classifications as the more meaningful 





Health and development policies in Mozambique are firmly grounded in the equity 
discourse, but are dominated by non-political considerations. This is the case in both donor 
and government strategies. World Bank health sector assessments assert that “Equity is one 
of the guiding principles in the Mozambican health sector. However, current policy 
documents do not define operationally useful targets and norms for assessing whether equity 
objectives are met, either in terms of health outcomes, outputs, or allocation of resources.” 23 
The Bank’s response in its health equity reports to this perceived void are indicators that are 
exclusively economic 24, which is evidently the sole framework being used to understand and 
address this issue in Mozambique. 
The dominant preoccupation with economic disparities in Mozambique’s health 
equity strategy is also articulated as the individual focus of policy-makers themselves: “we 
are spending more money in hospitals in urban areas instead of community health…we need 
to adapt the health system to serve the poor…It is a structural problem. Places are less-
developed economically. There is less basic infrastructure.”25 This opinion reflected in an 
interview with a health policy-maker—who has operated in both national and donor 
institutions—illustrates that these policy documents are not merely symbolic; they indicate a 








The Importance of Political Dimensions in Achieving Equity 
In the context of Mozambique, these economic factors, considered in isolation, are 
insufficient in identifying target populations for health equity policy. In fact, economic 
measures of development in Mozambique have often been found misleading: “In the case of 
Mozambique, GDP is particularly unreliable as a measure of satisfaction among the people”8, 
and “You can see infrastructure, but it doesn’t mean his life is getting any better. It depends 
how you evaluate growth.”26 Political affiliation in Mozambique, on the other hand, has been 
a historic driver of conflict, and continues to be a meaningful framework for contextualizing 
Mozambique’s current disparities. 
The World Bank’s WDR2006 discusses this phenomenon in development in general: 
“inequities are usually associated with differences in an individual’s ‘agency’—the 
socioeconomically, culturally, and politically determined ability to shape the world around 
oneself. Such differences create biases in the institutions and rules in favor of more powerful 
and privileged groups.”5 So although donor institutions are cognizant of the political 
dimensions of development disparities, this is not reflected in their country-level policy 
prescriptions. Other researchers have considered the role of political parties as important “in 
determining the level of equalities or inequalities in a society and in explaining the level of 
health in its population.”27 In this way, political factors have been found to have relevant 






In Mozambique, all rural and income-poor places are not alike in terms of their development 
status. Recognizing that health outcomes are stratified along political lines helps to identify 
populations that are systematically underserved or otherwise being missed by current 
attempts of policy to address equityc: 
Community 1 is a small village that sits on the Beira Corridor—that major 
transportation artery that cuts through Mozambique connecting Zimbabwe to 
the coast. It is in the heart of the opposition party stronghold, and lies a few 
hours outside Beira’s major economic center and port. There are high-tension 
electric wires that run up and down the corridor, but no one in this village has 
access to the electricity. The quality of the pavement is among the better in 
Mozambique—although everyone knows there are no more potholes on the 
corridor once you get out of Sofala—but infrastructure is oddly otherwise 
conspicuously absent.  
Community 2 similarly has access to substantial transportation infrastructure 
and is located three hours outside the capital city, but stands at the birthplace 
of the ruling party. In Village 1 people say, “There is constant food insecurity 
and times of hunger.”28 In Community 2, the floods from a few years ago were 
the “only thing that could interrupt food production in those soils.”29 
Community 1  is overwhelmed by AIDS: “Our village is filled with orphans.”28 
In Community 2, there are many young parents alive and thriving. 
Community 1 exhibits the all-too-common signs of neglect by the public 
health system: “There are no latrines, and the health post is six kilometers 
away. You need a car to get there…there was a cholera outbreak and we tried 
to take a baby to the health post but it died before we arrived…The 
government did distribute bednets, but a government representative came to 
ask what was needed. We told them [water] pumps. And they were never 
provided despite assurances. The one pump is always full of people.”28 
Community 2, on the other hand, just received several superior interventions, 
including insecticide-treated bednets, even though it is in a more temperate 
part of Mozambique where most tropical diseases cannot even thrive, people 
are generally well-clothed and well-fed, and a startling majority of adolescents 
have cell phones (and access to the electricity necessary to charge them). 29 
                                                 





Residents of Community 1 are aware of their neglect by public officials, and many people in 
the region attribute this to a historic lack of consideration by the State closely tied to the 
history of political affiliation. Based on current policy, these two communities, with their 
very different development realities, have been placed in the same economic category in 
terms of equity promotion, and the donors essentially see them as identical.d  
 
Qualitative Data and Quantitative Analysis 
Based on key informant interviews, a perceptible disparity in health exists that is 
stratified by political affiliation. This qualitative perception motivates the proceeding 
quantitative analysis and grounds the qualitative data in a statistical reality. The quantitative 
analysis demonstrates that by only accounting for non-political factors in health equity 
policies, substantial swathes of the Mozambican population are not being served, and have 
systematically worse health outcomes, regardless of their income or the economic niche they 
occupy. This statistically significant quantitative association between political affiliation and 
health is dramatic enough that it has proven perceptible to Mozambicans, reinforcing 
notions of exclusion. In order to capture the totality of health inequity in Mozambique, both 
the distribution of health outcomes and allocation of health sector resources are examined.  
 
 
                                                 






Description of Data 
The qualitative framework upon which the following quantitative analysis rests is 
based on a series of key informant interviews—the findings of which are cited throughout. 
Residents of two “poor” and “rural” villages, comparable in their geographic endowment yet 
distinct in their political histories, were interviewed and the findings are discussed in the 
previous section. Other key informants were employed by donor, national government 
agencies or foreign NGOs, or were university affiliates studying development-related issues. 
Key informant interviews took place between June and August 2006. Once the salience of 
political affiliation as a health stratifier emerged in local-level qualitative investigation, 
country-level quantitative health and political data were analyzed to assess the statistical 
relevance of this qualitatively-perceived stratifier on a national scale. 
Quantitative health data come from five sources: Statistical Yearbooks30, Survey of 
Basic Indicators of Well-Being31, Socio-Demographic Indicators by Districts32 (all produced 
by the National Statistics Institute of Mozambique), District Profiles33, and the two 
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) for Mozambique.34 The Statistical Yearbooks are 
published every three years and include yearly province-level data by sector from 1994 
through 2004. The Survey of Basic Indicators of Well-Being consists of a multi-stage cluster 
sample of 14,500 households conducted between 2000 and 2001, and includes socio-
economic and infrastructure data reported at the provincial level. The Socio-Demographic 
Indicators by Districts is 1997 census data reported at the district-level. The District Profiles 





economic, geographical and investment data from the last ten years. The Mozambique DHS 
data come from two surveys conducted in 1997 and 2003. DHS is a project of USAID that 
emerged from the World Fertility Survey (WFS), and therefore has a women’s and 
reproductive health orientation. In the 1997 data, there were 11,114 respondents, of which 
8,779 were women, and 2,335 were men, constituting a nationally representative, multistage, 
clustered sample of 9,282 households. In the 2003 data, there were 15,042 respondents, of 
which 12,193 were women, and 2,849 were men, constituting a nationally representative, 
multistage, clustered sample of 12,087 households.  
All population data come from projections provided by the National Statistics 
Institute of Mozambique, and are available for the years 1997-2010. Any data which require 
population estimates—particularly those reported in the Statistical Yearbooks—for years 
prior to 1997 have been excluded. District and provincial population densities (people per 
square kilometer) are calculated using the population projections of the National Statistics 
Institute and land area estimates (in km.2) reported in the District Profiles.32, 33 Poverty 
incidence and per capita district budget data are also reported in the District Profiles, while 
province-level sector budget data is as reported by the Mozambican federal government. 33, 35 
Political data come from reports of voting outputs provided by the National Election 
Commission.4 These election outputs are used in the district-level analyses and are 
aggregated to the provincial level where necessary. Percentages of votes for FRELIMO in the 







The World Bank’s Poverty and Health group has produced a thorough quantitative 
methodology for examining health inequities across a variety of (primarily outcome) 
indicators.36 Here, the use of concentration curves and indices has been adapted from the 
Bank’s economic model to accommodate political variables in the case of health outcomes. As 
an extension, the allocations of health goods are measured as a form of distribution of wealth, 
and use the same methods. Concentration analyses involve a ranking of individuals or groups 
according to some measure of privilege, usually income. To assess the concentration of health 
goods or outcomes according to political affiliation, the ranking variable of privilege used is 
the proportion of votes for the ruling party in the legislative elections of 1994, 1999 and 
2004.  
Concentration analyses measure the degree to which a distribution deviates from 
perfect equality. In concentration curves, the x-axis represents some cumulative proportion 
of the total subjects represented (e.g. total population, total births, total children, etc.), and 
the y-axis represents the cumulative proportion of the outcome or resource distributed (e.g. 
vaccinations, incidence of disease, etc.). A 45-degree line is plotted to mark an equitable 
distribution (also known as the “line of equality”). The concentration index is twice the area 
between the curve and this 45-degree line, and values range from 0 (perfectly equal) to |1| 
(perfectly unequal). If the majority of the area under the curve lies above (below) the 45-
degree line, the concentration index will be negative (positive). A negative concentration 





FRELIMO), and a positive index implies a concentration among those higher ranked (i.e. 
stronger affiliation with FRELIMO).  
Cross-sectional (OLS) regressions are also used to assess the significance of political 
affiliation as a predictor of health at the district level, and fixed-effects panel regressions are 
used for province-level data available over several time periods.e Where available, poverty 
incidence and population density data are used as indicators of economic status and rural-
ness. The inclusion of these variables demonstrates the significance of political affiliation as a 
stratifier for health even once these economic factors emphasized in Mozambique’s health 
equity policy are accounted for. This indicates the inadequacy of economic variables used in 
isolation to identify underserved populations in Mozambique. 
 
Distribution of Health Outcomes 
Health outcomes have a direct impact on one’s quality of life and future well-being, 
and constitute a meaningful driver of individuals’ perceptions of their health status. 
Consistent disparities in health outcomes may be discernable to the people experiencing 
them, and can exacerbate tensions arising from inequity in a population. Across indicators of 
mortality and morbidity and over several years, positive health outcomes are either 
associated with or have been concentrated among regions more affiliated with FRELIMO.  
                                                 






Mortality data provide a definitive overview of a population’s health status, and are 
among the more reliably measured health outcomes. The chart below shows the outputs of 
regression models using life expectancy and under-5 mortality rates. 
Figure 1: Life Expectancy and U5MR OLS Regression (by district) and Degree of FRELIMO 
Affiliation (1997) 
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Life Expectancy is significantly positively correlated with the degree of affiliation with the 
ruling party, and under-five mortality rates are significantly negatively correlated, even 
when controlling for “rural-ness,” a factor emphasized as a target for health equity policy. A 
one-percent increase in a district’s voting output for FRELIMO is associated with a 0.21 year 
increase in life expectancy. Likewise, a one-percent increase in a district’s voting output for 
the ruling party is associated with a decrease in the under-5 mortality rate by two deaths per 
every 1,000 live births. Furthermore, political affiliation alone explains between one-quarter 





Morbidity is another important measure of a population’s status, and captures the 
impact of health on an individual’s general well-being. The following figure provides an 
indication of the distribution of morbidity across Mozambique’s provinces:  











































In the above measure of total chronic health burden (both mental and physical), the majority 
of the curve lies above the 45-degree line, and corresponds to a concentration index of -0.1, 
demonstrating that the persistent health problems reported are concentrated amongst those 
having a weaker affiliation with FRELIMO. 
Stunting (Figure 3) is an anthropometric measure of height-for-age that occurs below 





nutrition inadequacies, and better captures persistent inequities in nutrition status than other 
anthropometric measures. 
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The above regression output demonstrates a slight, yet statistically significant negative 
association between FRELIMO affiliation and incidence of stunting, even when controlling 
for population density. A one percent increase in voting output for FRELIMO is correlated 
with a .03% decrease in the incidence of stunting in a population. While the practical 
significance of this association may be limited, its statistical significance indicates a 
systematic nature of the concentration of chronic malnutrition according to political 
affiliation. 
Low birth weight is an important measure of nutritional status and early childhood 
health, and may be indicative of longer-term problems such as impaired cognitive 





unlike OLS regressions, controls for unobserved heterogeneity that exists between the 
provinces. 
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R2 (overall) 0.2410 0.1406 
 
The above panel regression output demonstrates a statistically significant negative association 
between a province’s FRELIMO affiliation and rates of low birth weight, even when 
controlling for population density. Over the ten years included in the analysis, a one percent 
increase in a province’s voting output for FRELIMO is predictive of a .1% decrease in the 
incidence of low birth weight in that province. This suggests that degrees of political 





affiliation with the ruling party alone explains approximately one-fifth of the variation in 
low birth weight within each province over the ten years, and one-fourth of the variation 
between them. 
The low birth weight concentration curves for each of the ten years corresponds to 
the following concentration indices: 
















As the above chart demonstrates, the incidence of low birth weight has been consistently 
disproportionately concentrated among those with a weaker affiliation with the ruling party. 
 
Distribution of Health Resources 
The distribution of infrastructure, personnel, supplies and budgetary support in the 
health sector are significant determinants of future health outcomes. Disparity in the 
allocation of these resources translates into health inequity in populations. When the 





health resources will serve to sustain these existing inequalities, whereas an unequal 
distribution of health goods that is regressive—in terms of need—will merely serve to 
exacerbate the health gap. This regressive inequality would further indicate an inadequacy in 
the operating frameworks used to address health inequity. 
Access to antenatal care is an important component of maternal and neonatal health. 
The following curves compare the concentration of women who did not receive antenatal 
care for births in the three years prior to the two surveys (1997 and 2003): 
Figure 6: Women Who Received no Antenatal Care Concentration Curve Ranked by Frelimo 
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The above curves correspond to a -.31 concentration index for 1997 and a -.36 concentration 
index for 2003, indicating worsening inequity along lines of political affiliation between the 





Similarly, inequity has persisted in child health which has experienced an increase in 
the concentration among those provinces less affiliated with FRELIMO of children who have 
not received any vaccinations: 
Figure 7: Children Who Did Not Receive Any Vaccinations Concentration Curve Ranked by 















































The concentration index for children without vaccinations went from -.24 in 1997 to -.30 in 
2003. Since vaccinations require little infrastructure or investment, they are among the 
easiest of interventions to deliver equitably, making this increased inequity particularly 
striking. 
The analyses that follow illustrate the allocation of various health sector goods—
health units, personnel and beds—across a population (either by district or province). The 





share the good). The regression output below demonstrates that at the district level, the ratio 
of population to health units is significantly negatively associated with FRELIMO political 
affiliation, even once controlling for poverty incidence and rural-ness. 
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A one percent increase in voting for FRELIMO is significantly correlated with a 62.7 drop in 
the number of people to which a health unit is allocated at the district level. This negative 
association is significant regardless of the model’s inclusion of economic stratifiers. At the 
provincial level, this inequality in the allocation of health units is less observable , yet 


















These concentration indices of health units over the Mozambican population appear 
relatively equal at the provincial level, with recent marginal increases in inequality. 
However, in the absence of an explicitly progressive distribution, targeting those with a 
concentration of worse health outcomes, this allocation implies a persistence of existing 
health inequity into the future.   
The distribution of physical infrastructure provides a general notion of a population’s 
access to health resources. The degree to which these health units are staffed and supplied, 
however, remains as meaningful a question in the equitable allocation of health goods. It also 
directly addresses the ability of the health system to effectively manage its population’s 
health needs. 
Without health personnel, a public health system is effectively unable to reach and 
serve a population. The following is a regression of the allocation of health workers to 





Figure 10: Population : Total Health Personnel Ratio OLS Regression (by district) and 
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As with health units, the allocation of health personnel is significantly associated with a 
district’s FRELIMO affiliation, and a one percent increase in voting output for the ruling 
party accounts for 15 fewer people per health worker. This inequity is also evident in 






Figure 11: Population : Health Care Personnel Ratio Fixed-Effects Panel Regression (by 
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The above regression output demonstrates that within a province, a one percent increase in 
voting output corresponds to over a 30-person drop in the ratio of population to health care 
personnel, even when controlling for population density. Political affiliation alone also 
explains over 13% of the variation in the population : health care personnel ratio within a 
province and between provinces over time. Not only are variations in political affiliation 





concentration of health personnel has also been consistently unequal over this period of time 
: 














The distribution of health workers has been concentrated among those with a stronger 
affiliation with the ruling party, resulting in all positive concentration indices. This is despite 
the larger health burden borne by the provinces with a weaker ruling party affiliation, the 
remedying of which would require a larger share of the health sector’s resources. This 
inequitable distribution is regressive in terms of need, and can only serve to exacerbate 
existing health inequity. The regressivity of the distribution of health care workers becomes 






Figure 13: Population : Skilled Health Personnel Ratio OLS Regression (by district) and 
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As the above regression outputs show, stronger affiliation with FRELIMO is consistently 
associated—at a 99.9% level of significance—with an even lower population : health worker 
ratio when skilled personnel are considered in isolation. Despite controlling for the 
economic parameters that have been emphasized in Mozambique’s policies on health equity, 
this relationship holds. At the provincial level, and over the period 1997-2004, this 




















Like the concentration indices for total health workers (Figure 12), these skilled health 
workers concentration indices are consistently regressively unequal, but indicate an even 
more severe deviation from an equitable distribution. These health worker regressions and 
concentration indices suggest that among regions with a weaker affiliation with the ruling 
party, a concentration of worse health outcomes coincides with a health system less equipped 
to deal with them—and increasingly more so as the ill health requires the expertise of skilled 
personnel. 
 
The number of beds used in a healthcare setting is often reported as a proxy measure for how 
well health units are supplied with goods necessary to accommodate a patient population. 
This offers a complementary physical capital measure to the human capital necessary to 
equip a health system. The regression below considers the number of people per bed 
































  1101.869 
(0.508) 




(pop./km2 as a 
measure of 
rural-ness) 













Again, stronger affiliation with the ruling party corresponds to a larger share of health goods. 
A one percent increase in voting output for FRELIMO is significantly associated with a drop 
of over 11 people to each bed, regardless of the model’s economic specifications. Over the 
period 1997-2004, there is also an inequitable concentration of this health resource evident 



















The positive indices above demonstrate a persistent unequal concentration of this health 
resource among the populations with a stronger ruling party affiliation—one that has grown 
over the last 5 years included in the analysis. If this is an indication of future health resource 
allocation, the trend will further exclude the populations with a greater need of human 
capital investment (in the form of health), concentrating the distribution of health goods 
among those more aligned with the ruling party. 
Just as the allocation of existing health goods provides an indication of expected 
trends in the distribution of health outcomes, so does budgetary expenditure imply an 
allocation of resources for health, and by extension, policy’s future impact on health equity. 
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The per capita budget in 2004 (as reported by the districts) is positively associated with a 
district’s degree of affiliation with the ruling party, independent of model specifications. A 
one percent increase in voting output for FRELIMO is significantly correlated with an 
additional 0.10 MTn. increase in the general budget allocation per person when considered 
in isolation. Once controlling for the other factors more often emphasized as relevant 
stratifiers, the magnitude of the impact of political affiliation tends to increase, 
demonstrating its relevance and sensitivity as a distinguishing variable within the context of 
poor and rural districts. While increased voting output for the ruling party is a statistically 





exists along political lines becomes even more pronounced with the isolation of budget 
expenditures in health. The following curves plot the concentration of general budget 
expenditures alongside the distribution of the health budget. Figure 18 plots the budget 
allocation from internal financing sources: 



































The above concentration curves demonstrate that the inequity in allocation of financial 
resources is preserved at the provincial level. The concentration index for the internally-
financed general budget is .06, whereas this figure jumps to .27 when considering the health 
sector in isolation. This suggests that internal financing in the health sector is 





outcomes and a lower per person share of health goods. This can only result in greater health 
disparities along political lines. 
A case can be made, however, for the role of external financing in reducing inequality both 
in general expenditure and health expenditure, specifically: 










































When internal and external financing are considered jointly, inequity still persists, although 
with some alleviation. The per capita budget allocation for all sectors corresponds to a 
concentration index of .05, demonstrating a concentration of resources among those with a 
stronger affiliation with the ruling party, although to a lesser extent than the internal 
financing index of .06 implies . When the health sector is considered in isolation, the 





plagued by an inequitable distribution of resources. This is, however, a meaningful 
improvement over the otherwise .27 concentration index .  
The above analysis of the allocation of health resources demonstrates that the 
Mozambican health system is not structured to target the populations in need as determined 
by the distribution of health outcomes. In fact, it is regressive, perpetuating the exclusion of 
unidentified underserved populations. External financing can successfully serve to reduce 
inequity in the distribution of health investment—and ultimately mitigate health 
disparities—if it is sufficiently progressive and targeted at groups currently missed. This has 
been demonstrated in Mozambique’s allocation of health financing along a political 
stratification, although the resulting distribution remains highly inequitable, prompting the 
need for further health equity investment and policy better equipped to identify underserved 
populations. 
 
The Nature of Mozambican Politics and the Feasibility of Moving Forward 
Donors have acknowledged that political affiliation plays a role in the country’s 
development, and Mozambicans are still keenly aware of their tumultuous political history: 
“There is a collective memory of the persecution of non-FRELIMO people…FRELIMO had a 
brutal re-education camp in Niassa…Lazaro Nkavandame, Uria Simango, Padre Gwenjere 
[political dissidents], these have long been forbidden names…FRELIMO does not allow the 





FRELIMO were to try to exit, their [sic] life would be destroyed.” 26 Incidents of violence also 
demonstrate the depth of Mozambicans’ perceptions of political rifts, including “the death of 
119 RENAMO cadres in Montepuez after the 2004 election”8, and reports of politically-
motivated violence even outside election time. These include “terrorist acts” and RENAMO 
“political prisoners”37, or the “assassination” of a RENAMO parliamentary deputy.38  
Both the UK Department for International Development (DfID) and the US Agency 
for International Development (USAID) produced reports that discuss Mozambique’s 
political cleavage. The DfID conflict assessment describes an almost tenuous democracy: “as a 
trigger for actual conflict, the election process is pre-eminent…largely because the political 
system is currently based on the exclusion of RENAMO.”8 This clearly couches political 
divides in a historical framework, and provides precedent for political stratification. The 
USAID Corruption report states, “A dominant fact of Mozambican political life is the 
blurring of the line between party (Frelimo) and state, thus rendering separation and balance 
of power a meaningless construct that does little to check the excesses of any branch of 
government or of the party… The dominance of the Presidency, combined with the weak 
legislative branch, ensures that electoral politics in Mozambique is a winner-take-all game.”12 
Beyond a discussion of FRELIMO’s dominance of domestic politics, the report alludes to how 
this may translate into disparities in development outcomes: “Frelimo benefits greatly from 
access to state resources not only during political campaigns, but perhaps even more so from 
its ongoing ability to use its control of the state to disperse patronage in the form of jobs and 





areas, where alternatives to state-provided jobs and services are fewest.”12 This assessment 
offers one of many explanations as to the mechanism by which political factors translate into 
differences in well-being of whole populations. 
Political dimensions of development, embedded in a social, cultural, and historic 
reality, are multifaceted and complex, with paths of causation that are nearly impossible to 
trace. There are several explanations offered for why political affiliation and development 
outcomes are closely linked in Mozambique, which motivate the exploration of association 
between politics and health disparities. As described in the USAID report, there are widely-
held perceptions that “The whole economic and social system in Mozambique is in the hands 
of FRELIMO…relationship with the party is key to economic success. It gives access to loans 
and concessions, it means influence.”26 Likewise, many Mozambicans believe that 
development aid has been targeted by the ruling government to punish the regions that 
support RENAMO.8 Others claim that RENAMO is defunct and to blame for their supporters 
being worse-off: “It is alleged that only [RENAMO] party leader Afonso Dhlakama knows 
how…financial resources the party pulled together from private donations are spent. Most 
notably, money hardly trickles down to the districts.”39 RENAMO claims that FRELIMO 
actively tries to undermine its ability to govern effectively: “‘there’s too much political, 
economic and social exclusion…[FRELIMO] created an establishment and a status quo that 
they fear Renamo in power would destroy’ (Simango).”39 One interviewee attributed positive 
health indicators in FRELIMO areas to the party’s “[strength] in the women’s empowerment 





education of the mother…Mozambique has done better [in empowering women] than other 
countries that were independent longer…This was a key success of FRELIMO. It was good at 
mobilizing women for social action.” 25  
So while Mozambicans are acutely aware that this dynamic exists, and are only too 
quick to offer their theories as to how this came to be, Mozambicans are prepared to move 
forward. The lack of consensus around the causes of these disparities need not impair the 
priority of aid to address this stratifier. The history of conflict resolution in Mozambique is 
one of making amends and not dwelling on the past: “Despite [the] atrocities committed in 
the past, neither Frelimo nor Renamo publicly offered any apology for their crimes against 
the people of Mozambique…For the people, it was the need for peace that was emphasized 
more than the desire to settle accounts.”40 Therefore, the possibility of targeting people who 
have been excluded, without a detailed articulation of how this came to be, is possible in this 
context, and should be reflected in health equity programming. 
 
Conclusion 
The purpose of equity-based approaches to health is to target the most underserved 
populations. This is consistent with the perspectives of policy-makers in Mozambique: 
“Mozambique has achieved good results despite low spending…This does not mean that 
disparities have been eliminated…The health sector should compensate for it. It should 
improve in general the level of living. Our greatest challenge…is to allocate resources in the 





resources should target whichever populations are in most need, particularly populations 
that are systematically missed by current equity policy frameworks.  
The association between political affiliation and health outcomes exists, regardless of 
the lack of consensus as to the cause. Given the systematic emphasis on economic 
frameworks in the country’s development policy, it is conceivable that both the government 
and donors are as yet unaware of this dynamic. As such, it is a correlation that policy-makers 
have demonstrably been unable to address. It is therefore incumbent upon those of them 





Appendix A - Geography 
Community 1 is located in the province of Sofala, and Community 2 is located in the 













Appendix B – Supplementary Quantitative Data 
 
Scatter plots for Figure 1: Life Expectancy and U5MR 32, 33, 41 
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    0 0  
Sofala 0.19622333 0.09811167 5.6 0.084737466 0.189914583 -0.024085104 
Zambezia 0.2605445 0.13027225 1.9 0.27668234 0.335871586 -0.008290095 
Manica 0.31944942 0.15972471 1.9 0.342749782 0.386109999 -0.002268268 
Tete 0.37222155 0.18611078 2.6 0.419751341 0.466234932 -0.015146171 
Nampula 0.39229275 0.19614637 2.3 0.609422637 0.640826901 -0.004050595 
Niassa 0.41191026 0.20595513 2.3 0.660147113 0.687518659 0.011306845 
Inhambane 0.6211479 0.31057395 3.2 0.731742656 0.779210519 -0.031260992 
Cabo Delgado 0.62314786 0.31157393 1.4 0.816411915 0.826650948 -0.010839924 
Maputo Cidade 0.82659902 0.41329951 2.0 0.879009583 0.876756167 -0.014720583 
Maputo 
Province 0.84778385 0.42389193 1.7 0.931827118 0.912691516 0.019135602 
Gaza 0.87432402 0.43716201 3.2 1 1 0 






Scatter plot for Figure 3: Stunting 32, 33 
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Scatter plot for Figure 4: Low Birth Weight 30, 32, 33 
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     0 0  
Sofala 0.143947664 22737 3504 0.154110041 0.102939645 0.11789247 -0.00223041 
Manica 0.273117541 15703 1776 0.113099408 0.174033512 0.177646188 0.000289454 
Nampula 0.310440552 30727 4270 0.13896573 0.313147136 0.321310814 0.00252453 
Zambezia 0.385160524 24338 3600 0.147916838 0.423335159 0.442433214 -0.00110649 
Tete 0.40634992 13444 1813 0.134855698 0.484201614 0.503431801 -0.00264705 
Niassa 0.472281087 12090 1529 0.126468156 0.538937961 0.554875177 0.004340395 
Cabo 
Delgado 0.580203181 10218 1655 0.161969074 0.585199002 0.610557836 -0.02812356 
Inhambane 0.593574963 21948 1653 0.075314379 0.684566523 0.666173205 -0.00432326 
Maputo 
Province 0.781222687 10605 1201 0.113248468 0.732579671 0.706580984 0.043129808 
Maputo 
Cidade 0.789194756 37077 6562 0.176983035 0.900442328 0.927360205 -0.02691788 
Gaza 0.815359129 21990 2159 0.098180991 1 1 0 






















     0 0  
Sofala 0.143947664 22170 3788 0.170861525 0.102862711 0.134708393 -0.00201613 
Manica 0.273117541 15493 2096 0.135286904 0.174745975 0.209246088 -0.00133554 
Nampula 0.310440552 31716 4740 0.149451381 0.321899504 0.377809388 -0.0004419 
Zambezia 0.385160524 24075 3648 0.15152648 0.433600891 0.507539118 -0.00376125 
Tete 0.40634992 12395 1649 0.133037515 0.491110286 0.566180654 -0.00322655 
Niassa 0.472281087 13448 1838 0.136674598 0.553505312 0.631543385 0.000479006 
Cabo 
Delgado 0.580203181 9624 1457 0.151392352 0.598158029 0.683357041 -0.02522211 
Inhambane 0.593574963 16764 1313 0.078322596 0.675938384 0.730049787 -0.01327806 
Maputo 
Province 0.781222687 10974 994 0.090577729 0.72685473 0.765398293 -0.01766412 
Maputo 
Cidade 0.789194756 36236 4295 0.118528535 0.894979817 0.918136558 -0.02315674 
Gaza 0.815359129 22635 2302 0.101700906 1 1 0 



























     0 0  
Sofala 0.143947664 20903 3465 0.16576568 0.090765009 0.119158155 -0.00296684 
Manica 0.273117541 16086 1716 0.106676613 0.16061364 0.178169813 -0.00033725 
Nampula 0.310440552 38710 5361 0.138491346 0.328700206 0.362529661 0.002910622 
Zambezia 0.385160524 26443 3940 0.148999735 0.443521003 0.498022628 -0.00118669 
Tete 0.40634992 14147 1928 0.136283311 0.504950108 0.56432477 -0.00373802 
Niassa 0.472281087 15337 1949 0.127078307 0.571546431 0.631349084 0.002152975 
Cabo 
Delgado 0.580203181 11618 1730 0.148906869 0.621994112 0.690842189 -0.02410867 
Inhambane 0.593574963 16900 1243 0.073550296 0.695377294 0.733587813 -0.01254124 
Maputo 
Province 0.781222687 12653 1161 0.091756896 0.750319152 0.773513532 -0.00552165 
Maputo 
Cidade 0.789194756 35008 4343 0.124057358 0.902330893 0.922865298 -0.0205344 
Gaza 0.815359129 22493 2243 0.099719913 1 1 0 






















     0 0  
Sofala 0.143947664 17931 2382 0.132842563 0.07303126 0.080402349 -0.00141873 
Manica 0.273117541 18763 1917 0.102169163 0.149451176 0.145109026 0.003934122 
Nampula 0.310440552 39674 5428 0.136815043 0.311039609 0.32832647 0.007169423 
Zambezia 0.385160524 30220 4532 0.149966909 0.434122798 0.481300209 -0.00018378 
Tete 0.40634992 16255 2162 0.133005229 0.500327869 0.554276649 -0.00166888 
Niassa 0.472281087 16853 2154 0.127811072 0.568968537 0.626983055 0.001475449 
Cabo 
Delgado 0.580203181 13185 1830 0.138794084 0.622669789 0.688753122 -0.02734915 
Inhambane 0.593574963 18890 1220 0.064584436 0.699606965 0.729933167 -0.00833613 
Maputo 
Province 0.781222687 12447 1214 0.097533542 0.750302413 0.770910687 -0.00733671 
Maputo 
Cidade 0.789194756 37609 4373 0.11627536 0.903480297 0.918517518 -0.01503722 
Gaza 0.815359129 23698 2414 0.101865136 1 1 0 




























     0 0  
Sofala 0.143947664 23443 3224 0.137525061 0.089664642 0.100326747 -0.00233064 
Manica 0.273117541 20202 1943 0.096178596 0.166933127 0.160790415 0.003099606 
Nampula 0.310440552 39306 5250 0.133567394 0.317270474 0.324163684 0.010915178 
Zambezia 0.385160524 33305 5288 0.158774959 0.444655233 0.488719465 -0.00329235 
Tete 0.40634992 17499 2126 0.121492657 0.511585301 0.554877859 0.005526809 
Niassa 0.472281087 19202 2907 0.15139048 0.585028992 0.645339972 0.005117121 
Cabo 
Delgado 0.580203181 12870 2026 0.157420357 0.634254089 0.708386494 -0.02506508 
Inhambane 0.593574963 19974 1472 0.073695805 0.710650521 0.754193247 -0.01259816 
Maputo 
Province 0.781222687 11796 969 0.08214649 0.755767789 0.784347285 -0.01111716 
Maputo 
Cidade 0.789194756 37808 4350 0.115055015 0.900375595 0.919713708 -0.01933811 
Gaza 0.815359129 26047 2580 0.099051714 1 1 0 























     0 0  
Sofala 0.196223334 26325 4054 0.153998101 0.094260578 0.118822909 0.00030863 
Zambezia 0.260544499 36840 5785 0.157030402 0.226171678 0.2883815 -0.00897043 
Manica 0.31944942 21848 2050 0.093830099 0.304401691 0.348467085 -0.00080634 
Tete 0.372221554 20582 2788 0.135458167 0.378098604 0.430183481 -0.00854493 
Nampula 0.39229275 39916 4777 0.11967632 0.521023779 0.57019755 -0.00567462 
Niassa 0.411910265 17881 2019 0.112913148 0.585049359 0.629374524 -0.021766 
Inhambane 0.621147898 21544 1562 0.072502785 0.662190856 0.675156809 0.007114803 
Cabo 
Delgado 0.623147857 13138 2003 0.152458517 0.709233419 0.733864822 -0.00391148 
Maputo 
Cidade 0.826599023 41241 5025 0.121844766 0.856902954 0.881147781 -0.01293894 
Maputo 
Province 0.847783853 13558 1188 0.087623543 0.905449389 0.915968111 -0.01051872 
Gaza 0.874324018 26406 2867 0.108573809 1 1 0 




























     0 0  
Sofala 0.196223334 27820 4265 0.153306973 0.091373993 0.114761597 0.000435176 
Zambezia 0.260544499 43364 6825 0.157388617 0.233801808 0.298407061 -0.00838396 
Manica 0.31944942 20018 1786 0.089219702 0.299550356 0.34646432 -0.0041401 
Tete 0.372221554 25015 3018 0.120647611 0.381711407 0.427671941 -0.00246905 
Nampula 0.39229275 49549 6536 0.131909827 0.544453677 0.603541061 -0.00388249 
Niassa 0.411910265 20198 2468 0.122190316 0.61079343 0.669949413 -0.02392124 
Inhambane 0.621147898 22127 1507 0.068106838 0.683468927 0.710499408 0.003304505 
Cabo 
Delgado 0.623147857 15630 2163 0.138387716 0.734805214 0.768700893 -0.00625435 
Maputo 
Cidade 0.826599023 41868 5030 0.120139486 0.872319461 0.904046927 -0.01022619 
Maputo 
Province 0.847783853 13831 1314 0.095003977 0.917746984 0.939403724 -0.02165674 
Gaza 0.874324018 25043 2252 0.089925328 1 1 0 























     0 0  
Sofala 0.196223334 27846 4093 0.146987 0.087039422 0.104717802 0.000709087 
Zambezia 0.260544499 41926 6481 0.154581882 0.218089296 0.270531648 -0.00764281 
Manica 0.31944942 25211 2451 0.097219468 0.296892387 0.333239523 -0.00433689 
Tete 0.372221554 25450 2919 0.114695481 0.37644253 0.407920995 0.003009487 
Nampula 0.39229275 52954 7323 0.138289836 0.541963091 0.595277081 -0.00458484 
Niassa 0.411910265 21437 2546 0.118766618 0.60896963 0.660415494 -0.02418585 
Inhambane 0.621147898 23898 1614 0.067537032 0.683668621 0.701709052 0.006623662 
Cabo 
Delgado 0.623147857 16877 2495 0.147834331 0.736421775 0.76554265 -0.00151594 
Maputo 
Cidade 0.826599023 40026 5003 0.124993754 0.861532739 0.893542445 -0.01280869 
Maputo 
Province 0.847783853 16124 1462 0.09067229 0.911932209 0.930947142 -0.01901493 
Gaza 0.874324018 28175 2699 0.095794144 1 1 0 



























     0 0  
Sofala 0.196223334 32050 4772 0.148892356 0.092415845 0.11909159 -0.00122007 
Zambezia 0.260544499 47034 6474 0.137645108 0.228037901 0.280658847 -0.00715554 
Manica 0.31944942 27871 2706 0.097090165 0.308403642 0.348190666 -0.00483558 
Tete 0.372221554 28573 3099 0.108459035 0.390793594 0.425530322 -0.00156423 
Nampula 0.39229275 53766 6604 0.122828553 0.545827302 0.590341902 -0.00381816 
Niassa 0.411910265 23233 2623 0.112899755 0.612819419 0.655802346 -0.02227042 
Inhambane 0.621147898 25429 1688 0.066380904 0.686143679 0.697928625 0.011013834 
Cabo 
Delgado 0.623147857 17637 2716 0.153994443 0.736999787 0.765710007 -0.00343449 
Maputo 
Cidade 0.826599023 43624 5050 0.115761966 0.862789142 0.891739456 -0.0141357 
Maputo 
Province 0.847783853 18678 1574 0.084270264 0.916646963 0.931020714 -0.01437375 
Gaza 0.874324018 28907 2764 0.095616979 1 1 0 























     0 0  
Sofala 0.196223334 31079 4369 0.140577239 0.083822629 0.10947954 -0.00227558 
Zambezia 0.260544499 54535 6583 0.12071147 0.230908027 0.274438069 -0.00531163 
Manica 0.31944942 29119 2807 0.096397541 0.309444374 0.344776606 -0.00648054 
Tete 0.372221554 29809 2739 0.091885001 0.389841708 0.413411181 0.008321247 
Nampula 0.39229275 61654 7889 0.127956013 0.556127637 0.611095798 -0.00863665 
Niassa 0.411910265 27232 2601 0.095512632 0.629574589 0.676272333 -0.0212516 
Inhambane 0.621147898 24954 1538 0.061633405 0.696877588 0.714811938 0.009710364 
Cabo 
Delgado 0.623147857 20008 2765 0.138194722 0.750840815 0.784098028 -0.00232256 
Maputo 
Cidade 0.826599023 43883 4809 0.109586856 0.86919689 0.904603202 -0.01603303 
Maputo 
Province 0.847783853 19266 1422 0.073808782 0.921158882 0.940236049 -0.01907717 
Gaza 0.874324018 29232 2385 0.08158867 1 1 0 




























     0 0  
Sofala 0.2560518 35175 4669 0.132736318 0.08876994 0.116879866 -0.00299587 
Zambezia 0.363148466 56798 6191 0.109000317 0.232109103 0.271860215 -0.00760402 
Manica 0.459000902 31883 2456 0.077031647 0.312571136 0.333341678 0.004525196 
Nampula 0.483064973 67915 7880 0.116027387 0.48396589 0.530603049 -0.00694661 
Niassa 0.663506596 31724 2933 0.092453663 0.56402666 0.604025334 -0.01032396 
Tete 0.740098501 31837 2706 0.084995446 0.644372604 0.671765089 0.010989026 
Cabo 
Delgado 0.755719003 23566 3158 0.13400662 0.703845309 0.750819836 -0.02333691 
Inhambane 0.771984417 25725 1442 0.056054422 0.768766609 0.786917666 0.004811848 
Maputo 
Cidade 0.819233172 41359 4518 0.109238618 0.873142898 0.900017523 -0.01122417 
Maputo 
Province 0.857565205 19540 1517 0.077635619 0.922455325 0.937992841 -0.01553752 
Gaza 0.940233047 30727 2477 0.080613142 1 1 0 
       -0.05764298 
 
















    0 0  
Sofala 0.143947664 632 54.2 0.150190114 0.296641411 -0.012058744 
Manica 0.273117541 307 24 0.223146388 0.360447927 -0.018687157 
Nampula 0.310440552 675 30 0.383555133 0.535811927 0.022388679 
Zambezia 0.385160524 632 49 0.533745247 0.803993276 -0.024345026 
Tete 0.40634992 197 14.6 0.580560837 0.828901026 -0.010037091 
Niassa 0.472281087 230 30.5 0.635218631 0.88965058 -0.023113423 
Cabo Delgado 0.580203181 233 20.4 0.690589354 0.930813057 -0.066491089 
Inhambane 0.593574963 372 7.1 0.778992395 0.953685718 -0.048647584 
Maputo 
Province 0.781222687 247 4.4 0.837690114 0.963097353 -0.044618237 
Maputo 
Cidade 0.789194756 204 1.4 0.886169202 0.965570634 -0.079401433 
Gaza 0.815359129 479 8.3 1 1 0 























    0 0  
Sofala 0.196223334 418 18.7 0.073526825 0.094193721 0.017627626 
Zambezia 0.260544499 865 41.7 0.225681618 0.528860278 -0.030793931 
Manica 0.31944942 451 9.1 0.305013193 0.578316621 -0.031275495 
Tete 0.372221554 557 12.4 0.402990325 0.661546823 -0.068667268 
Nampula 0.39229275 1192 12.1 0.612664908 0.835353193 -0.006833185 
Niassa 0.411910265 272 16.5 0.660510114 0.889435713 -0.045581116 
Inhambane 0.621147898 442 6.7 0.738258575 0.925121981 -0.040740177 
Cabo Delgado 0.623147857 533 9.7 0.832014072 0.987424127 -0.049668326 
Maputo 
Cidade 0.826599023 291 0.3 0.883201407 0.988476133 -0.061656753 
Maputo 
Province 0.847783853 359 0.2 0.946350044 0.989341357 -0.042991313 
Gaza 0.874324018 305 2.9 1 1 0 
      -0.360579939 
 

















    0 0  
Sofala 0.143947664 125 27.3 0.100482315 0.139367059 -0.00385585 
Manica 0.273117541 81 15.7 0.165594855 0.191303496 -0.006200548 
Nampula 0.310440552 202 18.2 0.327974277 0.341448274 0.083883648 
Zambezia 0.385160524 208 50.6 0.495176849 0.77128283 -0.029313126 
Tete 0.40634992 60 6.5 0.54340836 0.787210494 -0.016488724 
Niassa 0.472281087 70 17.9 0.599678457 0.83838322 0.003968141 
Cabo Delgado 0.580203181 71 29.8 0.656752412 0.924792838 -0.072270672 
Inhambane 0.593574963 127 6.5 0.758842444 0.958506394 -0.046074993 
Maputo 
Province 0.781222687 76 5.3 0.819935691 0.974956812 -0.044612626 
Maputo 
Cidade 0.789194756 60 1.2 0.868167203 0.977897303 -0.109730101 
Gaza 0.815359129 164 3.3 1 1 0 
























    0 0  
Sofala 0.196223334 138 10.6 0.071354705 0.086542899 0.011459745 
Zambezia 0.260544499 277 20.4 0.214581179 0.420858329 -0.024597747 
Manica 0.31944942 157 4.8 0.295760083 0.465443186 -0.013621715 
Tete 0.372221554 202 9.9 0.400206825 0.583756345 -0.023822932 
Nampula 0.39229275 411 10.3 0.612719752 0.834208938 0.014140375 
Niassa 0.411910265 78 16.9 0.653050672 0.91219694 -0.064222957 
Inhambane 0.621147898 147 0.9 0.729058945 0.920024138 -0.030826695 
Cabo Delgado 0.623147857 169 6.8 0.816442606 0.988013678 -0.052615704 
Maputo 
Cidade 0.826599023 106 0.3 0.871251293 0.989895046 -0.065003449 
Maputo 
Province 0.847783853 127 0 0.936918304 0.989895046 -0.052976742 
Gaza 0.874324018 122 1.4 1 1 0 
      -0.302087821 
 
Scatter plot for Figure 8: Population : Health Units Ratio  32, 33 










0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1














































    0 0  
Sofala 0.143947664 1368671 121 0.08513908 0.11480076 -0.00136479 
Manica 0.273117541 1039463 75 0.14979956 0.18595825 -0.01312341 
Nampula 0.310440552 3063456 157 0.34036386 0.33491461 -0.01090342 
Zambezia 0.385160524 3096400 166 0.53297746 0.49240987 0.004922923 
Tete 0.40634992 1226008 84 0.60924209 0.57210626 0.033073395 
Niassa 0.472281087 808572 107 0.65953985 0.67362429 -0.00527199 
Cabo Delgado 0.580203181 1380202 84 0.74539622 0.75332068 -0.00047875 
Inhambane 0.593574963 1157182 76 0.81737949 0.82542694 0.004641654 
Maputo 
Province 0.781222687 830908 61 0.86906667 0.88330171 -0.0229513 
Maputo Cidade 0.789194756 987943 38 0.93052231 0.91935484 0.011167475 
Gaza 0.815359129 1116903 85 1 1 0 
















    0 0  
Sofala 0.143947664 1398561 130 0.0850119 0.11638317 -0.00064422 
Manica 0.273117541 1070057 91 0.1500556 0.19785139 -0.01588108 
Nampula 0.310440552 3130088 162 0.34031884 0.34288272 -0.01540283 
Zambezia 0.385160524 3165614 166 0.53274153 0.49149508 0.003420947 
Tete 0.40634992 1258411 86 0.60923438 0.56848702 0.032433808 
Niassa 0.472281087 829192 112 0.65963703 0.6687556 -0.00699624 
Cabo Delgado 0.580203181 1406931 85 0.74515771 0.74485228 -0.00016793 
Inhambane 0.593574963 1182445 80 0.81703294 0.81647269 0.006524685 
Maputo 
Province 0.781222687 855996 67 0.86906489 0.87645479 -0.02390425 
Maputo Cidade 0.789194756 1018246 39 0.93095924 0.91136974 0.019589503 
Gaza 0.815359129 1135814 99 1 1 0 




















    0 0  
Sofala 0.196223334 1461812 163 0.08478861 0.13360656 -0.01356482 
Zambezia 0.260544499 3310874 174 0.27682726 0.27622951 -0.00049219 
Manica 0.31944942 1135377 78 0.34268185 0.34016393 -0.00059941 
Tete 0.372221554 1325883 91 0.41958625 0.4147541 -0.01405117 
Nampula 0.39229275 3271796 188 0.60935828 0.56885246 0.027626096 
Niassa 0.411910265 873303 113 0.66001195 0.66147541 -0.0014114 
Inhambane 0.621147898 1235323 85 0.73166366 0.73114754 -0.00865391 
Cabo Delgado 0.623147857 1462670 89 0.81650203 0.80409836 -0.02549844 
Maputo Cidade 0.826599023 1077650 37 0.87900832 0.83442623 0.022337216 
Maputo 
Province 0.847783853 908054 92 0.93167764 0.90983607 0.02184157 
Gaza 0.874324018 1177923 110 1 1 0 
















    0 0  
Sofala 0.196223334 1495009 157 0.08468752 0.13116124 -0.0127825 
Zambezia 0.260544499 3386832 175 0.27654081 0.27736007 -0.00059295 
Manica 0.31944942 1169974 77 0.34281613 0.34168755 0.000291941 
Tete 0.372221554 1361002 93 0.41991257 0.41938179 -0.01355225 
Nampula 0.39229275 3346576 188 0.60948549 0.5764411 0.028257526 
Niassa 0.411910265 896672 113 0.66027911 0.67084378 -0.00110564 
Inhambane 0.621147898 1262925 85 0.73181981 0.74185464 -0.00827709 
Cabo Delgado 0.623147857 1491771 89 0.81632391 0.81620718 -0.02593244 
Maputo Cidade 0.826599023 1106627 37 0.87901081 0.84711779 0.022694428 
Maputo 
Province 0.847783853 934956 92 0.93197311 0.92397661 0.007996499 
Gaza 0.874324018 1200895 91 1 1 0 




















    0 0  
Sofala 0.196223334 1529187 146 0.0845903 0.11850649 -0.01117829 
Zambezia 0.260544499 3464805 168 0.2762535 0.25487013 0.000264214 
Manica 0.31944942 1205901 77 0.34296053 0.31737013 0.003031185 
Tete 0.372221554 1397136 99 0.42024614 0.39772727 -0.0108636 
Nampula 0.39229275 3424057 189 0.60965528 0.55113636 0.033283912 
Niassa 0.411910265 920957 124 0.66060001 0.65178571 0.00438138 
Inhambane 0.621147898 1291300 95 0.73203107 0.7288961 -0.00491067 
Cabo Delgado 0.623147857 1521755 95 0.81621025 0.80600649 -0.02410397 
Maputo Cidade 0.826599023 1134982 40 0.87899425 0.83847403 0.011727749 
Maputo 
Province 0.847783853 962363 79 0.93222944 0.9025974 0.02963204 
Gaza 0.874324018 1225127 120 1 1 0 
















    0 0  
Sofala 0.196223334 1564367 146 0.08449723 0.11850649 -0.01116816 
Zambezia 0.260544499 3544853 168 0.27596781 0.25487013 0.000134552 
Manica 0.31944942 1243124 77 0.34311352 0.31737013 0.002982131 
Tete 0.372221554 1434431 99 0.42059243 0.39772727 -0.01076339 
Nampula 0.39229275 3504496 189 0.60988318 0.55113636 0.033216083 
Niassa 0.411910265 946231 124 0.6609926 0.65178571 0.004482388 
Inhambane 0.621147898 1320453 95 0.73231514 0.7288961 -0.00466256 
Cabo Delgado 0.623147857 1552733 95 0.81618397 0.80600649 -0.02410979 
Maputo Cidade 0.826599023 1162486 40 0.87897412 0.83847403 0.011527195 
Maputo 
Province 0.847783853 989987 79 0.93244697 0.9025974 0.02984957 
Gaza 0.874324018 1250665 120 1 1 0 





















    0 0  
Sofala 0.2560518 1600581 140 0.08441214 0.11372868 -0.01112406 
Zambezia 0.363148466 3626739 155 0.27568068 0.23964257 0.002170018 
Manica 0.459000902 1281317 82 0.34325533 0.30625508 -0.00553447 
Nampula 0.483064973 3588348 188 0.53249919 0.45897644 0.030966981 
Niassa 0.663506596 972391 126 0.58378157 0.56133225 0.003350805 
Tete 0.740098501 1472728 99 0.66145094 0.64175467 -0.00258429 
Cabo Delgado 0.755719003 1584584 95 0.74501942 0.7189277 0.012348035 
Inhambane 0.771984417 1350372 105 0.81623593 0.80422421 -0.02260605 
Maputo Cidade 0.819233172 1189594 42 0.87897325 0.83834281 0.011420049 
Maputo 
Province 0.857565205 1017542 79 0.93263683 0.90251828 0.03011855 
Gaza 0.940233047 1277307 120 1 1 0 
      0.048525573 
 
Scatter plot for Figure 10: Population : Total Health Workers Ratio32, 33 
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Scatter plot for Figure 11: Total Health Workers Ratio 30, 32, 33 
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    0 0  
Sofala 0.143947664 1368671 847 0.08513908 0.11 -0.00210382 
Manica 0.273117541 1039463 453 0.14979956 0.16883117 -0.01174598 
Nampula 0.310440552 3063456 1050 0.34036386 0.30519481 -0.02333379 
Zambezia 0.385160524 3096400 802 0.53297746 0.40935065 0.004428216 
Tete 0.40634992 1226008 515 0.60924209 0.47623377 0.005163536 
Niassa 0.472281087 808572 368 0.65953985 0.52402597 0.000834201 
Cabo Delgado 0.580203181 1380202 535 0.74539622 0.59350649 0.018651645 
Inhambane 0.593574963 1157182 634 0.81737949 0.67584416 0.003494973 
Maputo 
Province 0.781222687 830908 362 0.86906667 0.72285714 0.130856937 
Maputo Cidade 0.789194756 987943 1553 0.93052231 0.92454545 0.005976859 
Gaza 0.815359129 1116903 581 1 1 0 


















    0 0  
Sofala 0.143947664 1398561 977 0.0850119 0.11503591 -0.00194703 
Manica 0.273117541 1070057 553 0.1500556 0.18014836 -0.01252612 
Nampula 0.310440552 3130088 1231 0.34031884 0.32509125 -0.02312555 
Zambezia 0.385160524 3165614 984 0.53274153 0.44095137 0.002087566 
Tete 0.40634992 1258411 571 0.60923438 0.50818321 0.00078422 
Niassa 0.472281087 829192 368 0.65963703 0.55151301 -0.00305016 
Cabo Delgado 0.580203181 1406931 568 0.74515771 0.61839162 0.013547688 
Inhambane 0.593574963 1182445 661 0.81703294 0.69622042 0.003409005 
Maputo 
Province 0.781222687 855996 412 0.86906489 0.74473095 0.112819496 
Maputo Cidade 0.789194756 1018246 1553 0.93095924 0.92758742 0.003371818 
Gaza 0.815359129 1135814 615 1 1 0 













    0 0  
Sofala 0.196223334 1429640 969 0.08489608 0.09956843 -0.00795634 
Zambezia 0.260544499 3237079 1282 0.27712302 0.23129881 -0.00027293 
Manica 0.31944942 1102069 522 0.34256701 0.28493629 -0.00108785 
Tete 0.372221554 1291694 590 0.41927147 0.34556104 -0.01671657 
Nampula 0.39229275 3199618 1136 0.60927387 0.46228935 0.006130597 
Niassa 0.411910265 850809 471 0.65979732 0.5106864 0.005113988 
Inhambane 0.621147898 1208493 616 0.73156106 0.57398274 -0.00115744 
Cabo Delgado 0.623147857 1434391 635 0.81673927 0.6392314 0.164313586 
Maputo Cidade 0.826599023 1048155 2432 0.87898169 0.88912865 -0.00157488 
Maputo 
Province 0.847783853 881714 498 0.93134037 0.94030004 -0.00895967 
Gaza 0.874324018 1156220 581 1 1 0 






















    0 0  
Sofala 0.196223334 1461812 1027 0.08478861 0.10398947 -0.00896362 
Zambezia 0.260544499 3310874 1282 0.27682726 0.23379911 -0.00040053 
Manica 0.31944942 1135377 535 0.34268185 0.28797084 -0.00240281 
Tete 0.372221554 1325883 569 0.41958625 0.34558526 -0.01498225 
Nampula 0.39229275 3271796 1191 0.60935828 0.46618064 0.011185557 
Niassa 0.411910265 873303 564 0.66001195 0.52328878 0.009420048 
Inhambane 0.621147898 1235323 702 0.73166366 0.59437019 -0.0088637 
Cabo Delgado 0.623147857 1462670 561 0.81650203 0.65117456 0.15523814 
Maputo Cidade 0.826599023 1077650 2370 0.87900832 0.89115026 -0.00439213 
Maputo 
Province 0.847783853 908054 478 0.93167764 0.93955043 -0.00787279 
Gaza 0.874324018 1177923 597 1 1 0 















    0 0  
Sofala 0.19622333 1495009 1169 0.08468752 0.11185532 -0.01235171 
Zambezia 0.2605445 3386832 1124 0.27654081 0.21940484 -0.00070218 
Manica 0.31944942 1169974 523 0.34281613 0.2694479 0.001827262 
Tete 0.37222155 1361002 689 0.41991257 0.33537461 -0.01572454 
Nampula 0.39229275 3346576 1191 0.60948549 0.44933499 0.010068219 
Niassa 0.41191026 896672 564 0.66027911 0.50330112 0.008344836 
Inhambane 0.6211479 1262925 702 0.73181981 0.57047173 -0.00892379 
Cabo Delgado 0.62314786 1491771 561 0.81632391 0.6241508 0.185907804 
Maputo Cidade 0.82659902 1106627 2881 0.87901081 0.8998182 -0.0074529 
Maputo 
Province 0.84778385 934956 478 0.93197311 0.94555545 -0.01358234 
Gaza 0.87432402 1200895 569 1 1 0 




















    0 0  
Sofala 0.19622333 1529187 2593 0.0845903 0.14496562 -0.0184114 
Zambezia 0.2605445 3464805 1982 0.2762535 0.25577235 -0.00123133 
Manica 0.31944942 1205901 1025 0.34296053 0.31307654 -0.00013328 
Tete 0.37222155 1397136 1255 0.42024614 0.38323922 -0.02231078 
Nampula 0.39229275 3424057 2140 0.60965528 0.50287919 0.011498111 
Niassa 0.41191026 920957 1089 0.66060001 0.56376139 -0.00023595 
Inhambane 0.6211479 1291300 1084 0.73203107 0.62436406 -0.01502994 
Cabo Delgado 0.62314786 1521755 917 0.81621025 0.67563035 0.136547888 
Maputo Cidade 0.82659902 1134982 3922 0.87899425 0.89489573 -0.00070981 
Maputo 
Province 0.84778385 962363 955 0.93222944 0.94828647 -0.01605702 
Gaza 0.87432402 1225127 925 1 1 0 















    0 0  
Sofala 0.19622333 1564367 2076 0.08449723 0.11134352 -0.01280357 
Zambezia 0.2605445 3544853 1879 0.27596781 0.21212121 0.002645105 
Manica 0.31944942 1243124 1141 0.34311352 0.27331724 0.006151304 
Tete 0.37222155 1434431 1485 0.42059243 0.35296326 -0.01490691 
Nampula 0.39229275 3504496 2301 0.60988318 0.47637436 0.010227547 
Niassa 0.41191026 946231 1057 0.6609926 0.53306516 0.009024538 
Inhambane 0.6211479 1320453 1327 0.73231514 0.60423706 -0.01018232 
Cabo Delgado 0.62314786 1552733 1031 0.81618397 0.65953339 0.140428945 
Maputo Cidade 0.82659902 1162486 4154 0.87897412 0.8823277 0.005949156 
Maputo 
Province 0.84778385 989987 1127 0.93244697 0.94277286 -0.01032589 
Gaza 0.87432402 1250665 1067 1 1 0 






















    0 0  
Sofala 0.2560518 1600581 2005 0.08441214 0.09956302 -0.01176651 
Zambezia 0.363148466 3626739 1736 0.27568068 0.1857682 0.003285617 
Manica 0.459000902 1281317 1157 0.34325533 0.24322177 -5.7443E-05 
Nampula 0.483064973 3588348 2697 0.53249919 0.37714768 0.015510193 
Niassa 0.663506596 972391 1318 0.58378157 0.44259609 0.01131059 
Tete 0.740098501 1472728 1576 0.66145094 0.52085609 0.000519213 
Cabo Delgado 0.755719003 1584584 1341 0.74501942 0.58744662 0.0115489 
Inhambane 0.771984417 1350372 1443 0.81623593 0.65910219 0.143922033 
Maputo Cidade 0.819233172 1189594 4571 0.87897325 0.88608601 0.001945718 
Maputo 
Province 0.857565205 1017542 1134 0.93263683 0.94239746 -0.00976063 
Gaza 0.940233047 1277307 1160 1 1 0 
      0.166457682 
 
Scatter plot for Figure 13: Skilled Health Workers 32, 33 










0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
































































    0 0  
Sofala 0.143947664 1368671 202 0.08513908 0.097115385 -0.00124486 
Manica 0.273117541 1039463 123 0.14979956 0.15625 -0.01227505 
Nampula 0.310440552 3063456 243 0.34036386 0.273076923 -0.02314376 
Zambezia 0.385160524 3096400 180 0.53297746 0.359615385 0.004603959 
Tete 0.40634992 1226008 125 0.60924209 0.419711538 -0.00382916 
Niassa 0.472281087 808572 59 0.65953985 0.448076923 0.006556018 
Cabo Delgado 0.580203181 1380202 142 0.74539622 0.516346154 0.015152797 
Inhambane 0.593574963 1157182 146 0.81737949 0.586538462 0.006229776 
Maputo 
Province 0.781222687 830908 93 0.86906667 0.63125 0.206048945 
Maputo Cidade 0.789194756 987943 586 0.93052231 0.912980769 0.017541544 
Gaza 0.815359129 1116903 181 1 1 0 



















    0 0  
Sofala 0.143947664 1398561 232 0.11503591 0.098765432 0.000425262 
Manica 0.273117541 1070057 140 0.18014836 0.158365262 0.003197886 
Nampula 0.310440552 3130088 341 0.32509125 0.303533418 -0.00264445 
Zambezia 0.385160524 3165614 235 0.44095137 0.40357599 0.004028159 
Tete 0.40634992 1258411 166 0.50818321 0.474244359 -0.00778484 
Niassa 0.472281087 829192 59 0.55151301 0.49936143 0.002525707 
Cabo Delgado 0.580203181 1406931 153 0.61839162 0.56449553 -0.0026026 
Inhambane 0.593574963 1182445 157 0.69622042 0.631332482 0.003458587 
Maputo 
Province 0.781222687 855996 115 0.74473095 0.680289485 0.056635477 
Maputo Cidade 0.789194756 1018246 571 0.92758742 0.923371648 0.004215777 
Gaza 0.815359129 1135814 180 1 1 0 
      0.061454962 
 
                                                 























    0 0  
Sofala 0.196223334 1429640 231 0.08489608 0.093598055 -0.01080273 
Zambezia 0.260544499 3237079 209 0.27712302 0.17828201 0.003828048 
Manica 0.31944942 1102069 138 0.34256701 0.234197731 -0.00019716 
Tete 0.372221554 1291694 128 0.41927147 0.286061588 -0.00644536 
Nampula 0.39229275 3199618 282 0.60927387 0.400324149 0.015323446 
Niassa 0.411910265 850809 144 0.65979732 0.458670989 0.009323913 
Inhambane 0.621147898 1208493 158 0.73156106 0.522690438 0.004387231 
Cabo Delgado 0.623147857 1434391 165 0.81673927 0.589546191 0.191317115 
Maputo Cidade 0.826599023 1048155 689 0.87898169 0.868719611 0.007581548 
Maputo 
Province 0.847783853 881714 149 0.93134037 0.929092382 0.002247992 
Gaza 0.874324018 1156220 175 1 1 0 



















    0 0  
Sofala 0.196223334 1461812 314 0.08478861 0.127746135 -0.01732275 
Zambezia 0.260544499 3310874 209 0.27682726 0.212774614 0.002768636 
Manica 0.31944942 1135377 149 0.34268185 0.273393002 0.002257165 
Tete 0.372221554 1325883 167 0.41958625 0.341334418 -0.01629627 
Nampula 0.39229275 3271796 284 0.60935828 0.456875509 0.008094007 
Niassa 0.411910265 873303 126 0.66001195 0.508136697 0.008701803 
Inhambane 0.621147898 1235323 168 0.73166366 0.576484947 -0.0069371 
Cabo Delgado 0.623147857 1462670 141 0.81650203 0.633848657 0.152713538 
Maputo Cidade 0.826599023 1077650 579 0.87900832 0.869406021 0.009996328 
Maputo 
Province 0.847783853 908054 156 0.93167764 0.932872254 -0.00119462 
Gaza 0.874324018 1177923 165 1 1 0 
























    0 0  
Sofala 0.196223334 1495009 302 0.08468752 0.101376301 -0.01185906 
Zambezia 0.260544499 3386832 267 0.27654081 0.191003693 -0.0020762 
Manica 0.31944942 1169974 114 0.34281613 0.229271568 0.002577632 
Tete 0.372221554 1361002 176 0.41991257 0.288351796 -0.01463174 
Nampula 0.39229275 3346576 284 0.60948549 0.383685801 0.00629005 
Niassa 0.411910265 896672 126 0.66027911 0.425981873 0.006761245 
Inhambane 0.621147898 1262925 168 0.73181981 0.482376636 -0.0061248 
Cabo Delgado 0.623147857 1491771 141 0.81632391 0.529707956 0.26548275 
Maputo Cidade 0.826599023 1106627 1090 0.87901081 0.895602551 -0.00140239 
Maputo 
Province 0.847783853 934956 156 0.93197311 0.947969117 -0.01599601 
Gaza 0.874324018 1200895 155 1 1 0 



















    0 0  
Sofala 0.196223334 1529187 370 0.0845903 0.111177885 -0.0134292 
Zambezia 0.260544499 3464805 310 0.2762535 0.204326923 0.002722704 
Manica 0.31944942 1205901 197 0.34296053 0.263521635 -0.00058025 
Tete 0.372221554 1397136 192 0.42024614 0.321213942 -0.01967492 
Nampula 0.39229275 3424057 326 0.60965528 0.419170673 0.010886846 
Niassa 0.411910265 920957 176 0.66060001 0.472055288 0.003598139 
Inhambane 0.621147898 1291300 188 0.73203107 0.528545673 -0.01545765 
Cabo Delgado 0.623147857 1521755 132 0.81621025 0.568209135 0.230918275 
Maputo Cidade 0.826599023 1134982 1087 0.87899425 0.894831731 -0.00379248 
Maputo 
Province 0.847783853 962363 166 0.93222944 0.944711538 -0.0124821 
Gaza 0.874324018 1225127 184 1 1 0 

























    0 0  
Sofala 0.196223334 1564367 401 0.08449723 0.109353695 -0.01391002 
Zambezia 0.260544499 3544853 305 0.27596781 0.192527952 0.001822967 
Manica 0.31944942 1243124 196 0.34311352 0.245977638 0.002275405 
Tete 0.372221554 1434431 228 0.42059243 0.308153804 -0.01486065 
Nampula 0.39229275 3504496 379 0.60988318 0.411508045 0.010734542 
Niassa 0.411910265 946231 191 0.6609926 0.463594219 0.007672762 
Inhambane 0.621147898 1320453 226 0.73231514 0.52522498 -0.00810326 
Cabo Delgado 0.623147857 1552733 180 0.81618397 0.574311426 0.22568756 
Maputo Cidade 0.826599023 1162486 1176 0.87897412 0.895009545 -0.00255571 
Maputo 
Province 0.847783853 989987 189 0.93244697 0.946550314 -0.01410334 
Gaza 0.874324018 1250665 196 1 1 0 


















    0 0  
Sofala 0.2560518 1600581 420 0.08441214 0.099384761 -0.0123377 
Zambezia 0.363148466 3626739 334 0.27568068 0.178419309 0.001968778 
Manica 0.459000902 1281317 215 0.34325533 0.229294841 0.005342144 
Nampula 0.483064973 3588348 600 0.53249919 0.371273071 0.00842943 
Niassa 0.663506596 972391 218 0.58378157 0.422858495 -0.00134713 
Tete 0.740098501 1472728 228 0.66145094 0.476810222 -0.00525552 
Cabo Delgado 0.755719003 1584584 221 0.74501942 0.529105537 0.00639251 
Inhambane 0.771984417 1350372 250 0.81623593 0.588263133 0.212059422 
Maputo Cidade 0.819233172 1189594 1289 0.87897325 0.893279697 -0.00737818 
Maputo 
Province 0.857565205 1017542 195 0.93263683 0.939422622 -0.00678579 
Gaza 0.940233047 1277307 256 1 1 0 






Scatter plot for Figure 15: Beds 32, 33 
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    0 0  
Sofala 0.14394766 1368671 1641 0.08513908 0.11471513 -0.0030847 
Manica 0.27311754 1039463 728 0.14979956 0.16560643 -0.0093165 
Nampula 0.31044055 3063456 2124 0.34036386 0.31408598 -0.02861414 
Zambezia 0.38516052 3096400 1340 0.53297746 0.40775952 0.010035337 
Tete 0.40634992 1226008 1104 0.60924209 0.48493534 0.0052511 
Niassa 0.47228109 808572 696 0.65953985 0.53358965 -0.00629962 
Cabo Delgado 0.58020318 1380202 857 0.74539622 0.59349878 0.020849035 
Inhambane 0.59357496 1157182 1220 0.81737949 0.67878364 0.017541 
Maputo 
Province 0.78122269 830908 921 0.86906667 0.74316672 0.097825971 
Maputo Cidade 0.78919476 987943 2362 0.93052231 0.90828382 0.022238497 
Gaza 0.81535913 1116903 1312 1 1 0 


















    0 0  
Sofala 0.14394766 1398561 1676 0.0850119 0.11566598 -0.00175028 
Manica 0.27311754 1070057 984 0.1500556 0.18357488 -0.00971117 
Nampula 0.31044055 3130088 2435 0.34031884 0.35162181 -0.03297051 
Zambezia 0.38516052 3165614 1477 0.53274153 0.45355418 -0.00855292 
Tete 0.40634992 1258411 711 0.60923438 0.5026225 0.004350374 
Niassa 0.47228109 829192 706 0.65963703 0.55134576 -0.01109677 
Cabo Delgado 0.58020318 1406931 792 0.74515771 0.60600414 0.01985114 
Inhambane 0.59357496 1182445 1233 0.81703294 0.69109731 0.016987304 
Maputo 
Province 0.78122269 855996 939 0.86906489 0.75590062 0.09128078 
Maputo Cidade 0.78919476 1018246 2302 0.93095924 0.91476881 0.016190437 
Gaza 0.81535913 1135814 1235 1 1 0 















    0 0  
Sofala 0.19622333 1429640 1786 0.08489608 0.11739188 -0.01381066 
Zambezia 0.2605445 3237079 1569 0.27712302 0.22052057 0.001633885 
Manica 0.31944942 1102069 882 0.34256701 0.27849349 0.00673898 
Tete 0.37222155 1291694 1248 0.41927147 0.3605232 -0.00211241 
Nampula 0.39229275 3199618 2409 0.60927387 0.5188642 0.005422256 
Niassa 0.41191026 850809 790 0.65979732 0.57079006 0.011512974 
Inhambane 0.6211479 1208493 1210 0.73156106 0.65032207 -0.01471359 
Cabo Delgado 0.62314786 1434391 846 0.81673927 0.70592875 0.081519396 
Maputo Cidade 0.82659902 1048155 2337 0.87898169 0.85953727 0.007108389 
Maputo 
Province 0.84778385 881714 902 0.93134037 0.91882477 0.012515607 
Gaza 0.87432402 1156220 1235 1 1 0 




















    0 0  
Sofala 0.19622333 1461812 1906 0.08478861 0.12699893 -0.01552454 
Zambezia 0.2605445 3310874 1569 0.27682726 0.23154318 0.00166617 
Manica 0.31944942 1135377 917 0.34268185 0.29264392 0.006446992 
Tete 0.37222155 1325883 1268 0.41958625 0.3771322 -0.00257002 
Nampula 0.39229275 3271796 2468 0.60935828 0.54157783 -0.00100085 
Niassa 0.41191026 873303 651 0.66001195 0.58495469 0.011299585 
Inhambane 0.6211479 1235323 1210 0.73166366 0.66557836 -0.01327269 
Cabo Delgado 0.62314786 1462670 886 0.81650203 0.72461354 0.068793234 
Maputo Cidade 0.82659902 1077650 2097 0.87900832 0.86433902 0.010233847 
Maputo 
Province 0.84778385 908054 952 0.93167764 0.92777186 0.00390578 
Gaza 0.87432402 1177923 1084 1 1 0 















    0 0  
Sofala 0.19622333 1495009 2001 0.08468752 0.12831858 -0.01550007 
Zambezia 0.2605445 3386832 1679 0.27654081 0.2359882 0.00184533 
Manica 0.31944942 1169974 986 0.34281613 0.29921765 0.005510385 
Tete 0.37222155 1361002 1300 0.41991257 0.38258304 -0.0060695 
Nampula 0.39229275 3346576 2468 0.60948549 0.54084904 -0.0020276 
Niassa 0.41191026 896672 651 0.66027911 0.58259587 0.009554348 
Inhambane 0.6211479 1262925 1210 0.73181981 0.66018982 -0.01420914 
Cabo Delgado 0.62314786 1491771 886 0.81632391 0.71700654 0.064828068 
Maputo Cidade 0.82659902 1106627 2097 0.87901081 0.85148134 0.008510066 
Maputo 
Province 0.84778385 934956 951 0.93197311 0.91246633 0.019506774 
Gaza 0.87432402 1200895 1365 1 1 0 




















    0 0  
Sofala 0.19622333 1529187 2024 0.0845903 0.12271873 -0.01517601 
Zambezia 0.2605445 3464805 1627 0.2762535 0.22136664 0.001514039 
Manica 0.31944942 1205901 972 0.34296053 0.28030073 0.002499774 
Tete 0.37222155 1397136 1162 0.42024614 0.35075487 0.00248796 
Nampula 0.39229275 3424057 2705 0.60965528 0.51476384 -0.0032326 
Niassa 0.41191026 920957 622 0.66060001 0.55247681 0.015849681 
Inhambane 0.6211479 1291300 1381 0.73203107 0.6362093 -0.01001453 
Cabo Delgado 0.62314786 1521755 981 0.81621025 0.69568908 0.080784895 
Maputo Cidade 0.82659902 1134982 2515 0.87899425 0.84817801 0.010060684 
Maputo 
Province 0.84778385 962363 1036 0.93222944 0.91099254 0.0212369 
Gaza 0.87432402 1225127 1468 1 1 0 















    0 0  
Sofala 0.19622333 1564367 2024 0.08449723 0.12271873 -0.01516155 
Zambezia 0.2605445 3544853 1627 0.27596781 0.22136664 0.001400092 
Manica 0.31944942 1243124 972 0.34311352 0.28030073 0.002456371 
Tete 0.37222155 1434431 1162 0.42059243 0.35075487 0.002586281 
Nampula 0.39229275 3504496 2705 0.60988318 0.51476384 -0.00330878 
Niassa 0.41191026 946231 622 0.6609926 0.55247681 0.015942512 
Inhambane 0.6211479 1320453 1381 0.73231514 0.6362093 -0.00980019 
Cabo Delgado 0.62314786 1552733 981 0.81618397 0.69568908 0.080776599 
Maputo Cidade 0.82659902 1162486 2515 0.87897412 0.84817801 0.00985785 
Maputo 
Province 0.84778385 989987 1036 0.93244697 0.91099254 0.02145443 
Gaza 0.87432402 1250665 1468 1 1 0 




















    0 0  
Sofala 0.2560518 1600581 2039 0.08441214 0.11944233 -0.01463724 
Zambezia 0.36314847 3626739 1660 0.27568068 0.21668326 0.00560863 
Manica 0.4590009 1281317 1254 0.34325533 0.29014118 -0.00011447 
Nampula 0.48306497 3588348 2725 0.53249919 0.44976861 -0.00238411 
Niassa 0.6635066 972391 663 0.58378157 0.48860641 0.004796833 
Tete 0.7400985 1472728 1250 0.66145094 0.56183 -0.00735179 
Cabo Delgado 0.755719 1584584 1022 0.74501942 0.62169762 0.017086083 
Inhambane 0.77198442 1350372 1406 0.81623593 0.70405952 0.071587327 
Maputo Cidade 0.81923317 1189594 2421 0.87897325 0.84587898 0.007949991 
Maputo 
Province 0.8575652 1017542 1036 0.93263683 0.90656669 0.026070135 
Gaza 0.94023305 1277307 1595 1 1 0 
      0.108611387 
 
Scatter plot for Figure 17: Budget Allocation 32, 33 
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Sustainability in development has been defined as “meet[ing] the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”1 
Economists have interpreted this as an average quality of life (i.e. utility derived from 
consumption) that is non-declining, and therefore dependent upon a non-decreasing total 
resource stock. 2 This has obvious implications for the management of exhaustible resources.  
J.M. Hartwick proposed that “the investment of current exhaustible resource returns 
in reproducible capital implies per capita consumption constant.”3 In other words, Hartwick’s 
rule states that as long as the rents from exhaustible resources are invested in other forms of 
capital, net investments are zero and the resulting intertemporal allocation will fit the 
sustainability criterion. Apart from the very real challenges to this framework’s assumptions 
about substitutability,4 the implicit assumption in this argument is that the only possible 
impact of depleting natural capital on other forms of capital is enhancing (or neutral), and 
this relationship only takes place once the resource rents have been mobilized and are being 
invested. This overlooks the possibility that the very act of extracting exhaustible resources 
may be amplified by a concurrent loss of other types of capital. This suggests that adhering to 
Hartwick’s sustainable result—maintaining a non-decreasing total capital stock—is a more 
elusive goal than already thought.  
Various public health studies and conflict assessments have demonstrated the 
potential for resource extraction to result in negative impacts on human capital (in terms of 




the sustainability of countries’ natural resource use and development. Currently, the 
Hartwick result is preserved in principle—that utility should be non-declining—but the 
mechanisms for achieving this—unquestioningly extracting natural resources and investing 
the rents in other forms of capital after the fact—are inadequate for achieving this definition 
of sustainability and should be reconsidered. 
 
The Hartwick Rule and its Applications 
Hartwick’s rule emphasizes sustainability through “the value of depleted natural 
capital measured at competitive prices equal[ing] the reinvestment in manmade capital,” or 
“The depletion of natural capital at any time correspond[ing] in market value to the 
accumulation of manmade capital.”2 (emphasis added) It is therefore presumed that non-
natural resources can only benefit from extraction, through investment. But what if 
depleting natural capital simultaneously depletes other forms of capital? Without investment 
in some alternative store of value there is no possibility of a zero net effect and sustainable 
industry. What if the depletion of natural capital less than compensates for any immediate 
degradation of manmade capital?  
In considering different approaches to sustainable resource management, it is useful 
to employ Geir B. Asheim’s distinction between Hartwick’s result—of a non-decreasing total 
capital stock—and Hartwick’s restrictive prescription proposed to achieve this—investment 
of revenue from depletion of natural capital being sufficient to ensure accumulation of other 




management policies, but current accounting mechanisms have limited themselves to the 
construct of Hartwick’s prescription, thereby overestimating the current sustainability of 
countries’ policies. 
In discussing the components of Hartwick’s rule, I adopt Asheim’s use of the term 
“natural capital” to refer to the exhaustible resources whose depletion we are concerned 
about in terms of intergenerational equity, and to identify it as a component of a total 
available capital stock upon which consumption and by extension, utility, are based: “Human 
economic activity leads to the depletion of natural resources and the degradation of 
environmental resources. Sustainable development requires that manmade capital (both real 
and human) be accumulated in order to make up for the decreased availability of natural 
capital…The present generation must leave behind a bequest of manmade and natural capital 
that will benefit all later generations.”2 In this context, the total capital stock “includes 
everything that influences the situation in which people live…captur[ing] the importance of 
health, culture, and nature,” and “The quality of life does not exceed the sustainable level if 
and only if the stock of the aggregate capital good is not reduced.”2  Here Asheim emphasizes 
the importance of Hartwick’s result as the key to sustainability. He also notes the potential 
for a vicious cycle between depletion of natural capital and investments in “manmade” 
capital: “accumulation of manmade capital without leading to future depletion and 
degradation of natural capital.”2 Another vicious cycle the literature does not address is one 
where depletion and degradation of natural capital itself leads to future depletion and 




countries’ genuine investment only consider the potential of exhaustible resources to deplete 
resource stocks, assuming that other forms of capital can only grow. 
Kenneth Arrow et al. assess the sustainability of different countries’ consumption 
paths by examining the “genuine investment” in the different societies’ “productive bases”, 
which “can be expressed as the sum of the values of investments or disinvestments in each of 
society’s capital assets… The assets to be included are manufactured capital, human capital, 
natural capital and the knowledge base.”5 While this concept accommodates the notion of 
depletion in components of the capital stock other than the natural, in their analyses they 
only consider depletion in natural capital (in terms of damage from CO2 emissions, energy 
depletion, mineral depletion and net forest depletion). Despite this limited focus inspired by 
Hartwick’s prescription, the article concludes that “several nations of the globe are failing to 
meet a sustainability criterion: their investments in human and manufactured capital are not 
sufficient to offset the depletion of natural capital.”5 Once depletion of human capital is 
accounted for and social capital understood to be an asset of the “productive base,” the results 
may prompt even greater concern about the sustainability of current exhaustible resource 
management. 
Current attempts by economists to better capture harmful effects of extracting non-
renewable resources on aggregate notions of capital only take into account the natural 
environment. This should go a step further to capture the immediate and very real effects of 
extractive industries on human and social capital in order to better assess whether a country 





Apart from manufacturing capital assets, the literature considers investments in 
human capital as  the principal means of achieving Hartwick’s result.5 According to the 
United Nations Development Programme’s Human Development Index, education and 
health are the primary components of human capital.6  
Education contributes to the “knowledge base” of total capital stock, but an 
individual’s pursuit of it is dependent upon the individual’s perception of benefit from 
education outweighing the individual’s opportunity cost. In countries characterized by 
conflict involving exhaustible resources – as with Sierra Leone and its diamonds – often “the 
value of education itself was deprecated in favor of the quick acquisition of wealth.”7 This de-
prioritization of education is a direct result of the presence of extractive industries; it 
presents an impediment to the achievement of Hartwick’s result, but is not explained by the 
education expenditure measures currently used to describe human capital investment. 
While health is a component of human capital, it is often neglected in sustainability 
assessments. This is particularly relevant when considering exhaustible resources, which 
typically involve mining. There are countless studies that establish the health risks associated 
with these industries, especially in developing countries. The established risks of mining 
include environmental factors such as air and water contamination, but also social factors 
like overcrowding and migration.  
Environmental contamination from extractive industries can have several deleterious 




area in Botswana, inhalation of mineral dust particles was found to pose a health hazard that 
could lead to silicosis (which can lead to the onset of TB) and related illnesses.8 
Environmental factors resulting from nickel and copper mining and smelting in Botswana 
were also found to “be contributory to the negative health effects occurring at [nearby 
communities].”9 In Nigeria, the oil industry constitutes a risk to human health by threatening 
water supplies, fisheries, agriculture, and hunting because of polluted soils, rivers and 
ponds.10 Although depletion of natural capital is accounted for according to Hartwick’s 
result, his prescription and subsequent accounting methods do not take into consideration 
the accompanying negative effects of environmental contamination on human health. 
The transient communities associated with mining have often been thought to 
contribute to the spread of HIV infection, and the overcrowding migrant workers often have 
to endure can compound risks of acquiring tuberculosis. In China’s Yunnan province, one 
study determined that “miners needed to be viewed as a key population in HIV/STIs 
prevention and control.”11 
A study assessing the impact of South Africa’s migrant mining labor system on HIV 
transmission concluded that this subpopulation, created by the mining industry, “fits the 
description in the epidemiology of STDs of a high-risk core group with multiple partners and 
frequent partner change, and the mobility to be major carriers to urban, suburban and rural 
areas.” 12 Mining in Zambia (primarily of copper) is associated with increased incidence of 
tuberculosis (and its risk factor, silicosis), and is also characterized by a high prevalence of 




Botswana and Zambia), determined that among 34 workforces, the mining sector had the 
highest infection rate.14 The insalubrious effects of extractive industries are well-
documented, and can arguably set back the aggregate capital stock into which a country is 
investing the rents from its natural capital. The negative health effects associated with 
migration in extractive industries are linked to strains on social ties and may therefore be 
acting as proxies for diminished social capital as well.15 
Not only does the exploitation of exhaustible resources have direct negative effects on 
health and education, but the very presence of an active extractive industry has also been 
found to provide less incentive to a country’s elites to develop human capital altogether. If 
elites can capture rents from extracted resources without facing the negative externalities on 
workers, they have no incentive to invest in human capital.16 
 
Social Capital 
Whether social capital is defined as “an input in the production of human capital,”17 
or “can be decomposed into constituents of (a) ‘human capital’ and (b) ‘total factor 
productivity,’”18 continuous degradation of social capital leads to a “decreasing average 
quality of life,”2 making management of the associated resource stock unsustainable.  
Exhaustible resources have multiple, complex effects on systems of social capital. 
They have been found to both initiate conflict and exacerbate already weak systems of social 
capital. 19  Hence, the windfall of resources that come from extractive industries liberate 




dependent on the diversified financial inputs from society than in resource rich countries, 
and so is more likely to be representative and accountable towards it, hence less violently 
conflictual.”16 Outlining the different components of social capital helps to identify the ways 
in which exhaustible resources impact other forms of capital. 
 
Social Capital Theory 
There are three types of social capital. Bonding are the links formed within like 
groups (among homogeneous individuals), bridging relates to links created between different 
groups (among heterogeneous individuals), and linking captures the relationship between 
institutions and the people they serve. Linking best approximates notions of governance. 
Deepa Narayan discusses the societal effects of different combinations of social capital (see 





Figure 20: Social Capital Matrix 20 
 
In places with low bridging and high linking (quadrant 2), groups are systematically 
excluded. In societies with low bridging and low linking (quadrant 3), conflict often erupts 
into violence. Places with high bridging and low linking (quadrant 4) are left to construct 
alternatives to the State’s functions. The cases of Nigeria, Botswana and Chad demonstrate 






The Case of Nigeria’s Oil 
Nigeria is plagued by poor linking social capital because of external systems of 
accountability that override internal ones, and incentive structures exist that actively erode 
multiple forms of social capital, creating complex, multifaceted crises. 
Nigeria's oil curse has made endemic the dynamic of exclusion (depicted in quadrant 
2 above). All aspects of the oil industry—production, distribution and profits—are 
characterized by inequity and the active exclusion of the people of the Niger Delta, where 
the vast majority of the oil extraction takes place. The depletion of the natural capital itself—
and the resulting adverse ecosystem impacts—constitute exclusion of these ethnic minorities: 
“To the oil minorities the denial of direct access to oil revenues and insensitivity to the 
degradation of their environment by the federal government amounts to injustice and 
expropriation.”10 Exclusion also takes place at national levels, where access to political power 
is controlled by an insular ruling elite: “Environmental conflict in the oil-producing areas 
thus becomes a terrain for contesting not just political space and access to resources, but one 
for resisting authoritarian forms of state rule and accumulation.”10  
Conflict pervades most aspects of Nigeria’s oil industry—evidenced by recent violent 
developments with the Movement to Emancipate the Niger Delta—but the country’s civil 
war in 1967 best approximates Narayan’s description of simultaneous low bridging and low 
linking social capital. Nigeria’s ethnic cleavage erupted into pogroms in which tens of 




breakdown of social capital where “control of the oil producing areas had been a decisive, but 
hidden factor in the outbreak of the Nigerian civil war.”10 
In countries without established linking capital, mobilizing extractable resources 
inhibits the development of this form of social capital further. Because of the oil industry, the 
Nigerian government is independent of its people. Nigerians have to become states unto 
themselves (much as Narayan describes coping), providing their own water or electricity 
(despite the presence of delivery infrastructure) in the general absence of state provision of 
these services. 
Where social capital is already weak, incentives exist for the revenues from resource 
extraction to further undermine the development of social capital. This results from less 
internal accountability as the government answers to external multinationals, and active 
marginalization of people living in resource exploitation zones. Nigeria is essentially 
beholden to foreign economic interests, and this sabotages any attempt to construct linking 
social capital with the Nigerian people: “Indeed, at no other point in time has the state been 
so dependent on the oil multinationals to increase oil reserves and provide revenues for 
resolving the economic and political crises in which Nigeria has been immersed.”10 
Nigeria simultaneously suffers from multiple social capital crises as a result of the 
extraction of oil. Ethnic minorities living on oil rich lands are actively excluded, ethnic 
cleavage has been exacerbated by struggles to control this exhaustible resource, and the State 
has become less responsive to its people while trying to consolidate its control over the 




quality of life, but are not captured in standard negative “genuine investment,” thereby 
overestimating the feasibility of achieving Hartwick’s result. 
 
Botswana’s “Sustainable” Diamond Mining 
Botswana is often lauded as “an excellent model for resource-rich economies, escaping 
the ‘resource curse’ through prudent macroeconomic management. It devised its own rule-
of-thumb for reinvestment of mineral revenues to offset depletion, the Sustainable Budget 
Index, which requires that all mineral revenues be reinvested, approximating Hartwick’s 
Rule.”21 While Botswana does invest a large proportion of the revenues from diamond 
mining in other forms of capital, the immediate negative effects of the country’s mining 
industry on health and social capital threaten this sustainability. 
As described previously, Botswana’s mining has been found responsible for 
respiratory ailments, and its workforce suffers from increased incidence of HIV infection. 
The latter is particularly meaningful in Botswana, which has the highest HIV prevalence of 
all countries in the world, and for the treatment of which a substantial portion of the 
diamond revenues have been allocated. 
Botswana has also not escaped from the diminished social capital associated with 
extractive industries. The government’s mistreatment of the San people of the Kalahari 
desert has mired Botswana’s diamond industry in controversy, and is evidence of Narayan’s 
construct of exclusion. In 2002, the Government of Botswana cut off water supplies and basic 




This was part of an effort to facilitate the forced relocation of the San to “resettlement 
camps.”22  The intention to exploit diamonds in the CKGR has been established by many as 
the reason for the displacement of indigenous peoples to marginal lands and has caused the 
“worsening [of] their position at the bottom of the Botswana social ladder.”22  
While Botswana may initially present a model for how resources should be managed 
“sustainably,” Botswana’s diamonds are not without their controversy. The health burden the 
Government of Botswana is attempting to address with diamond wealth may actually be 
attributable to this industry’s existence in the first place. Moreover, the extraction of 
diamonds has been dependent on the systematic marginalization of an entire people, which 
is a cost to the people of Botswana that puts Hartwick’s result out of reach, and is not being 
accounted for in assessments of the sustainability of the country’s resource management. 
 
The Chad-Cameroon Pipeline 
 The Chad-Cameroon pipeline is Sub-Saharan Africa’s largest ever private sector 
investment. Under the direction of the World Bank, this project also includes several legal 
and financial mechanisms meant to address the negative impacts of extractive activities 
observed elsewhere.23 In some ways, it attempted to forcibly impose an adherence to 
Hartwick’s prescription on the execution of the project. However, this project has been 
characterized by depleted human and social capital on virtually every front. The ruling 
government is rapidly consolidating its power and is not accountable to its people, 




the brunt of the negative health impacts associated with the project, but it is also being 
systematically politically marginalized, resulting in depletion of both its human and bridging 
social capital, and could be on a trajectory toward total exclusion.23 The country has had 
various civil convulsions and may even be depleting the social capital of its neighbors.24 The 
evidence of armed conflict has a compound effect on both the human and social capital of 
Chad’s citizenry.23 
The effects of other extractive industry projects are now widely-known and the 
parties involved in this pipeline project were able to anticipate the likely impact it would 
have on human capital.  Part of the design of the program was indeed intended to account 
for these impacts. Still, adequate advance provisions were apparently neither made to 
prevent nor prepare for them.23 Whatever health promotion that took place was only 
provided to workers involved with the project, indicating a motivating framework of project 
sustainability, not investment in human capital.25 As a result, the prevalence of sexually-
transmitted and opportunistic infections have gone up significantly in both the worker and 
civilian populations, and sanitation has worsened.23 At the very least, meaningful, widely-
accessible investments in social capital and human capital infrastructure – designed to be 
implemented before extraction takes place – could have reinforced the relevant social 
services and public capacity, equipping them to mitigate the consequent negative effects 
these activities have on human and social capital. Improvements in these forms of capital 
clearly cannot be treated as merely an afterthought – they must characterize the planning 






In a resource management sustainability assessment or a cost-benefit analysis of 
launching extraction of an exhaustible resource, careful evaluation of the immediate impacts 
on human and social capital must take place in order to achieve Hartwick’s result. The 
relationship between non-renewable resources and other forms of capital is not necessarily 
desirable, and a more successful application of Hartwick’s prescription would include the 
types of negative impacts outlined here in determining the true size of the resource stock 
passed on to future generations.  
Improved human capital accounting could examine the changes in health burden for 
diseases associated with extractive industries. Here I outline three risk factors—
environmental contamination, overcrowding and increased mobility from labor migration—
whose associated infirmities should be monitored in order to accurately capture the status of 
the total capital stock. Improved social capital accounting would require careful conflict and 
governance assessments in order to determine the true impact of exhaustible resource 
depletion. In places like Botswana, the threats to social capital are well-defined and can 
likely be resolved through peaceful negotiation. The Nigerian context, however, is mired in 
deep social divisions inextricably linked to oil wealth, and resource extraction likely should 
have been delayed until an adequate social capital framework was in place to ensure equity 
and accountability. A similar argument can be made for Chad’s more recent mobilization of 




consideration in domestic resource management, and may induce the unsustainable 
practices. Until these drains on the total capital stock are accounted for, Hartwick’s result 
will remain elusive. 
 
A Framework for Sustainability 
In order to avoid future costs in terms of depleted social and human capital, a 
framework for non-renewable management and planning is necessary. The framework 
presented here is adapted from one designed by ecological economists to determine 
ecological sustainability4: 
1. Only stress existing social and human capital to the extent that these systems can absorb 
and adapt to the strain being placed upon them. 
2. Do not disrupt established modes of coping with stress to human and social capital 
systems. 
3. Active investment to reinforce and promote growth of human and social capital stocks 
must take place before any attempts are made that might deplete them, and this should only 
occur in circumstances where it is clear the total net benefit to human and social capital 
stocks of extractive activities is positive. Much like the physical capital that receives 
investment in advance of the generation of rents, so too must sources of human and social 
capital be strong and intact prior to any disruptions. 
Extractive activities must therefore account not only for the natural capital being 




should never come to outstrip the investments to human and social capital being made in 
advance. There is no reason, however, for these efforts at sustainability to be limited to 
mitigating or coping with impacts. The planning processes of extractive sectors can act as an 
investment in human and social capital themselves, instead of regarding these forms of 
wealth as necessarily outside industrial expansion. Human and social capital are currently 
treated as spheres removed from these processes with which there are no natural interfaces. 
The interactions are then actively created through rent investments after the fact. Perhaps 
this is why these capital losses have long gone unanticipated and unacknowledged in the first 
place. When human and social capital are not treated as an afterthought, extractive activities 
may not be something from which they merely have to recover. Community participation 
from the stage of the planning and execution processes may act as investments in social 
capital, and are likely to maximize benefits to human capital as well.  
Properly conceived community participation27 in the design and implementation of 
non-renewable resource management has the potential to promote the creation of human 
capital and improve social capital across the board. Capacity-building efforts that accompany 
effective community participation structures would constitute human capital investments. 
Bonding capital could be generated by facilitating community consensus about extractive 
activities. Bridging capital would at the very least be kept in tact by disallowing systematic 
marginalization of any group as inherent to the nature of community participation. Bridging 
capital may even be promoted by requiring different groups to cooperate in consultative 




would be built on the basis that extractive activities cannot take place without input and 
endorsement from the people most affected. This would require institutions to be more 
representative and accountable to the people they are intended to serve. Disruptions to 
extractive activities in protest of the harm caused to social and human capital would then be 
characterized as dissent coming from legitimate stakeholders, not merely a nuisance for 
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Introduction: Proselytizing the Gospel of Mammon 
 
One thing I do know: Never, on this Earth, was the relation of man to man 
long carried on by Cash-payment alone. If, at any time, a philosophy of 
Laissez-faire, Competition and Supply-and-demand, start up as the exponent 
of human relations, expect that it will soon end. 
Such philosophies will arise: for man's philosophies are usually the 
'supplement of his practice;' some ornamental Logic-varnish, some outer skin 
of Articulate Intelligence, with which he strives to render his dumb 
Instinctive Doings presentable when they are done. Such philosophies will 
arise; be preached as Mammon-Gospels, the ultimate Evangel of the World; be 
believed, with what is called belief, with much superficial bluster, and a kind 
of shallow satisfaction real in its way:--but they are ominous gospels! They are 
the sure, and even swift, forerunner of great changes. Expect that the old System 
of Society is done, is dying and fallen into dotage, when it begins to rave in that 
fashion. Most Systems that I have watched the death of, for the last three thousand 
years, have gone just so. The Ideal, the True and Noble that was in them having 
faded out, and nothing now remaining but naked Egoism, vulturous Greediness, 
they cannot live; they are bound and inexorably ordained by the oldest Destinies, 
Mothers of the Universe, to die. Curious enough: they thereupon, as I have pretty 
generally noticed, devise some light comfortable kind of 'wine-and-walnuts 
philosophy' for themselves, this of Supply-and-demand or another; and keep 
saying, during hours of mastication and rumination, which they call hours of 
meditation: "Soul, take thy ease; it is all well that thou art a vulture-soul;"--and 
pangs of dissolution come upon them, oftenest before they are aware! 
Cash-payment never was, or could except for a few years be, the union-bond 
of man to man. Cash never yet paid one man fully his deserts to another; nor 
could it, nor can it, now or henceforth to the end of the world. 
… 
Mammon is like Fire; the usefulest of all servants, if the frightfulest of all 
masters! 
 
- Thomas Carlyle, Past and Present  (1843)1 
 
These words, penned by the one who first called economics a “dismal science,” point 
to an era of collective dysfunction in which relations between human beings become 




selfishness and avarice reign. But Carlyle indicates that this philosophy is untenable, and 
cannot be sustained as the foundation of a society – human reality cannot be reduced to cash 
and its acquisition alone. The Gospel of Mammon reads: The necessary destination of all 
human endeavor is self-interested material accumulation. Here, this is being referred to as 
the materialism paradigm. 
Thinkers have long noted trends like the one described above. These philosophies are 
grounded in a notion of human progress predicated upon material pursuit which robs other 
endeavors of their intrinsic value. It acts upon human beings through the stimulation of an 
impulse to which all are susceptible – material pursuits form the lowest common 
denominator of human reality. Economics has been heavily influenced by materialistic 
assumptions and this thinking is evident in its original tenets that persist in the discipline 
today. As a field, economics has offered its own vision of this narrow concept of prosperity 
which has shaped how it has approached development. These ideas are so consuming and 
pervasive that materialism is now a fully-established paradigm. However, the overwhelming 
evidence suggests that this worldview has been harmful for human well-being and is not 
suitable to ensure the sustainability of the planet. Thankfully, its pernicious nature has not 
escaped those who recognize its limitations. Alternatives have been offered that recognize 
the true source of human prosperity lies in the endeavors of intrinsic value that have been 
undermined by materialism. Great efforts must be made to reestablish and promote these as 




Much of economics appears unmoved by this learning because of its static view of 
human reality. There seems to be no such thing as paradigms – there are only constant, 
unchanging drivers of human motivation that are programmed in human beings and 
insulated from such dynamics. Economics therefore fails to see its true role as the master of 
Mammon, and has instead subordinated itself as its servant, deploying its instruments to 
guide human behavior while remaining agnostic toward their effects. Incentives present at 
least one interface which stimulates the materialistic impulse and penetrates the human 
psyche to destroy intrinsic motivation. 
Forming the foundation upon which economics has located itself in social policy2, 
incentives are regularly deployed as a policy tool to achieve economic ends. This has been 
particularly true in the context of development. Much like the concept of chrematistics 
which originated with Aristotle, this approach is one that seeks immediate impacts, 
potentially at the expense of long-term sustainability. The idea is essentially that we can pay 
our way out of corruption, environmental degradation, poor health, lack of education and 
social vulnerability. This reflects a deeply-embedded materialistic logic that is at odds with 
empirical psychological research. Conditional cash transfers are one of many such incentive 
programs currently operating, and offer an opportunity to examine the usefulness of this 
materialistic approach to development. Predictably, they have offered something by way of 





These programs effectively pay people to send their children to school or to access the 
health system, creating an unambiguous association between material payoffs and health or 
education, where health- or learning-promoting behaviors are easily reduced to an 
opportunity for the participants to acquire cash. The design of such programs is typically 
ambivalent toward the source of motivation for these “optimal” behaviors. Clearly, it is not 
only the resultant behavior that is relevant, but the motivation as well. Relying on the 
material impulse to motivate improvements in health and education are both unsustainable 
and actually ineffective. Indeed, “Never, on this Earth, was the relation of man to man long 
carried on by Cash-payment alone.” 
The materialism paradigm has defined our objectives, beliefs about well-being, and 
notions of progress. As such, it has direct implications for our approach to sustainable 
development, defined as: “development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”3 Unfortunately, 
this paradigm is largely at odds with both well-being and sustainability, and in some ways, 
directly undermines them. Clearly, materialism is not a useful logic to be deploying in 
development. 
 
Trends through the ages 
Various scholars and thinkers across disciplines have identified trends in social reality 
that point to the existence of a pervasive paradigm. This paradigm “reads” reality in a 




society. Many anticipated its damaging effects and proposed the restoration of alternative 
approaches to human purpose. The paradigm is appropriately referred to as materialism. 
 
Reading Reality: Heidegger, by way of Escobar 
Arturo Escobar, an anthropologist, explains Heidegger’s concept of “enframing”: 
“technology is presented as a way of bringing forth new realities, but this bringing forth is 
different from the creative power of arts and crafts and the manifestations of nature 
(poiesis)…technology imposes on nature a type of order or approach the fundamental feature 
of which is a challenge to release nature’s energy for human purposes…driven by criteria of 
maximum yield at minimum expense. Everything is called upon to stand by ready for our 
purposes…Heidegger calls this characteristic of modern technology ‘enframing’.”4 In this 
description, to enframe nature is to reduce it to its instrumental value for human beings, and 
poiesis is the transcendent depiction of nature in which it possesses intrinsic value. 
Enframing further “see[s] nature as an object of research and utilization,” and “orders the real 
as composed of things that stand in reserve for [modern man’s] use.” Enframing also has 
elements of a paradigm in that this “ordering” should occur “to such an extent that the 
posture itself becomes transparent, ‘natural’.” As an element of a paradigm, however, Escobar 
explains that Heidegger regarded enframing as “a source of utmost danger, first and foremost 
because it precludes man from approaching nature in a more primal way (for instance, in the 
sense of poiesis). Science may make correct determinations through its calculations, yet truth 




ordering nature, is one which strips nature (and “the real”) of its intrinsic value, and is so 
pervasive as to appear natural and preclude man from perceiving intrinsic value of those 
things not “standing in reserve for his use.” However, Heidegger "also believed that there are 
still - scattered in the midst of our contemporary, objectified and subjectifying practices - a 
sort of pre-technological understanding that embodies a non-objectifying way of relating to 
nature and human beings. It is thus necessary to unearth this understanding, muted by our 
everyday busy concerns and dispersed by post-Enlightenment achievements, and encourage 
their growth."4  In this sense, poiesis can impart a transcendent knowledge revealing, or 
restoring, the intrinsic value that enframing may obscure: "Heidegger seemed to find part of 
the answer in the kind of poetic revealing founding the arts, and on a reflection on art that is 
not oblivious to technology."4 Enframing, as an approach to interpreting reality, has deeply 
affected human understanding of pursuit and purpose. 
 
Intrinsic value: Scitovsky and Illich 
The economist Tibor Scitovsky wrote extensively about the inefficacy of society’s 
pursuit of satisfaction. He noted the tendency for material accumulation to become an 
indicator of one’s social value: "When profits or earnings are all a man has to show for his 
work, he transfers to them his pride of achievement and regards them as the symbol and 
measure of society's appreciation of what he does for society…We use money not only as a 
medium of exchange but also as the measuring rod of man's worth.” Scitovsky goes on to 




usefulness to society. Being useful to society is a source of satisfaction and comfort; money 
income is a token of such usefulness and therefore becomes itself a source of satisfaction and 
comfort."5 Here Scitovsky explains how material wealth, a source of instrumental value, can 
take on intrinsic value as a “source of satisfaction and comfort” for the individual by 
operating in a paradigm in which social value is articulated in exclusively material terms. 
Scitovsky elaborates on what is called the “money illusion”:  “Money is sought and valued, 
not only for its purchasing power but also as a symbol of achievement, of success, of society's 
appreciation of one's services."6 Material accumulation therefore becomes an individual’s 
primary – if not exclusive – source of meaning.  
By contrast, in reflecting on Keynes’ famous “animal spirits”, Scitovsky notes the 
value of intrinsic motivation: "The other context in which Keynes deals with activities 
pursued for their own sake is his discussion of businessmen's motivation for investment in 
The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money…’animal spirits…the spontaneous 
urge to action rather than inaction’...[is] the main motivating force of all creative activity, 
not only in the fields of science, art and leisure, but also in that of business investment and so 
of economic and technical progress.” Here Scitovsky redefines the sources of society’s 
progress, “warning against attributing an exaggerated importance to economic incentives,” 
and “stressing instead his animal spirits…the excitement of creating something new or 
unique."7 
Ivan Illich, the philosopher, explains the phenomenon he terms “the modernization 




generates 'modernized poverty.' This is a form of disvalue necessarily associated with the 
proliferation of commodities…in which the very abundance of commodities paralyzes the 
autonomous creation of use-values."8  For Illich, use-value is true intrinsic value, and a 
regime of material accumulation is characterized by “the belief that useful activities by 
which people both express and satisfy their needs can be replaced indefinitely by 
standardized goods or services."8 The notion that there is no intrinsic source of well-being 
and no need that cannot be satisfied by material accumulation leads to several dysfunctions: 
"Autonomous and creative human action, required to make man's universe bloom, 
atrophies…Expectations grow, while hopeful trust in one's own competence and the concern 
for others rapidly decline,"8 and “The peculiarly modern inability to use personal 
endowments, communal life, and environmental resources in an autonomous way infects 
every aspect of life where a professionally engineered commodity has succeeded in replacing 
a culturally shaped use-value…The opportunity to experience personal and social satisfaction 
outside the market is thus destroyed."9 Illich points out that “this does not represent simply a 
net loss of satisfactions that do not happen to fit into the industrial age. The impotence to 
produce use-values ultimately renders counterpurposive the very commodities meant to 
replace them."8 He further explains that in this regime, "Human responses to everyday 
occurrences have been standardized”8 by what is a fundamentally materialistic paradigm. 
This phenomenon of undermining both the pursuit and creation of use-value is an 
articulation of the displacement of intrinsic value by material accumulation. The source of 




nonmarketable use-values must inevitably occupy the center of any culture that provides a 
program for satisfactory life to a majority of its members…a modern world in which active 
people would use modern convivial tools to create an abundance of use-values that liberated 
them from consumption…a society [inspired] to protect personal use-value against disabling 
enrichment."8 
 
Questioning the Primacy of Material Accumulation 
Several economists throughout history have commented on the rise of a materialistic 
paradigm. Simonde de Sismondi, an economist of the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-
century questioned the fundamental premise that increased material production “is the 
object of human society”, and that by focusing exclusively on “material goods”, society may 
not be “approaching its goal”.10 John Ruskin, a nineteenth-century economist described how 
material accumulation pursued for its own sake results in what he called illth: "And 
possession is in use only, which for each man is sternly limited; so that such things, and so 
much of them as he can use, are, indeed, well for him, or Wealth; and more of them, or any 
other things are ill for him, or illth."11 In contrast to his ideal of "organic welfare", early 20th- 
century economist John A. Hobson subsequently noted, "We cannot admit as the objective of 
the economic activities either the yield of material goods which these activities produce, or 
the 'psychic income' which they yield as assessed in terms of current deservedness or 
satisfaction, without reference to their intrinsic desirability...A material or a psychic income 




impulse: “This charge of materialism made against the more advanced industrial 
communities...[is] based on an over-stimulation of certain instincts for physical 
satisfactions…[leading to] a hasty exploitation of newly roused tastes that absorb too much of 
human nature in economic processes...Getting and spending, we lay waste our powers.”12 In 
this sense, materialism is fostered and embedded in a society by “over-stimulating” 
individuals’ material “instincts”. For both Ruskin and Hobson, the explicit pursuit of intrinsic 
value is essential for the promotion of welfare, and regarding material accumulation as its 
own destination is not merely misguided, but potentially harmful. Richard Henry Tawney, 
another early 20th-century economist elaborates on the implications of a materialism regime 
for society:  
As long as individuals think the attainment of moderate material comfort [is] 
the chief end of life…believing that the principal aim of man, what should be 
taught to children, what should serve as a rough standard of merit, what 
merits approbation and respect, is the attainment of a moderate – or even 
immoderate – standard of comfort, and that moral questions arise only after 
this has been attained; then they must be content to go without religion, 
literature, art, and learning. These are not hard to find for those who really 
seek them, or who seek them first.  But if they are sought second they are 
never found at all…What I mean is that the failure of society to make the 
changes which are obviously important when regarded in bulk is due to the 
fact that individually we all have a false philosophy of life. We assume that the 
greatest misfortune which can befall a man is poverty - and that conduct 
which leads to the sacrifice of income is unwise, impractical, etc.; in short that 
a man's life should be judged by its yield of income, and a nation's life by its 
production of wealth.13  
Tawney is describing materialism as a paradigm, where the pursuit of material accumulation 




accordingly. He also points out that the pursuit of material accumulation does not enhance 
the intrinsic sources of well-being, rather, it necessarily displaces them. These must be 
pursued on their own merit. John Stuart Mill, the 19th-century philosopher and economist 
also rejected humanity’s commitment to the materialistic enterprise: "But the best state for 
human nature is that in which, while no one is poor, no one desires to be richer…That the 
energies of mankind should be kept in employment by the struggle for riches…in themselves 
they are of little importance…I know not why it should be matter of congratulation that 
persons who are already richer than any one needs to be, should have doubled their means of 
consuming things which give little or no pleasure except as representative of wealth.”14 Mill 
effectively re-conceives the object of society and source of prosperity as transcendence over 
the materialistic impulse, not submission to it. John Maynard Keynes, the 20th-century 
economist, suggests a similar destination where society can do away with what he calls the 
money-motive:  
When the accumulation of wealth is no longer of high social importance, there 
will be great changes in the code of morals…We shall be able to afford to dare 
to assess the money-motive at its true value. The love of money as a possession 
– as distinguished from the love of money as a means to the enjoyments and 
realities of life – will be recognised for what it is, a somewhat disgusting 
morbidity, one of those semicriminal, semi-pathological propensities which 
one hands over with a shudder to the specialists in mental disease…there will 
still be many people with intense, unsatisfied purposiveness who will blindly 
pursue wealth – unless they can find some plausible substitute. But the rest of 
us will no longer be under any obligation to applaud and encourage them. For 
we shall inquire more curiously than is safe to-day into the true character of 
this ‘purposiveness’ with which in varying degrees Nature has endowed almost 
all of us…But, chiefly, do not let us overestimate the importance of the 
economic problem, or sacrifice to its supposed necessities other matters of 




Here, Keynes perceives a sort of temporarily useful “money-motive”, where the 
accumulation of material wealth is acceptable so long as it does not take on intrinsic 
motivation or displace sources of intrinsic value. Purposiveness is seen as a rather 
dysfunctional materialistic conception, but one to which we are all susceptible. At some 
level, materialism is grounded in the lowest common denominator of human reality – 
material impulse. In this sense it is a potentially universally-applicable paradigm. 
Economist Amartya Sen contrasts the materialistic “opulence” concept to the 
endeavor he has proposed as a source of intrinsic value – the expansion of capabilities: "The 
market values commodities, and our success in the material world is often judged by our 
opulence, but despite that, commodities are no more than means to other ends. Ultimately, 
the focus has to be on what life we lead and what we can or cannot do, can or cannot be. I 
have elsewhere called the various living conditions we can or cannot achieve our 
'functionings,' and our ability to achieve them, our 'capabilities.' The main point here is that 
the standard of living is really a matter of functionings and capabilities, and not a matter 
directly of opulence, commodities, or utilities."16 Sen’s capabilities approach redirects 
attention and value to intrinsic pursuits, offering a different conception of prosperity in the 
face of a paradigm of opulence.g  
 
                                                 




The Problem with Materialism: Aristotle through the Ages 
Aristotle’s concepts of chrematistics and pleonexia have influenced thought on 
economics throughout the centuries. In this tradition, Sismondi rejected a paradigm in 
economics directed exclusively at material accumulation: “The chremastic [sic] science, or 
the study of the means of increasing wealth, in setting aside the purpose of wealth, is a false 
science…When one takes the increase of economic goods as the end of society, one 
necessarily sacrifices the end for the means. One obtains more of production, but such 
production is paid for dearly by the misery of the masses.”10 Here Sismondi rejects the 
widely-held assumption that material growth leads necessarily to well-being. 
Herman Daly, an ecological economist, draws a distinction between the origins of 
economics in chrematistics and oikonomia: "Oikonomia differs from chrematistics in three 
ways. First, it takes the long-run rather than the short-run view. Second, it considers costs 
and benefits to the whole community, not just to the parties to the transaction. Third, it 
focuses on concrete use value and the limited accumulation thereof, rather than on abstract 
exchange value and its impetus toward unlimited accumulation.”17 It is worth noting that 
here chrematistics appears to be ill-suited for questions of sustainability given its tendency to 
favor the short-run. However, Daly demonstrates that economics is not inherently a 
materialistic science, and it is the operating paradigm that is relevant in the generation of 
materialistic conclusions: “Unlimited accumulation is the goal of the chrematist and is 
evidence for Aristotle of the unnaturalness of the activity. True wealth is limited by the 




thing as enough. For chrematistics, more is always better."17 Oikonomia is therefore well-
being achieved by the pursuit of intrinsic value, whereas chrematistics is the futile pursuit of 
perpetual accumulation of exchange (or instrumental) value. 
Historian Jerry Muller describes the influence Aristotle’s economic insights had on 
Hegel: “Unlike more moral pursuits, [Aristotle] maintained, the pursuit of wealth lacks any 
natural, intrinsic limit and is hence prone to excess. Those engaged in commerce for money 
thus have a propensity to pleonexia (greediness or overreaching); they tend to devote their 
lives to gaining more and more without limit or reflective purpose."18 Here, pleonexia is the 
materialistic impulse in full fruition. In this context, Hegel explained the self-generating 
nature of the system: “Hegel saw the market as creating new wants that are perceived by the 
individual as ‘needs.’ Indeed, the market was a want-creating machine.” The system 
characterized by a materialistic paradigm induces wants and in so doing, converts individuals 
to materialism and sustains itself. However, the implications for well-being are negative: 
“The result could degenerate into the continual, irritable search for more and more, without 
satisfaction in any level of attainment— psychic misery in the midst of material excess. 
When consumer goods are chosen merely on the basis of ever new induced wants, rather 
than because they fit in with a rational life plan, the result would be what Hegel called a ‘bad 
infinity.’”19 Furthermore, Hegel saw sources of intrinsic value as the welfare buffer to bad 
infinity: “Without a firm mooring in institutions like the family or the professional 




appropriate wants, the individual might be attracted to one commodity after another, in an 
endless round of joyless consumption."20 
These insights offered by philosophers and economists throughout the centuries, 
especially of the modern era, point to the existence of a coherent paradigm. This paradigm is 
characterized by the reduction of human reality to its material aspects, the privileging of 
material interpretations of value, interest, progress and human purpose, and the 
displacement of intrinsic pursuits. In short, the materialism paradigm dictates that the 
necessary destination of all human endeavor is self-interested material accumulation. And in 
virtually no other discipline is the materialism paradigm so embedded as economics. 
 
The Materialism Paradigm: Enter Economics 
The materialism paradigm is deeply-embedded in the operating frameworks in 
economics relating to the human being and the nature of human reality. Here, Adam Smith’s 
lasting contributions from The Wealth of Nations are instructive. His introduction of the 
concept of the “invisible hand” states: 
As every individual, therefore, endeavours as much as he can both to employ 
his capital in the support of domestic industry, and so to direct that industry 
that its produce may be of the greatest value; every individual necessarily 
labours to render the annual revenue of the society as great as he can. He 
generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows 
how much he is promoting it. By preferring the support of domestic to that of 
foreign industry, he intends only his own security; and by directing that 
industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he 
intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an 
invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it 




interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when 
he really intends to promote it.21 
Adam Smith thus elevates the pursuit of self-interest to true virtue, and abstracts away from 
any considerations for community or social well-being at the level of the individual. He 
elaborates on the role of self-regarding behavior as the essential foundation of modern 
society: "It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect 
our dinner, but from their regard to their own self-interest. We address ourselves, not to their 
humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their 
advantages."22 It becomes clear that the virtue of self-interest, as the ultimate mediator of 
interactions between individuals, is referred to in its material dimensions. 
Countless economists and others have commented on the pervasiveness of this 
concept of “Homo economicus— that selfish, materialistic creature that has traditionally 
inhabited the economic textbooks.”23 Some have noted that human beings are viewed as 
excessively atomistic24, devoid of their social components. Others have pointed out that this 
view precludes the impetus (or need) for true cooperation25 and casts other-regarding 
behavior or that which is directed toward the public good outside the bounds of rationality26. 
Moreover, acquisitive self-interest is unlimited27, should go unrestrained26, and in fact, is the 
basis upon which economic theory should be built26. This limited conception of a human 
being has hampered economic understanding of non-material and social reality. 
Some economists suggest that economics is essentially blind to anything that cannot 




self-interested individuals.”30 This has led to the conclusions that this framework corrodes 
moral considerations, particularly toward others31, and does not recognize the critical 
contributions community and social reality make to human welfare.26 Others note that “the 
primacy of the relations among people, which characterized traditional society, gave place to 
the primacy of the relations between people and things”4, indicating that this economic 
framework displaced preexisting value systems that favored the social over the material. As a 
result, this inability to account for well-being deriving from non-material sources embedded 
in social relations has not been costless. The price has been paid repeatedly in the form of 
diminished welfare as a result of deterioration of community.32-35 At best, “social costs can be 
considered only as externalities and are actually little considered even under that heading.”34 
Further to this, social welfare is seen merely as "the summation of the increase of goods and 
services acquired by the individual members. The society as such does not appear…There is 
no way to conceive of a collective good - only of the possibility that there can be 
improvement for some without costs to others."34 This directly implicates any pursuits to 
ensure global prosperity. The inconsistency between this economic version of reality and the 
aspirations of society has been further articulated: “How, then, can we resolve the paralyzing 
contradiction that, on the one hand, we desire a world of peace and prosperity, while, on the 
other, much of economic and psychological theory depicts human beings as slaves to self-
interest?”36  
Economic logic has responded by encouraging and relying upon the mobilization of 




to conduce to optimality, and eventually, development: “economists and policy makers [see] 
social policy as the goal of improving social welfare by devising material incentives that 
induce agents who care only for their own personal welfare to contribute to the public 
good.”23 Unlike Hobson’s indictment of the over-stimulation of materialistic instincts, the 
approach in economics has been to embrace this as the instrument of choice to bring about 
prosperity. 
 
Economic Notions of Prosperity 
The assumptions operating in economics also determine its conclusions about the 
aims of human society. Mill stated in 1844 that “Political Economy considers mankind as 
occupied solely in acquiring and consuming wealth; and aims at showing what is the course 
of action into which mankind, living in a state of society, would be impelled, if that 
motive...were absolute ruler of all their actions. Under the influence of this desire, it shows 
mankind accumulating wealth, and employing that wealth in the production of other 
wealth.”37 The economic idea of human progress is strictly limited to material accumulation 
as it “makes entire abstraction of every other human passion or motive.”37 Informed by the 
principle of Smith’s invisible hand, conventional economic theory also indicates that purely 
by pursuing one’s “self-interested acquisitive nature,” prosperity will be achieved.38  
So entrenched are these principles that Karl Polanyi equated the consuming pursuit of 
economic gain to "the most violent outburst of religious fervor in history", "a motive rarely 




the level of a justification of action and behavior in everyday life."4 Many have supported the 
assertion that this idea of progress is unprecedented4, 39, and has, in the past, been otherwise 
considered illegitimate by society at large.27 The ideas about progress as articulated in 
economics are therefore artificially conceived and assumed within the bounds of the 
discipline’s own constructs. This has led to the idealization of wealth maximization at the 
aggregate level40, with material accumulation so pervasive in culture that it is taken to be the 
“surest perceived route to personal happiness, social status, and national success…that leads 
people to find meaning, contentment, and acceptance.”41 These beliefs about prosperity have 
been propagated throughout the development enterprise as well. 
Development has functionally become "blind imitation” of the materialism 
characterizing developed countries42, with the developing world “increasingly enamored of 
the materialistic values that create a 'thing oriented society'."43 These materialistic pursuits 
may incur significant ecological and social costs, but these have been subordinated as the 
“price to be paid for economic 'progress'."44 The “package deals” of materialistic 
development45 have been effective at conveying their paradigm – the value system has been 
found operating throughout the world in countries of varying levels of economic 
development.8, 41, 46 This effective exportation of materialism has characterized the history of 
the development enterprise. 
Arturo Escobar considers the figure of the economist in development history as of 
particular importance in this process. He is unequivocal about the intention of development 




“the axioms of development economics in its early years reveals one basic fact: From the very 
beginning, development was not a process which involved only the material conditions of 
living…More than that, development was, inevitably and perhaps more significantly, a 
mechanism through which a whole rationality was to be learned. For development to occur, 
the rationality of ‘Economic Man’…had to be brought to the peoples of the Third World."4 
And these “Third World peoples” from multiple countries, cultures, and traditions, were 
only seen in their material dimension of impoverishment and therefore considered to be 
essentially the same.47 Escobar describes an intent, widely-articulated in policy documents 
from the time of the inception of development, to “transform drastically two-thirds of the 
world in the pursuit of the goal of material prosperity and economic progress."48 This 
consuming material identity extended to the reconstruction of an individual’s universe in 
which “the material aspects would be not the goal and the limit but a space of possibilities for 
broader individual and collective endeavors."49 Human aspiration, self-concept and location 
within reality were thus contracted to an exclusively-material space.  
Analyzing the legacy of development in Colombia, Escobar notes that this 
“developmentalization” was applied extensively to peasants, women and the environment50, 
much like the methods of fragmentation and abstraction observed in economics generally. 
Similarly, development programs were designed exclusively within a reductionist paradigm 
on the premise that “Only through material advancement could social, cultural, and political 
progress be achieved."47 The primacy assigned to spreading the “dominant economic 




disqualification of non-Western knowledge systems"48, implying an active displacement of 
any alternative paradigms to materialism. In this context, only material considerations could 
provide sufficient justification for programs designed to improve agriculture51, nutrition51, or 
promote women’s human capital development.50 Escobar’s assessment of these programs 
show that they tend to exacerbate deprivation and undermine well-being, particularly in the 
case of rural development throughout the decades of Integrated Rural Development and 
Structural Adjustment programs.51  
 
The Impacts of Materialism – Lessons from Economics 
Research in economics has been useful for understanding the social dynamics that 
take place in a materialistic regime as countries become more “developed”. Richard 
Easterlin’s famous study looking at the relationship between income and happiness found 
that within countries there is a strong positive association between the two – individuals in 
higher status groups were happier than those in the lowest status group.  Between countries, 
however, the positive relationship between income and happiness was less clear, leading him 
to conclude that relative status may be the factor determining individuals’ happiness.52 These 
findings, termed “Easterlin’s paradox”, imply that material sources of happiness are 
inherently constrained. Scitovsky explains how happiness derived from material notions of 
status and value has negative social effects, whereas that derived from intrinsic sources may 




The demand for the comfort [status] yields...is satiable when people seek 
recognition for excellence in their job or profession, in a sport, game, or 
hobby, or in their expert appreciation of food, wine, music, painting, or any 
other of the many good things of life. Thanks to the great multiplicity possible 
in such aims and the standards set for them, full status satisfaction in such 
form is within many people's reach. By contrast, when people seek status not 
in other people's recognition of their specific accomplishments, but in a 
general token, like income, which is supposed to express the value society 
places on their services, then status becomes a matter of ranking on a one-
dimensional scale, and the seeking of status becomes a zero-sum game. This 
means that one person's gain in status is automatically matched by an equal 
loss of status suffered by those he now outranks. A gain in status by anyone 
becomes merely a change in ranking, which changes only the distribution of 
status satisfaction but leaves unchanged the sum total of such 
satisfactions...Such limitation of the supply of status satisfaction, however, 
imposes no limits on people's demand for status, nor on the amount of money 
they may spend in seeking it. Money income as a measure of one's success in 
life has the drawback that knowledge of it is seldom in the public domain. 
Therefore, to enjoy not only one's high income, but also the esteem it can 
secure, one must make it known through appropriate spending behavior."53 
Scitovsky draws a distinction between the desire to rank and the desire to belong. The latter 
is “a deep-seated and very natural drive whose origin and universality go beyond man and 
are explained by that most basic of drives, the desire to survive."53 People may pursue rank in 
their desire to belong, but its scope is limited when it is tied to material wealth. This is 
apparent from the results Easterlin observed. If human beings instead attempted to satiate 
this desire with the more “beneficial” and “noble” pursuits of status arising from intrinsic 
value to society, it is clear that total social happiness would be higher as well as self-
reinforcing instead of internally constrained and zero-sum. In reflecting on relative wealth as 
a source of happiness, Stephen Marglin also notes that in this regime, people’s participation 




optimality would dictate: “Bringing everybody’s consumption down a notch is like making 
the crowd at a football game sit down. We see as well as when we are all standing, and with 
less effort.”54 Clearly, non-material conceptions of status and value would be more effective 
at generating lasting, shared, prosperity. 
 
Materialism as a Paradigm 
The way materialism has influenced economics – and through economics, 
development – is best understood as a paradigm. Understanding the nature of paradigms will 
lend insight into how materialism, as a mode of “knowing reality”, behaves, entrenches itself 
and propagates. 
Psychology research by Kilbourne et al looks at how a slightly more restricted notion 
of materialism behaves as a Dominant Social Paradigm (DSP) in seven industrialized 
countries they examine.h The authors explain that a DSP is essentially a “worldview, or 
overarching system of beliefs, for achieving progress,” that it is ubiquitous, embedded in 
society’s institutions, internalized by individuals, and constitutes conventional practices. It 
also “simultaneously legitimizes its own existence and reinforces its premise."55 Materialism, 
which sees self-interested material accumulation as the necessary destination of all human 
                                                 
h In their model, “materialism refers to a mode of expressive behavior by individuals in that it is consumption 
for purposes other than instrumental value, or the immediate utility, provided by the object possessed.” This 
values orientation, based upon the reassignment of intrinsic value to material accumulation, is consistent with 





endeavor, acts as the DSP being propagated by mainstream economics in sustainable 
development. 
Keynes was perhaps among the first to assert that the materialistic potential for 
“purposiveness” is endowed by Nature in almost all of us. Since then, several psychologists 
have indicated a ubiquitous susceptibility in human beings to materialistic impulse so that 
“all of us to some extent take on or internalize materialistic values.”56 Others have noted that 
while human beings have long attributed special significance to material possessions, “Only 
in modernity has this wealth of material artefacts been so deeply implicated in so many 
social and psychological processes”57, that contrary to previous societies, the current regime 
has “made an institution of…materialistic ‘impulses’.”58 Escobar also argues that the 
materialistic take on development is now so pervasive that this economic view “is embedded 
in the most basic practices of individuals and societies."4  
The current ubiquity of materialism can be explained by its self-justifying and self-
generating nature. John Kenneth Galbraith explained rampant materialism by stating that 
modern society "evaluates people by the products they possess…The urge to consume is 
furthered by the value system."59 Scitovsky describes it as a system that “gives rise to both a 
need and its satisfaction”60, and many others have pointed out that the culture of materialism 
actively constructs people as materialistic “in order to keep the system going”8, especially as 
the premise of development.9 Psychologists have identified an even more complex dynamic. 
Tim Kasser explains that dissatisfaction arising from adherence to materialistic values may 




unhappiness incurred. This has the effect of reinforcing the value system as well as the 
unhappiness that feeds it.61 
Frameworks in economics are particularly adept at fashioning society in its own 
image: "Economics is not only descriptive; it is not only evaluative; it is at the same time 
constructive - economists seek to fashion a world in the image of economic theory."62 Several 
scholars have noted the generative tendency of economic frameworks.34, 38 This poses a 
problem because much of the inefficacy or harm caused by economic theory is not “visible” 
to the theory – it arises from neglect or hostility toward those aspects of reality that the 
theory has turned into abstractions. These frameworks are thereby incapable of accounting 
for their failures, and overestimate their success, allowing them to persist.34 This is why 
Marglin insists that “we have to be careful how we structure our institutions, our economic 
institutions in particular, so that they serve, not undermine, our basic values."62 
Materialism, as it is conceived here, has also behaved as a DSP – it is a set of beliefs 
that has ubiquitously informed notions of progress, permeated human reality, recast 
societies, and reinforced itself in multiple ways. This has been particularly evident in the 
realm of development, which to some extent, is an active project to deploy a different vision 
of society: "As is well known, the dominant model of development depends on a society of 
vigorous consumers of material goods. In such a model, endlessly rising levels of 
consumption are cast as indicators of progress and prosperity. This preoccupation with the 
production and accumulation of material objects and comforts (as sources of meaning, 




information to the exclusion of competing voices and paradigms."36 As a system inculcating a 
set of ideals, modifying behavior of individuals and institutions, and aligning societies with 
predetermined notions of prosperity, materialism, in its functioning as a paradigm, has been 
particularly successful. Though its universal application would imply a belief in its efficacy, 




The consensus in psychology is clear: “materialistic values undermine well-being.”63 
The dynamics of materialism have negative effects on health, happiness and social welfare, 
and in one instance, was even found to have indirect negative effects on economic growth.64 
Materialism is “a system driven by anxiety”57, and has given rise to a “social recession.”65 Its 
assertions about what constitutes progress are largely at odds with the “factors—family, 
friendship, health, peer approval, community, purpose—known to have a strong correlation 
with reported happiness.”66 Unfortunately, “People have a good grasp of the things that make 
them happy but a poor grasp of how to achieve these things,”66 allowing the dictates of  the 
materialism paradigm to fill in the gaps. 
The great deal of psychology research that has been dedicated to studying the 
existence and effects of materialism constitutes our most complete source of understanding 





1. Acquisition Centrality: "Materialists place possessions and their acquisition 
at the center of their lives...Materialism thus lends meaning to life and 
provides an aim for daily endeavors."  
2. Acquisition as the Pursuit of Happiness: "One of the reasons that possessions 
and their acquisition are so central to materialists is that they view these as 
essential to their satisfaction and well-being in life...While most individuals 
are probably involved to some extent in the pursuit of happiness, it is the 
pursuit of happiness through acquisition rather than through other means 
(such as personal relationships, experiences, or achievements) that 
distinguishes materialism."  
3. Possession-defined Success: "Materialists tend to judge their own and others' 
success by the number and quality of possessions accumulated."67  
Therefore, not only is the belief – that material accumulation is the necessary destination of 
all human endeavor – aligned with psychologists’ understanding of the phenomenon, but it is 
also perceived to be a source of meaning, well-being and status, confirming the concept of a 
paradigm. This is consistent in much of the literature. One psychologist describes 
materialism as “evaluat[ing] our own well-being and accomplishment not by looking inward 
at our spirit or integrity, but by looking outward at what we have and what we can buy,”68 
and another describes “materialism as an enduring belief in the desirability of acquiring and 
possessing things.”46 Given this limited paradigmatic conception of purpose, Tim Kasser sums 
up much of psychologists’ learning about materialism, noting: "If we agree that the highest 
personal and social goals are to create great material wealth…if wealth and seemingly 
limitless consumption form our vision of prosperity…there is no doubt that the materialistic 
goals…have brought about prosperity in one sense of the word, [but] we must also recognize 




circumstances…[they] must be considered remarkably less successful, if not unmitigated 
failures."43 Kasser describes how materialism fares as a framework for prosperity, given a 
different set of intrinsic values: "Humanity has become ensnared in a vision of prosperity 
that has elevated financial profit, material wealth, and consumption to the highest good. 
While such a vision has fulfilled its promise of creating wealth, goods, and services, it has 
failed to provide optimal levels of happiness, social cohesion, and ecological sustainability; 
indeed, some evidence suggests it has damaged these aspects of 'the good life.'"43 
Psychologists have contributed a great deal of insight into how these intrinsically valuable 
outcomes are undermined. 
Circumplex research has been particularly useful in determining the psychological 
relationship between different types of motivations. Based on survey responses collected 
from around the world, circumplex models capture the degree to which goals are 
experienced either as consistent with each other or in conflict with each other. In the 
circumplex below, the closer two goals are together, the more compatible they are: 






Kasser explains that based on analysis of the circumplex, adherence to materialistic values 
undermines the ability of an individual to realize the intrinsic goals of “growing as a person, 
intimately connecting with other people, and contributing to the world at large…[which] 
are also the very values and goals that empirical research demonstrates promote personal 
happiness, positive social involvement, and ecologically sustainable behavior.”43 
Psychologists have thus demonstrated that materialistic goals displace intrinsic pursuits 
which are more conducive to human well-being. The model also suggests that stimulating 
the materialistic motivation for a particular pursuit is incompatible with the intrinsic 
motivation for those pursuits, thus robbing them of their intrinsic value. Here it is again 
evident that materialism behaves as a paradigm, actively shaping individuals’ conceptions of 





The Impacts of Materialism – Lessons from Psychology 
The harm materialism causes is extensive, affecting physical, mental and social well-
being. First, efforts to pursue material accumulation often have severely health-degrading 
effects. Studies from around the world have yielded observations “from low life satisfaction 
and happiness, to depression and anxiety, to physical problems such as headaches, and to 
personality disorders, narcissism, and antisocial behavior.”70 Research has even demonstrated 
the direct effects of materialism on increased cortisol (a hormone related to stress) secretion. 
The same research found that less-materialistic behavior can conversely result in positive 
health effects.71 Not only is materialism associated with physical illness72 and psychological 
disorders70, 73, but “high materialists” also indicate a “lower satisfaction with [their] 'health 
and physical condition'.”74  
Second, materialism also affects happiness and satisfaction more generally. Possibly 
the most consistent finding, studies have shown that the more individuals subscribe to the 
frameworks of materialism, the more they report being unhappy, anxious, depressed, less 
satisfied and even angry, as well as having few pleasant emotions.43, 66, 70, 73, 75 Even the 
psychological needs empirically associated with quality of life that are directly related to 
material consumption – such as safety, security, and sustenance – are “relatively unfulfilled 
when people hold materialistic pursuits as central in their value systems."56 This suggests that 
while these pursuits are related to one’s material state, they possess an intrinsic value that is 




circumplex above (figure 1). While the needs in the lower right quadrant are not as opposed 
to the materialistic values in the lower left quadrant as the socially-oriented goals are (upper 
right), they still are more closely related to intrinsic motivation than purely materialistic 
aims.  
Third, materialism is associated with negative social orientations. Several multi-
nation studies have indicated that materialistic individuals have more negative and 
unsuccessful relationships, place less value on relationships and contribution to their 
communities, and treat people like objects of instrumental value.76 Kasser explains that as 
materialistic aims grow in importance, individuals have been found to “become less 
concerned with fully understanding others’ subjective experience, feelings, and 
desires…people exist largely to reflect well on ourselves and to be used and manipulated to 
obtain what we want…we move farther and farther from what makes us civilized. We treat 
each other in less humane ways.”77 One study expands on this dynamic: “materialism is not 
just a selfish pursuit of self-gratification but also a demonstration of mastery and control over 
the material world...those high in materialism may favor objects over people because these 
possessions give them mastery and control over others. Thus, materialistic individuals appear 
to be not only hedonistic pleasure seekers but also power-hungry control seekers."72 
Furthermore, in materialistic societies where people’s relative position plays a prominent 
role in their aspirations, elites may "feel that education of the poor threatens the political 
status quo."78 Not only does materialism erode social relations and promote power-seeking, it 




The negative impact materialism has on social endeavors incurs a compounded cost. 
Materialistic individuals are less invested in their relationships and communities, and less 
interested in contribution to the common good. This leads to “low-quality relationships 
characterized by little empathy and generosity, and by objectification, conflict, and feelings 
of alienation,”76 which devastates personal well-being. Materialism thus has multiple 
negative effects on social reality: it breeds selfishness, undermines the possibility for 
coordination76, degrades established patterns of cooperation62, and causes “greater misery 
coming from less harmonious social relationships.”66 These, combined with the negative 
impacts on health and happiness, demonstrate that the materialism paradigm is not merely 
an ineffective one for sustainable development, it is actually harmful. Much like the 
“developmentalization” process described by Escobar, psychologists have found that 
materialism degrades the non-material aspects of reality that were previously sources of 
intrinsic value, leading to diminished human welfare. 
Another social dynamic psychologists have identified is related to the 
intergenerational transfer of materialism. Children of materialistic parents are exposed to 
more messages encouraging and reinforcing materialistic values. Their parents are also likely 
to be less nurturing, spend more time dedicated to materialistic pursuits, and convey their 
bond with material things. This transmits a system of beliefs that wealth and possessions “are 
of primary importance…perhaps of more importance than family,” and the children have 
subsequently been found to value these things more highly.77 Adherence to materialism 




transmission of materialistic values – instilling psychically the inability "of future generations 
to meet their own needs." 
 
Materialism and Environmental Sustainability 
Also closely related to the pursuit of sustainable development, the tendency in 
economics to abstract away from the aspects of human reality unrelated to self-interested 
material accumulation has implications for the discipline’s view of nature. John Stuart Mill 
noted: 
…solitude in the presence of natural beauty and grandeur is the cradle of 
thoughts and aspirations which are not only good for the individual, but 
which society could ill do without. Nor is there much satisfaction in 
contemplating the world with nothing left to the spontaneous activity of 
nature; with every rood of land brought into cultivation, which is capable of 
growing food for human beings; every flowery waste or natural pasture 
ploughed up, all quadrupeds or birds which are not domesticated for man's use 
exterminated as his rivals for food, every hedgerow or superfluous tree rooted 
out, and scarcely a place left where a wild shrub or flower could grow without 
being eradicated as a weed in the name of improved agriculture. If the earth 
must lose that great portion of its pleasantness which it owes to things that the 
unlimited increase of wealth and population would extirpate from it, for the 
mere purpose of enabling it to support a larger, but not a better or a happier 
population, I sincerely hope, for the sake of posterity, that they will be content 
to be stationary, long before necessity compel them to it.14 
Even in the mid-nineteenth century the threat of displacement of the intrinsic value of 
nature was apparent to this economist. For Mill, nature may serve material ends, but it 
cannot realize its full potential contribution to human prosperity without regard for its 




will) take precedence over additional material accumulation. Unfortunately, many scholars 
have since indicated that the thrust of the operating paradigm has left little consideration for 
nature outside the materialistic economic regime.  
 
Economic Anthropocentrism 
There is a consistent notion that economics generates a fragmented picture of reality, 
where “On the one side there are human beings, the satisfaction of whose wants is the single 
end of economic activity. On the other side there is everything else, all of which comes into 
consideration only as means to the end of satisfying human wants…nature in general, [has] 
disappeared from view. Economics as a discipline floats free from the physical world."29 This 
is akin to what Karl Polanyi called “disembedding” the economy and subordinating the 
“substance of society…to the laws of the market"4, or what Daly calls the “subsumption” of 
nature under the “property-relation”.29 Much in the same way that economics is not 
equipped to “see” community, it likewise is ill-suited to account for nature, leading to the 
“symbolic death” of nature50, or the “destruction” of the physical world.29 The aspects of 
nature that it can “see” are the ones assigned value, a phenomenon Escobar calls "the 
crematistic (sic) valorization of nature", particularly as carried out by economists in the 
context of development.50 Some have even gone so far as to suggest that “The strains we are 
imposing on the natural world mean that more and more decisions about it are guided by 
economics rather than by other considerations. The luxury of deciding to preserve some 




the fact that humans did not make it gives it intrinsic worth - is fast disappearing.”79 In this 
sense, economic approaches to the environment are potentially hostile toward its intrinsic 
value. 
This view is consistent with an anthropocentric approach to nature.29 Some consider 
the anthropocentric approach to be the operative one in mainstream sustainable 
development thinking (as articulated by the Brundtland Commission), describing it as 
follows: "The essence of the anthropocentric approach to the natural world is that 
humankind is above nature and has the right - divine or otherwise - to subjugate it... the 
anthropocentric approach to the human condition within the natural world is based on 
materialism and the pursuit of wealth...explanations of life are reduced to the material."44 
Others have concurred that the Commission’s “undeviating materialism contrasts sharply 
with this practical eco-centrism…[of] upholding the pre-eminent importance of biological 
over material wealth, of natural capital over human capital.”80 Even the discourse on 
sustainable development is compromised by its materialistic confines. Tools of economic 
valuation of nature arising out of this discourse are criticized as well: “Commodification and 
pricing deny intrinsic value and permit extinction or contamination without regard to future 
consequences. Economic utilitarianism precludes the simple recognition that nature's 
subsidies are unquantifiable.”80 Economics either denies the intrinsic value of nature that lies 
outside the economic system, or materializes its value in order to incorporate it and align it 




contrast starkly with frameworks that place the intrinsic value of nature at the center of its 
understanding. 
 
Biocentrism, Ecological Economics and the Importance of Community 
Opposite this anthropocentric approach is the biocentric approach, which Dick 
Richardson described as “anti-materialist in that it eschews the pursuit of wealth as a goal in 
itself and seeks to enhance the non-material...dimension of human experience. There is 
emphasis on the quality of life as distinct from the quantity of material possessions, on 
feelings and values, on the inner rather than the outer self. Partly this is a question of 
recognizing the wholeness of the self (material and non-material) as well as the wholeness of 
the planet.”44 This alternative approach to reality and prosperity requires “respecting the 
intrinsic value and life of the non-human world and the natural environment,” an intrinsic 
value which extends so far as to exist “independent[ly] of human life" altogether.44 The 
associated approach to sustainability advocates for the de-materialization of the economy or 
"the production and sale of de-materialised ‘services’, rather than material products," in 
recognition of the imperative to preserve intrinsic ecological value.81  
For economists Herman Daly and Stephen Marglin, such a posture toward the 
intrinsic value of nature is synonymous with an expanded concept of community that 
includes all of creation, and here confronts incompatibility again with standard economic 
constructs.30, 82 Escobar offers an example: "Within the Andean worldview...the peasant 




between individual and community, between society and the gods. This live world 
continually re-creates itself through mutual caring by all living beings. This caring depends 
on an intimate and ongoing dialogue between all living beings (including, again, people, 
nature, and the gods), a sort of affirmation of the essence and will of those involved."50 
Clearly, the perception of nature driving economic and mainstream sustainable development 
discourse differs markedly from those operating in communities throughout the world. 
Furthermore, there is substantial evidence that this discourse is ill-suited to address the 
challenges of sustainable development. 
Again, Daly’s perspective as an ecological economist is instructive here. Like Mill and 
Keynes before him, Daly identifies a material prosperity threshold, but one that has 
implications for the environment: "When the economy grows…it grows into the finite, non-
growing ecosystem and incurs the opportunity cost of displaced natural capital and ecological 
services. Beyond some point growth in production and population will begin to increase 
social and environmental costs faster than it increases production benefits, thereby ushering 
in an era of uneconomic growth – growth that on balance makes us poorer rather than 
richer, that increases ‘illth’ faster than wealth, and that is likely to be ecologically 
unsustainable."83 This concept of welfare-damaging uneconomic growth requires the 
perception of the intrinsic value of nature, which is largely impaired by an economic 
paradigm that privileges material accumulation above all else. Further to this point, Daly 
(invoking arguments originally put forward by Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen84) explains how 




of an inability to account for the role of entropy: "there is also a flaw in our very 
understanding of production as a physical process...value added by labor and capital in 
production is added to nothing, not even valueless neutral stuff. But value cannot be added to 
nothing. Neither can it be added to ashes, dust, rust, and the dissipated heat energy in the 
oceans and atmosphere. The lower the entropy of the input the more capable it is of 
receiving the imprint of value added by labor and capital. High entropy resists the addition 
of value. Since human action cannot produce low entropy in net terms we are entirely 
dependent on nature for this ultimate resource by which we live and produce."85 The logic of 
the entropy-uneconomic growth argument is related to the criticism of economics’ 
fragmentation of reality, where nature possesses no value ex-ante or ex-post its incorporation 
into material processes. The discourse of ecological economics reveals the fundamental 
incapacity of a materialism paradigm to cope with the exigencies of sustainable development.  
Not only are materialistic conceptions of nature a threat to sustainability, but the 
economic disregard for social reality poses one as well. Marglin explains how the economic 
dissolution of community – even in its more limited sense – threatens sustainability: 
Contrary to the economic conception of knowledge…under conditions of 
uncertainty, decision makers do not and cannot mobilize the apparatus of 
calculation and maximization. Without something to peg probabilities on, 
individuals necessarily fall back on quite different methods - on intuition, 
conventional behavior, authority - in short, on a different system of 
knowledge from that which drives maximizing behavior. This is a system of 
knowledge that is embedded in community, in the nexus of relationships that 
bind people to one another...and coping with uncertainty is - I insist - 
predominantly a matter of experiential knowledge, and will remain so no 
matter how adept at climbing decision trees or manipulating subjective 




Given the tremendous uncertainty related to climate change, water scarcity, social upheaval 
and various other concerns of sustainable development, "experiential knowledge" - arising 
from the social relations currently under threat by materialism - is critical. The collective 
well-being prescribed by the concept of sustainable development is undermined by only 
preserving "economic conceptions of knowledge". 
Psychology research on environmental attitudes indicates that the role of materialism 
as a value system is just as harmful to sustainability as materialism used to frame the 
theoretical constructs discussed above. Tim Kasser notes that a materialistic orientation leads 
“individuals to make the environmental and competitive choices that cause the tragedy of 
the commons” or that “are often unconcerned with, or actively hostile toward, nature.”77 
Such individuals are likely to personally consume more, less likely to engage in “ecologically-
responsible behaviors”, and have larger ecological footprints overall.43 Others have similarly 
found a negative relationship between materialism and environmental beliefs, and one that is 
rather insidious: “as beliefs in materialism increase, perceptions of environmental problems 
would decrease through processes of selective perception and distortion.”87 These 
psychological dynamics occurring at the individual level are strikingly similar to those 
shaping the economic discourse at a more theoretical level, where information inconsistent 
with the operating paradigm becomes abstract and recedes out of the realm of consideration. 
This regime of materialism puts the aims of sustainable development just that much further 





Alternative Conceptions of Prosperity 
These failures to meet the needs of the current generation as well as those in the 
future constitute a pressing need to identify alternative paradigms. The conclusion 
psychologists have come to is that a new pattern of behavior and belief grounded in the 
pursuit of intrinsic values is essential for human well-being: “Intrinsic values are based in 
people’s real psychological needs, support their growth and development, and…lead us to 
engage in behaviors and have experiences that satisfy our underlying psychological needs. As 
these needs are satisfied, our well-being increases.”63 Also, as individuals experience 
increased need satisfaction, they are likely to regenerate the value they attach to those 
experiences and diminish attachment to materialistic aims. Various frameworks have been 
created to outline those pursuits with intrinsic value. 
 
Intrinsic Value and Capabilities 
In the context of development, the capabilities discourse is most aligned with – and 
inspired by – the promotion of intrinsic value. Amartya Sen has offered a reformulation of 
the development question where a suite of freedoms or capabilities form "the primary end 
and the principal means of development,"88 redirecting the discourse to the fundamental 
non-material components of prosperity. For Sen, poverty is cast as capability deprivation 
instead of the more common narrow conception of income-poverty, specifically in order to 
capture intrinsic over instrumental value.89 Development is then “an expansion of people’s 




seen as a process of emancipation from the enforced necessity to ‘live less or be less’.”90 
Martha Nussbaum has formalized Sen's approach in the following 10 capabilities91:  
1. Life. Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length; not 
dying prematurely, or before one's life is so reduced as to be not worth living. 
2. Bodily Health. Being able to have good health, including reproductive 
health; to be adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter. 
3. Bodily Integrity. Being able to move freely from place to place; to be secure 
against violent assault, including sexual assault and domestic violence; having 
opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for choice in matters of reproduction. 
4. Senses, Imagination, and Thought. Being able to use the senses, to imagine, 
think, and reason—and to do these things in a "truly human" way, a way 
informed and cultivated by an adequate education, including, but by no means 
limited to, literacy and basic mathematical and scientific training. Being able 
to use imagination and thought in connection with experiencing and 
producing works and events of one's own choice, religious, literary, musical, 
and so forth. Being able to use one's mind in ways protected by guarantees of 
freedom of expression with respect to both political and artistic speech, and 
freedom of religious exercise. Being able to have pleasurable experiences and 
to avoid non-beneficial pain. 
5. Emotions. Being able to have attachments to things and people outside 
ourselves; to love those who love and care for us, to grieve at their absence; in 
general, to love, to grieve, to experience longing, gratitude, and justified anger. 
Not having one's emotional development blighted by fear and anxiety. 
(Supporting this capability means supporting forms of human association that 
can be shown to be crucial in their development.) 
6. Practical Reason. Being able to form a conception of the good and to 
engage in critical reflection about the planning of one's life. (This entails 
protection for the liberty of conscience and religious observance.) 
7. Affiliation. 
- Being able to live with and toward others, to recognize and show 




interaction; to be able to imagine the situation of another. (Protecting 
this capability means protecting institutions that constitute and nourish 
such forms of affiliation, and also protecting the freedom of assembly and 
political speech.) 
- Having the social bases of self-respect and non-humiliation; being able to 
be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others. 
This entails provisions of non-discrimination on the basis of race, sex, 
sexual orientation, ethnicity, caste, religion, national origin and species. 
8. Other Species. Being able to live with concern for and in relation to 
animals, plants, and the world of nature. 
9. Play. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities. 
10. Control over one's Environment. 
- Political. Being able to participate effectively in political choices that 
govern one's life; having the right of political participation, protections of 
free speech and association. 
- Material. Being able to hold property (both land and movable goods), and 
having property rights on an equal basis with others; having the right to 
seek employment on an equal basis with others; having the freedom from 
unwarranted search and seizure. In work, being able to work as a human, 
exercising practical reason and entering into meaningful relationships of 
mutual recognition with other workers. 
Many others have proposed similar frameworks28, 63, 92, and echoed similar sentiments: “the 
transition to sustainable consumption and production [is] part of a global enterprise which 
enables all individuals to fulfill their dual purpose, namely to develop their inherent 
potentialities and to contribute to the betterment of the wider community.”36 From this list 
of capabilities, it becomes clear that a materialistic orientation is ill-suited to the 




impulse – employed widely as a strategy to achieve development objectives – is not just 
unlikely to bring about an expansion in capabilities, but is likely to stifle the realization of 
some of them (2, 6, 10) if not displace the pursuit of them altogether (5,  7, 8). Sudhir Anand 
and Sen point out that material wealth does have instrumental value to the promotion of 
capabilities, but it is “nonunique” in this respect.40 They also, while acknowledging the 
material benefits of intrinsic human development, reject this as the motivating objective, as 
well as the reduction of human beings to their material functions. Additionally, Sen warns 
against the convenient exclusive focus on “material capabilities” in economics.93 Insofar as 
economics only "reads" material aspects of reality, it is missing major aspects of both the ends 
and means of development. 
 
The Contribution of Intrinsic Value to Well-Being 
Psychologists have found that these intrinsic value orientations are conducive to well-
being: “values that might act as a counterweight to the materialistic values...are the same set 
of values that are associated with high levels of personal well-being, the same set of values 
that conduce towards civil social behavior, and the same set of values that promote ecological 
sustainability. In a way, then, the basic strategy...is clear and simple: Work against the 
insalubrious effects of materialistic values by enhancing the likelihood that people can 
behave in ways that express intrinsic values.”43 These conclusions are based on evidence from 




value instead of materialism both experience and contribute more to well-being, creating a 
dynamic reinforcement in the welfare promotion of society and the individual.63 
Even approaches to consumption can be informed by a restoration of intrinsic value. 
Scitovsky distinguishes between what he calls “defensive” consumption and “creative” 
consumption. The former serves chiefly material ends of providing comfort and the latter is 
an instrument for stimulation, where "One of the main forms of human satisfaction is 
stimulus enjoyment."94 He notes that creative consumption is skill-intensive, providing 
positive externalities and defensive consumption is resource-intensive, creating negative 
externalities. The skills of creative consumption are directed at intrinsic cultural pursuits, 
which are a potentially unlimited source of satisfaction: “We must acquire the consumption 
skills that will give us access to society's accumulated stock of past novelty and so enable us 
to supplement at will and almost without limit the currently available flow of novelty as a 
source of stimulation."95 He underscores the social implications of the difference between the 
two: “The individual consumer's choice, therefore, between comfort and stimulus has a social 
significance that transcends his personal welfare...if one of these commodities provides 
comfort and the other, at the same market price, provides stimulus, then they may give the 
consumer the same satisfaction, but the total satisfaction they provide for society as a whole 
is likely to be very different."60 This approach to consumption, directed at intrinsic pursuits, 
has recently been demonstrated by psychologists to be more effective in promoting 




Psychologists make a similar distinction between material consumption, “made with 
the primary intention of acquiring a material good: a tangible object that is kept in one’s 
possession,” and experiential purchases, “made with the primary intention of acquiring a life 
experience: an event or series of events that one lives through.”97 Experiential purchases, 
akin to creative consumption, made individuals happier than material ones. Psychologists 
have explained this by suggesting that experiential spending is “inherently more social,” and 
“almost anything we do to improve our connections with others tends to improve our 
happiness as well—and that includes spending money.”96 Several studies have confirmed the 
conclusion that socially-oriented spending is a greater source of happiness than spending to 
acquire material possessions.73, 97, 98  
Psychologists distinguish welfare-enhancing forms of consumption on the basis that 
they facilitate the intrinsic value of social relations and interaction. Scitovsky makes the 
distinction on the basis that the consumption requires appreciation of the intrinsic value of 
material-independent sources of stimulation. Neither of these forms of consumption derives 
their benefit from an acquisitive nature, and both are experience-based (over material-
based). 
Beyond experiential purchases, psychologists have identified a strong and consistent 
relationship between prosocial spending and well-being.96, 99 Much of this research on 
prosocial behavior deals with adherence to materialistic values—where prosociality places 
less emphasis on self-interested material accumulation. Not only do individuals who spend 




on oneself was not associated with happiness99, contrary to much of economic shorthand 
where utility, the principal component of welfare, is conventionally reduced to a function of 
consumption. Psychologists also note that materialistic impulses can swiftly subvert prosocial 
behavior, making people “less likely to help acquaintances, to donate to charity, or to choose 
to spend time with others, precisely the kinds of behaviors that are strongly associated with 
happiness.”100 Dismantling the materialism paradigm is imperative. 
As is characteristic of a paradigm, materialism is deeply-entrenched in the 
assumptions, institutions and interactions permeating human reality. Scholars across the 
disciplinary spectrum have acknowledged this and assert that the underlying materialistic 
logic and frameworks must be dismantled in order to reconstruct reality and prosperity upon 
a different basis. One targets economics, advocating "questioning and confronting the 
misguided scientism, the rampant materialism, and naturalism that has long inspired 
orthodox economists,” warning that “Sidestepping values like justice, community, equality, 
dignity, the guidance of economic policy may very well operate to corrode these very values 
and create an individualistic and overly competitive society with an ever-worsening craving 
for power and the acquisition of consumer goods."101 Another says, "Preventing the collapse 
of human civilization requires nothing less than a wholesale transformation of dominant 
cultural patterns."41 Yet another insists that policy must be directed not at the “outcome of 
cultural processes” but rather at the “process that engenders materialism in the first place. 
That is, the institutions of the DSP of society."55 Still another calls for “an organic change in 




body—as well as the interconnectedness with the natural world that sustains it.”36 Above all, 
it is abundantly clear that attempting to manipulate the end-product outcomes of human 
well-being while maintaining ambivalence toward the underlying dynamics sustaining the 
materialism paradigm is ultimately a fruitless and possibly harm-exacerbating endeavor. 
 
Equilibria, Preferences and Incentives 
The promotion of materialism is antithetical to the goal of sustainable development, 
and the solution is to restore intrinsic value. While material wealth can promote some 
capabilities, materialism has been found to erode them. This requires the systematic 
unraveling of the beliefs and inclinations that perpetuate materialistic logic combined with 
vigilant adherence to an intrinsic value-promoting framework which has demonstrated 
contributions to well-being. Economics has instead been notoriously indifferent toward 
individuals’ preferences as drivers of their behavior.  
Traditionally, economics posits that the tastes and preferences guiding individuals’ 
behavior are static and exogenous to the system in which the behavior is taking place. 
Furthermore, it assumes that individuals are the best “rational” judge of what choices they 
should make, and their behavior is a perfect reflection not only of their preferences, but also 
of what will contribute most to their well-being. These assumptions “seemed to rule out - as 
a logical impossibility - any conflict between what man chooses to get and what will best 
satisfy him. Economists today consider the two synonymous. They accept unquestioningly 




motivation of consumer behavior."102 The problem, of course, lies with the fact that 
preferences can be learned, and they may be harmful for the well-being of individuals, the 
environment and society – especially since psychologists consider people to have a “poor 
grasp” of how to achieve the things that will make them happy. Marglin explains that in 
order to cope with this assumption of static preferences, economists further assume 
“unbounded wants” – part and parcel of Hegel’s bad infinity19 – and impute this quality to 
universal human nature.54 Additionally, economics assumes that “human behavior is driven 
in all settings entirely by external material inducements and sanctions,”103 but its associated 
“values, habits, and social norms [are] taken as given and beyond analysis and the reach of 
public policy.”104 Economics may have only intended to concern itself with means, but in 
“preferring to remaining silent” on “the important choice of ends,”101 it inadvertently offered 
up its means as the only ends worth pursuing.  
Economic logic has actively generated people’s materialistic preferences, particularly 
through the use of incentives. By further defining “the utility of an action solely in terms of 
the consequences of this action,”105 economics’ ability to recognize the displacement of 
intrinsic value along with its associated harmful effects is compromised. Furthermore, with 
respect to the promotion of well-being through the restoration of intrinsic value, economics 
has determined that it is totally unconcerned. It is difficult to see how mainstream economics 
with its materialistic, generative assumptions and lack of consideration for the origins of 
human motivation, is equipped to provide guidance on a collective enterprise to “meet the 




own needs.” This is especially hard to conceive in light of the significant welfare reductions 
associated with materialism combined with economics’ impaired self-awareness of how it is 
implicated in this process. 
It is puzzling that a paradigm that has so undermined human well-being in multiple 
ways should persist, especially one that was meant to deliver global prosperity. Materialism, 
like other fictitious constructs, can persist despite its empty promises. Work by Hoff and 
Stiglitz demonstrates that a paradigm operative in a culture influences both perceptions and 
behaviors of individuals, even if the paradigm is based on a fiction or is otherwise 
suboptimal. Fictitious social constructs can be “hierarchized and given precedence over other 
aspects of belief systems in which [the social construct] might be viewed as unacceptable. 
[The social construct is] entrenched and embedded in individuals’ minds through ritual and 
protocol."106 They also explain that these constructs can become established regardless of the 
preexisting economic reality: “If ideologies change, the equilibrium can change, with no 
change in the ‘fundamentals.’” These ideologies then unconsciously shape how people 
understand the information they encounter, which in turn dictates their preferences. The 
introduction of a materialistic paradigm in development is akin to an ideological shift of this 
sort. Though it is clearly ill-suited to the purposes of sustainable development, materialism 
has effectively been instituted through the development enterprise and has become sustained 
in an equilibrium, functioning as a paradigm. The “external material inducements and 




of work that examines their effect on human behavior and the premise of static and 
exogenous preferences.  
Every aspect of human endeavor can derive its motivation intrinsically or 
extrinsically. Economists have informed a great deal of social policy to provide extrinsic 
(material) incentives to individuals in order to induce them to behave in a particular way. 
Several scholars have studied the impact of such incentives and have found that they often 
tend to “crowd-out” positive behavior. Richard Titmuss famously posited that due to 
provision of incentives to encourage blood donation in Britain, voluntary contributions had 
instead gone down, as had the quality of the blood donated.107 Elinor Ostrom has also found 
that overuse of common property resources occurs when the state institutes fines and 
subsidies to encourage conservation. Ostrom explains that this approach to social policy is 
based on materialistic assumptions “that only short-term selfish actions are expected from 
‘the common people’,” and “solving collective-action problems requires public policies that 
are based on externally designed and monitored inducements.”103 
People often voluntarily behave in a particular way, yet upon the introduction of 
extrinsic rewards to promote that behavior, paradoxically reduce that behavior instead. 
Economists have hypothesized that this “crowding-out” occurs because the non-material 
social value driving people’s motivation is displaced by a value confined only to a material 
payment.108 The intrinsic value one assigned to blood donating has been displaced by a 
material value assigned to blood selling. Since total donation declined, it becomes clear that 




than the resulting material extrinsic value that replaced it. In some way, bringing an 
endeavor within the parameters of the materialism regime – or as psychologists have 
described it, “moving behaviors from the social realm into the economic realm”99 – destroys 
overall value for society. Tim Kasser explains that “rewards do decrease people’s motivation, 
interest, and enjoyment for what are initially intrinsically motivating activities,”109 thus 
robbing people of the  intrinsic benefits associated with non-material endeavors. Elizabeth 
Dunn et al have also noted that merely thinking about money may generate the dynamics 
that lead to crowding out.96 This would indicate that any nurturing of materialistic impulse is 
destructive of intrinsic value and its associated contributions benefiting society. 
Crowding-out generates negative social dynamics as well. When individuals perceive 
that others are behaving cooperatively, they themselves are motivated by commitment, 
honor and duty to contribute to public goods, generating a cooperative equilibrium. With 
the introduction of incentives, the intrinsic value individuals derive from cooperation, 
demonstrations of altruism and material sacrifice for the common good are undermined by 
appeals to their materialistic self-interest. When this occurs, if some individuals respond 
with diminished contributions to the public good, “reciprocity dynamics will induce still 
others to contribute less, thereby inducing others to do the same. This new noncooperative 
equilibrium that results is likely to be impervious to the subsequent removal of material 
incentives.”110 Society has thus become entrenched in a materialistic regime. This regime is 
characterized by the destruction of trust between individuals who are now unwilling to 




endeavor one already considers intrinsically valuable, introducing extrinsic material 
motivation erodes the likelihood that the behavior will be sustained by individuals or 
collectively. Material incentives, as instruments of the materialism regime, do not behave 
surgically and cannot simply be removed. They intimately reorder the value and motivation 
assigned to other aspects of life. 
Taking the crowding-out argument one step further, some have suggested that 
preferences themselves are formed endogenously. Providing incentives does not merely alter 
the behavior of individuals and their perceptions of intrinsic value, but it actually transforms 
their underlying preferences. This type of analysis differs from the analysis of crowding-out 
because it “focuses on the possibility that monetary incentives may induce a change in the 
underlying preference profile. The outcome of such a preference shift may indeed change the 
relative importance of intrinsic motivation and of extrinsic monetary rewards."112 And 
research shows that it is people with materialistic values for whom the relative importance of 
extrinsic monetary rewards is higher.109 The circumplex research on the compatibility of 
different goals supports this idea of preference change. Designing programs intended to 
actively stimulate materialistic motivation impairs people's ability to pursue goals upon a 
different basis. This interpretation would also be consistent with the tendency of materialism 
to operate as a paradigm.  
Oren Bar-Gill and Chaim Fershtman developed a model of a society with socially-
minded and non-socially-minded individuals who respond to subsidized contributions to a 




socially-minded ones. Eventually, this causes convergence to an equilibrium with fewer 
socially-minded individuals and a decline in social incentives. In essence, the previously 
socially-minded players "learn" to be materialistic. Not only do the material incentives cause 
"the disappearance of the social incentives," but they are also not sufficient to offset this, 
"result[ing] in a lower level of the public good."113 They also point out that these new 
preferences can proliferate not just by “learning” but also by transmission: “Preferences may 
evolve as a result of cultural transmission by which a socialization process transmits 
preferences across generations or through an imitation process by which individuals imitate 
other more ‘successful’ individuals.”113 These multiple modes of endogenous preference 
formation could lead to the ideological equilibrium described by Hoff and Stiglitz, with 
incentives establishing materialism as convention. 
The crowding-out literature indicates that material incentives rob activities of their 
intrinsic value and the preference formation literature indicates that these individuals also 
have learned to care less about social rewards. Taken together, it becomes apparent how 
Hobson’s “over-stimulation” of these material “instincts” causes individuals to adopt 
materialistic attitudes and simultaneously experience diminished satisfaction from activities 
that no longer possess intrinsic value. Bar-Gill and Fershtman explain the implications of 
their findings: "in designing an optimal public policy, it is not enough to consider the 
possible reaction of individuals to that policy; we should take into account as well the effects 
of different policies on the formation of preferences and subsequently on behavior."112 In 




unacceptable. Economics, particularly in its role to inform social policy, must be willing to 
deviate from its conventional thinking if it is to promote human welfare. 
 
The Psychology of Incentives 
Research examining the impacts of incentives on human psychology explains these 
results further. Systematic review of the psychology literature reveals that incentives like the 
ones used by economists directly undermine intrinsic motivation for the behaviors they are 
designed to elicit.114 Recent neurological115 and business116 research confirm these findings. 
This result has multiple causes, all of which are consistent with a materialistic premise. With 
the introduction of an incentive, the material reward becomes what is compelling about the 
activity. If the incentive conveys the belief that the behavior would not take place without 
the reward, the behavior then requires inducement. The activity is therefore diminished in 
value and requires an opportunity for reward in order to rally the necessary motivation. 
Finally, the activity may be reduced to the opportunity to acquire a material reward which 
not only diminishes intrinsic value, but may actually assign some negative value to the 
activity.114 Conversely, “when people are induced to engage in an activity with little or no 
extrinsic reward, they come to value the activity more highly, that is, they come to believe 
that their actions were intrinsically motivated."111 Kasser explains that welfare is lost with 
these decreases in intrinsic motivation: “Materialistic values lead people to enter into 
activities focused on rewards. As a consequence, those who believe in the importance of such 




intrinsically motivated. Their concern with money and praise distracts them from the 
interesting, enjoyable, and challenging aspects of what they are doing.”109 
The economic incentives that have been designed for use in development (discussed 
in the next section), are those described by psychologists as: expected, tangible, completion-
contingent, non-verbal, exogenous rewards. They are "rewards introduced [before] task 
performance, such that participants [expected] them while working on the target activity”, 
“given for completing one or more tasks”, “are not an inherent part of the task", and not 
contingent upon the participants performing well. This particular type of reward was in all 
respects found "to undermine intrinsic motivation, assessed with both [behavior and 
attitudes]"114, meaning that the materialistic impulses associated with the incentives 
subverted the activity’s intrinsic value both in terms of the participant’s stated as well as 
revealed preferences. There is also some evidence to suggest that “the phenomenon of 
extrinsic tangible rewards undermining intrinsic motivation is not merely transitory.”114 
Additionally, these sorts of incentives are perceived to be controlling, which is also 
linked to diminished intrinsic motivation. Psychologists have found that the way an 
incentive affects an individual’s feelings of autonomy is the most important consideration in 
understanding the impact of the reward on the individual. The psychological need of 
autonomy is what drives intrinsic motivation, and “Events that allow need satisfaction tend 
to increase intrinsic motivation whereas those that thwart need satisfaction tend to decrease 
intrinsic motivation.”114 Kasser indicates that materialistic values undermine these very needs 




in the dimensions that are monitored, and potentially reducing effort in the dimensions that 
are not.103 The problems with coercion complicate the use of incentives as a means to induce 
individuals to behave in certain ways: “Although rewards can control people's behavior—
indeed, that is presumably why they are so widely advocated…[when they] focus on the 
short term and opt for controlling people's behavior, they may be having a substantially 
negative long-term effect…Thus, if people use tangible rewards, it is necessary that they be 
extremely careful if they are concerned about the intrinsic motivation and task persistence of 
the people they are rewarding."114 Such incentives may be appealing to economists because 
they appear to provide an efficient and effective impetus for an individual to behave 
optimally. However, this efficiency is based on coercion that is not costless in the long-run, 
is inherently unsustainable, and does not lead to intrinsic improvement of the activity tied to 
the incentive. 
Other research indicates that the introduction of materialistic impulses even in one 
narrow sphere of human existence can cause materialistic preferences to proliferate 
throughout an individual’s behavior and society. Samuel Bowles explains that preferences are 
generalized in one’s behavior: "However acquired, preferences are internalized: there is 
considerable evidence that preferences learned under one set of circumstances become 
generalized reasons for behavior. Thus economic institutions may induce specific behaviors – 
self-regarding, opportunistic, or cooperative, say – which then become part of the behavioral 
repertoire of the individual…'likes' or habits initially induced by exposure or repetition 




tendency for dissonance reduction, where individuals seek coherence between the different 
aspects of their lives, thereby causing them to align and converge. Therefore, a materialistic 
change in preferences in one sphere affects the orientation of individuals in the other aspects 
of their lives. Bowles also explains the role of conformist transmission: “the prevalence of a 
trait in a population may enhance the replication propensity of each representative of that 
trait, independently of the payoff to those exhibiting the trait.”111 By nurturing materialistic 
impulses through the use of something like incentives, the subsequent drive for dissonance 
reduction combined with conformist transmission proliferates materialism throughout the 
reality of the individual and society, constituting an “ideological shift”, and establishing a 
materialism paradigm in equilibrium. Materially-poor contexts like those encountered in 
development may be particularly susceptible to these dynamics. Research has shown that 
individuals whose circumstances have been characterized by insecurity and material 
deprivation have a higher propensity toward adopting materialistic tendencies when 
messages in their environment promote those aspirations.117  
 
Material Incentives in Development 
Much of the legacy of development has been guided by the materialistic assumptions 
present in economics. The current development trends are no different, and offer a study of 
how the materialism paradigm may be introduced and what its effects are. Despite all that is 
known about the harm of materialism and the coercive nature of material incentives, many 




improve outcomes. Development programs currently pay (or otherwise materially-
incentivize) people in order to promote ecological conservationi, discourage corruptionj, 
encourage school enrolment and health system access, care for orphans and vulnerable 
children and increase health and education services in underserved areas, among others. This 
section examines the justification offered for such programs and what the preliminary 
findings have been. 
 
Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) 
Conditional cash transfers are programs that target poor households and provide 
material incentives for behaviors related to health and education such as school enrolment, 
nutrition monitoring, and regular health unit visits. CCT programs appear to be the new 
“wave” in development, having operated in only 3 countries in 1997 to at least 30 just over a 
decade later throughout the Americas, Africa, Asia and the Pacific.118 In some Latin 
American countries, they serve millions of households and constitute the largest social 
assistance program.118 Some have even said they are “as close as you can come to a magic 
bullet in development.”118 The widespread implementation of these incentive-based 
programs suggests that Keynes’ “‘purposiveness’ with which in varying degrees Nature has 
                                                 
i See Appendix A 




endowed almost all of us,” is in fact seen to be a universal trait – potentially elicited in a 
variety of social, cultural and geographical contexts. 
The rationale behind CCTs is to act as a subsidy for particular action, thereby 
inducing “optimal” behavior through increased supply of the action.119 CCTs are top-down in 
their design, with the conditionality predetermined and imposed from the outside. CCTs are 
widely regarded favorably,118, 120 and the World Bank assessment of CCT programs concluded 
that: “Our review of the CCT experience so far confirms that the programs have been 
effective in the sense that there is solid evidence of their positive impacts in reducing short-
term poverty and increasing the use of education and health services. Those achievements 
should not be minimized because they are powerful proof that well-designed public 
programs can have significant effects on critical social indicators.”118 Others, however, have 
not been so optimistic. Nicholas Freeland has linked CCTs to the legacy of the development 
approaches mentioned earlier: “It is redolent of the ‘conditionalities’ imposed by IMF, World 
Bank and other donors when making loans or implementing budget support programmes, a 
perpetuation of the mind-set that imposed ‘structural adjustment’ and enforced ‘poverty 
reduction strategies’.”121 Like those programs, CCTs are founded upon a materialistic logic. 
CCT design is embedded in a framework that sees human development as an 
instrument of material ends. Consistent with the previous eras in development, the 
framework motivating the design of CCTs regularly justify activities of intrinsic value in 
terms of what material benefits they might generate. Health and education are seen 




exclusively “value the benefits” of improved health and education in terms of “increased 
future earnings."118, 122 This reinforces the notion that the promotion of human development 
is only worthwhile to the extent that it facilitates material ends. Notably, the intrinsic value 
of pursuing programs for the purpose of increasing future wages never receives justification. 
One author further notes that "Education and human capital have been treated as though 
they were synonymous. The basic stated aim of transfers conditional on school attendance is 
to increase the human capital of beneficiaries. The predominance of income as a proxy for 
well-being, however, neglects the intrinsic value of education."123 Similarly, the choice to 
pursue education has been framed as a question of trading-off present for future welfare in 
terms of future earnings.118 The logic of the justification of CCTs taken to its natural 
conclusion seems to imply that if there were no clear material return on these investments in 
human capital, then human development would simply not be worth pursuing. 
Material compensation paradoxically has the potential to signal either 
acknowledgment and appreciation of intrinsic value by society, or recognition of the need to 
provide incentive because of insufficient intrinsic value. Which of these opposing 
interpretations dominates is dependent upon the context in which the compensation takes 
place and what justifications are provided. That these payments all take place in the context 
of “incentives” and the justifications for the programs are not based on the intrinsic value of 
the behaviors they encourage, suggests that material value needs to be provided because 
some other source of sufficient value does not already exist. This is confirmed by the 




particularly damaging to intrinsic motivation. CCTs are therefore embedded in a paradigm of 
economic and materialistic logic which is at odds with the intrinsic value of the activities 
they are meant to promote.  
In its review of CCTs, the World Bank is surprisingly direct about utilizing material 
inducements to elicit certain behaviors rather than promoting their intrinsic value to the 
recipients: “Suppose that, for some reason, potential beneficiaries are poorly informed about 
the future returns to education…the optimal policy intervention is to address the 
information problem—say through a publicity campaign. But processing information may be 
costly: Being convinced about the health benefits of greater schooling, for instance, may 
require time and effort to process the evidence.”118 The report then proceeds to assert that 
“inaccurate beliefs may result from the insufficient availability of information or from 
difficulties in processing the information that is available. If parents are poorly educated, it 
may limit their ability to process the information on education complementarities or on rates 
of return.”118  Because of this "limited ability" on the part of recipients, CCTs essentially 
convert health and education into opportunities to acquire cash, as conveying the intrinsic 
value of health and education is simply too difficult. These analyses assume, of course that 
preferences are static and exogenous,118, 124 and by attaching a conditionality to the transfer, 
there is an implicit detachment from participants’ belief in the intrinsic value of the activity 
meant to be enhanced. These programs are therefore ambivalent toward the intrinsic 
motivation of these endeavors, and regard the value attached to the cash transfer as the only 




the design of development programs will embody this, and elicit this sort of behavior. In the 
case of CCTs, this might be viewing the purpose of the program as an opportunity to acquire 
cash. 
The research on crowding out and endogenous preference formation suggest that 
CCTs may be less desirable approaches to sustainable development. By design, these 
programs see both the causes of the “problem” and benefits of the program as exclusively 
material. An approach that is unconcerned with intrinsic improvement is likely to be 
ineffective in generating such improvement, and focusing on material benefit – both in terms 
of cash transfers to participants and the cost effectiveness of the program – does not expand 
capabilities and instead promotes materialistic motivation. 
 
Initial Findings 
Inherent to the dynamics of materialism61 and incentives112, it is possible to observe 
some short-term gains in optimal behavior or increased welfare, with these disappearing in 
the long-run, often reverting individuals back to a level of well-being lower than their initial 
state. It may therefore be too early to assess the full long-term individual and social impacts 
of CCT programs in most countries. However, the initial results are still consistent with what 
one would expect for programs informed by a materialistic paradigm. While CCTs appear to 
be effective tools for material poverty reduction, their performance in terms of health and 




Given that intrinsic improvements in health and education are presumably the basis for the 
conditionality, the impact of these programs is limited.  
Consistent with the materialism regime more generally, CCTs are effective in their 
function to promote material accumulation, and this is the basis of much of the praise it has 
received.118 CCTs have been effective buffers against adverse economic impacts and are 
capable of acting as “counter-cyclical economic and social stabilizers.”125 More specifically, 
the Mexican CCT Progresa (now Oportunidades), has recently been demonstrated to act as 
an effective insurance mechanism against exogenous income shocks for rural households.126 
However, cash transfers generally are used as poverty-reduction measures that enable 
households to smooth their consumption. The advantage of these programs is meant to arise 
specifically from their contributions to human development.  
Child labor is the economic dimension that is at the interface with human 
development and is arguably the most relevant to the design of CCTs. The rationale that 
these programs are meant to ease the “trade-off between present and future welfare” is based 
on the idea that child labor is a major barrier to school enrolment, and necessitates the 
existence of a cash transfer conditioned on child education. However, these incentives have 
been ineffective at reducing child labor. 124, 127 
CCTs have similarly demonstrated little improvement in human development 
directly. While school enrolment has been shown to go up rather consistently (mostly when 
pre-program enrolment rates were low)118, 128, attendance and retention improvement is 




enrolment statistics mask other underlying dynamics: one CCT that “reduce[d] the price of 
girls’ education compared with that of boys’ education” resulted in “a 29 percent decline in 
boys’ enrollment in program schools.”124  
The impact on health has been similar. Health service utilization appears to have 
increased, though not as clearly as school enrolment118, improvements in nutrition are 
inconsistent118, 128, and both immunization coverage130 and health status have not clearly 
improved.118, 128, 130 In some cases, health has actually been negatively affected.131 
Interestingly, whatever improvements there may be in outcomes do not appear to be due to 
the incentive at all. Neither the cash component118, nor the existence of the conditionality125 
appear to be the “keys to success,” but rather “the information [and] awareness programmes 
provide.”125 
Although the impact of CCTs on intrinsic motivation has not been measured, CCTs 
are precisely the sort of incentive design psychologists have determined to be the most 
detrimental to intrinsic motivation. Additionally, it is possible to assess the impact of these 
programs on participant autonomy which psychologists have found to be the most important 
factor in determining intrinsic motivation (as discussed previously). 
Autonomy is undermined when participants perceive an incentive to be controlling, 
and studies have revealed repeated accounts of coercive dynamics in CCTs.124, 127, 132-134 The 
CCT in Brazil had initially demonstrated a negative impact on nutrition because “mothers 
may have kept children underweight under the mistaken belief that they would lose their 




(fertility rose 2-4%) because subsidies went to pregnant women.134 In many cases, the CCTs 
have been used as a tool of political manipulation.127 Clearly, CCTs can undermine the 
autonomy of participants by controlling their behavior with incentives. 
There have also been particularly worrying trends with cash transfers that have a 
significant social protection mandate – orphans and vulnerable children (OVC). These have 
become quite common in AIDS-endemic regions in particular. While only some of these are 
CCTs in the conventional sense, they all require the recipient to be caring for an orphan, and 
thus behave as an incentive. A South African OVC program offering a cash transfer that is 
considerably higher than other cash transfer programs led poor families to place their 
children in other people’s care.135 The OVC program in Zambia has had even more 
disconcerting impacts: 
What [OVC programs] didn't think about was the fact that in local culture AIDS 
orphans, all orphans in fact, are naturally absorbed into the extended family. The 
idea of orphan didn't even really exist. But once the NGOs started singling out 
these children and their caregivers, they created a social and economical reality 
that hadn't existed before. Families, desperate for money would begin to withhold 
their care for these orphans unless paid and all sorts of social problems arose.136 
This example demonstrates that preferences can change radically as a result of incentives tied 
to endeavors of intrinsic value. Here, a long-standing value system, arguably more 
sustainable than that offered by materialism, was rapidly dismantled, and in direct response 
to the presence of an incentive. Mobilizing the materialistic impulse is not costless and can 




Even Desmond Tutu has indicated that CCTs are characterized by unjust power 
dynamics: “Conditionalities attached to social transfers tend to prevent the poorest families – 
the very people who most desperately need income support – from accessing grants.”121 
Because the cost of conditionality is highest for the most vulnerable,121 these programs, 
directed at the poorest, are inherently coercive: “it is morally highly questionable whether a 
government (often encouraged by donors) can, on the one hand, proudly tell its citizens that 
social protection is their basic ‘human right’; and then, on the other hand, threaten to 
deprive the neediest among them of that very ‘right’ if they fail to meet certain 
‘conditions’.”121 Because of the extreme economic and often social vulnerability of the 
intended recipients of CCTs, incentives are particularly coercive and likely to inculcate 
materialistic values.137 
The World Bank report has also alluded to the coercive dynamics of CCTs, saying: 
“By pushing poor households to do something that they would otherwise not be doing, CCTs 
might be imposing costly distractions on people who are trying to do the best thing for their 
families under conditions of severe scarcity.”118 Elsewhere the report even likened CCTs to 
bribes: “it is possible to set a CCT level too high, thus encouraging children to a rate of 
service use that is greater than optimal. This situation is evocative of anecdotes about 
children wasting valuable time in classrooms where they learn nothing instead of helping 
their parents in the field, or of children taken to unsanitary health facilities that act as 
disease contamination foci because parents have been bribed to take the risk.”118 However, 




instruments.”118 In other words, CCTs are tools that are rather transparently intended to 
mobilize people’s materialistic impulses – where education quality is irrelevant and 
recipients would go so far as to undermine the health objective so long as they appear to 
comply with it superficially in order to receive payment – and incorporate a risk-return 
construct which holds health and education as equivalent (if not inferior to) material 
accumulation. Loss of the incentive clearly poses a threat that coerces participants into taking 
risks. 
CCTs are increasingly popular, but this may be because they suit the needs of donors 
quite well compared to those of recipients:  
Conditional cash transfer programs also serve the direct purpose of imposing 
donor preferences when tastes over allocations differ…Conditional cash 
transfer programs are thus suitable tools for aid agencies to move toward the 
announced objectives, although the exclusive focus on measurable dimensions 
of performance may come at the expense of more comprehensive and efficient 
development policies, whose impacts are difficult to assess…the temptation to 
implement programs that perform better only on the verifiable dimension may 
be high. This may lead to conditional cash transfer programs that enhance 
efficiency but worsen equity or that yield immediate gains but impose long-
run costs.124  
This suggests that the dynamic of coercion may be operating at multiple levels in the design 
of these programs, where funding acts as its own incentive for agencies to comply with 
donor priorities. This example is akin to the coercive dynamic typical of incentives 
discovered in the psychology research (cited previously), where individuals only exert effort 




objective with intrinsic value in other ways. Clearly, the autonomy of both participants and 
country agencies has been compromised in the pursuit of CCT programs. 
CCTs have been found to be somewhat effective at increasing rates associated with 
their conditionalities (e.g. school enrolment, health unit visits). However, they have been 
inconsistent in terms of outcomes which are more closely associated with meaningful, 
intrinsic improvements in health and education. Additionally, questions about sustainability 
and intergenerational benefits are widely noted.123, 127 Despite acknowledging all this, reports 
overwhelmingly conclude that “In contrast to many development programs, the recent 
expansion of conditional cash transfer programs is based on fairly solid evidence of program 
impact.”138 This leads one to suspect whether the intrinsic value of health and education was 
ever at the heart of CCT thinking to begin with. Improved school enrolment or health 
system access rates would be meaningful indicators of human development if they occurred 
in a context where the intrinsic value of these contributions to well-being was intact. When 
programs choose to elicit behavior with material inducements and are ambivalent toward the 
intrinsic value of health and education, they are emphasizing that the cash transfer is what is 
valuable, leading recipients to focus primarily on that. Furthermore, by touting these 
inconsistent results as definitive success, proponents of CCTs are implicitly content with 
reducing the value and purpose of health and education to opportunities to acquire cash. 
A cash transfer conditioned on adherence to certain health or education behaviors 
would appear initially to assign intrinsic value these endeavors. It becomes clear, however, 




foundation, where efficacy relies on the responsiveness of beneficiaries to materialistic 
impulses, not merely “providing funds to help overcome some financial barriers to access.”134 
The programs also appear to make only superficial gains in health and education, revealing a 
rather limited value of these endeavors inherent in the design of CCTs. They are furthermore 
presented in the framework of “incentives”, and evidence of their coercive dynamics suggests 
a punitive perception of cash transfers, not a socially-valued one. In the tension between 
promoting intrinsic value and depleting it, these programs deplete it. 
 
Conclusion 
The UK Sustainable Development Commission recently determined that “Prosperity 
itself – in any meaningful sense of the word – is under threat. Not from the current economic 
recession, but from the continuing surge of materialism, and from the economic model that 
perpetuates it.”65 Economists and philosophers have, for centuries, articulated concern about 
the relationship between a materialism regime and human well-being. The antidote they all 
identified is the same – the restoration of the intrinsic value of non-materialistic endeavors. 
Collective subscription to the belief that self-interested material accumulation is the 
necessary destination of all human endeavor has shaped disciplines, ideas about the place and 
purpose of human beings in the world, and humanity’s way forward. As a philosophy to 
promote prosperity for the current generation and into the future, it has proven itself 




Materialism is a paradigm that has characterized virtually every aspect of human 
reality. Mobilizing its impulses are a powerful tool to motivate human behavior, but only 
serves to spread its influence or further entrench people in its logic. In stripping other 
endeavors of their intrinsic value, materialism is debilitating and crushes self-actualization 
and human flourishing. As it has been applied to development, it is neither “meeting the 
needs of the present,” nor is it likely to enable “future generations to meet their own needs.” 
There is evidence to suggest that it has the potential to do great harm to the individual and 
the collective, the extent of which may not be apparent for some time. Recognizing the 
existence and operation of the materialism paradigm is the first step in dismantling it. 
 
Ways Forward 
Hoff and Stiglitz explain that while paradigms are pervasive and even fictitious ones 
manage to sustain themselves, they are subject to the laws of equilibrium.106 This suggests 
that an ideological shift, motivated by the restoration of intrinsic value, has the potential to 
cast society into a different paradigmatic equilibrium. Scholars have identified various 
domains of society in which people optimize something other than their material reality, or 
act as sources of knowledge of intrinsic value. These include: culture,95 community,62, 103, 139 
religion,42, 140 and sometimes all three.36 However, because of its pervasiveness, the 
materialism regime may co-opt culture,57 community,53 and religion.141 The integrity of these 
institutions must therefore be viewed in terms of the extent to which they have not been 




non-materialistic value systems throughout the ages, and may provide the only true sources 
of “knowing” intrinsic value. 
Many have advocated for a different system of measurement as a way to formalize 
those human endeavors of intrinsic value: "Efforts to change governmental measures of 
'prosperity' and 'progress' are a...path towards helping people and society disengage from 
materialistic pursuits and focus on intrinsic values concerns…all levels of government would 
do well to develop and adopt metrics that do not privilege materialistic values but instead 
account for how successful a society is with regard to intrinsic values."43 There needs to be a 
general acknowledgment of the inadequacy of an exclusively material paradigm to bring 
about prosperity.  
Great progress toward this goal has already been made by the Commission on the 
Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress.142  Built on the premise that 
“Producing better, truer, ways of measuring economic, environmental and social 
performance is a critical step in making progress towards building a better world,”143 The 
Commission has made a significant effort to account for the aspects of human endeavor that 
are intrinsically important, recognizing that well-being includes “the full range of factors 
that make life worth living, reaching beyond its material side.”142 This includes even those 
activities conventionally seen to possess value that is exclusively material, such as work or 
employment. The Commission report serves to re-center the focus of the discourse on 




The capabilities approach championed by Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum and 
others, is based on an inherent acknowledgment of the intrinsic value of the non-material 
aspects of human prosperity. An immediate and accessible policy correction would be to 
focus on capabilities expansion as a path to the restoration of intrinsic value. And in cases 
where the introduction of financial incentives is usefulk, they should be community-defined 
and allow a context of intrinsic value to inform their framing. 
Richard Henry Tawney addressed the following to his "Acquisitive Society": "These 
times are not ordinary, and in such times it is not enough to follow the road. It is necessary 
to know where it leads and, if it leads nowhere, to follow another. The search for another 
involves reflection, which is uncongenial to the bustling people who describe themselves as 
practical...But the practical thing for a traveler who is uncertain of his path is not to proceed 
with the utmost rapidity in the wrong direction: it is to consider how to find the right one."13  
The purpose of this paper has been to provide a coherent understanding of the 
rampant paradigm of materialism – to point out its ubiquity, how it behaves, what harm it 
causes, and how the constructs it presents might be reconceived. Above all, the hope of the 
author has been to undermine ambivalence toward the logic of materialism. Given its 
endemicity, development policy-makers, program designers, practitioners and theoreticians 
must be vigilant and cannot afford passivity in the face of this global disease. We should 
always be asking ourselves (1) whether our operating frameworks are grounded in 
materialistic assumptions about the nature of human progress, (2) whether we are 
                                                 




undermining the intrinsic value of non-material endeavors or displacing non-materialistic 
value systems and (3) whether our efforts promote the intrinsic value derived from non-
material sources of well-being and purpose. In short, we must tirelessly call all of us, citizens 





Appendix A - Incentives Done Right: Coalition for Rainforest Nations 
Incentives that are perceived to be controlling undermine autonomy and rob 
endeavors of their intrinsic value. However, Elinor Ostrom posits that subsidies and fines 
designed at the community-level are autonomy-enhancing. In an example of farmer-
managed irrigation systems, the incentives are designed by the participants themselves and 
were found more likely to be enforced and the rules more likely to be followed than 
programs imposed by an external entity. In fact, the program “crowded-in” cooperation 
instead of crowding it out.103 In another example, discussing cooperative behavior in the 
siting of a polluting facility, Dan Kahan explains how a bottom-up alternative (compared to 
the standard top-down compensation approach) could be effective and autonomy-promoting: 
Imagine the…case of a community whose residents start off with the belief 
that society’s resources are being inequitably distributed as a result of a 
fundamentally unjust political system…in this kind of political climate, there 
is at least some potential for compensation to work. Not only does 
compensation help to offset the material inconveniences…the very offering of 
it conveys a degree of respect that previously had been denied them by 
powerful institutions and interests. Case studies suggest that compensation is 
most likely to have this positive effect when incentives are part of a 
negotiated, ‘bottom-up’ siting process rather than a centrally administered 
‘top-down’ one…When voluntary acceptance is solicited, however, 
communities that historically have been disadvantaged are likely to feel 
respected and empowered; compensation is no longer seen as degrading. In 
addition, the process of negotiation is likely to create a climate akin to the 
face-to-face discussions in public goods games: When they are able to discuss 
the situation with remote political authorities, and are granted veto power, 
local communities are likely to be assured that others are willing to contribute 
their fair share to dealing with the problem. Accordingly, they reciprocate 
positively by showing greater receptivity…The key to solving NIMBY, in 
short, is trust. Various sources of evidence suggest that individuals can be 
made receptive…if they can be made to believe that society is committed to 




negotiated-compensation schemes—ones framed to emphasize respect for the 
interests and autonomy of prospective host communities—are one way to 
reverse deep-seated resentments and thus excite a reciprocal openness.110 
The Coalition for Rainforest Nations as a bottom-up negotiated effort, characterized by 
efforts to rectify what is an unjust system, is precisely the sort of endeavor that could 
succeed. The Coalition is made up of dozens of developing countries who have designed a 
proposal to receive carbon offset payments for existing (and new) forested land.144 It is 
essentially an intrinsically-motivated incentive to encourage forest conservation in rainforest 
nations.  
The disproportionate burden likely to fall on developing countries from the effects of 
climate change (relative to their contribution to the problem), as well as the effective global 
ecological service rainforest nations are providing in the form of carbon sequestration, 
constitute a regime of injustice of massive proportions. The proposal put forward is akin to 
the one described above – it conveys a degree of respect for these nations that had previously 
been denied them by powerful interests; it appears to be one of the only autonomy-
enhancing, bottom-up approaches (at least relative to the global-level policy-making) in 
sustainable development policy; and it is based on a reciprocal relationship with fellow 
nations predicated on the trust that others are making an effort to contribute their fair share. 
It constitutes an appeal to the global community to demonstrate the intrinsic value of the 
world’s rainforests. It may even go some ways to forging less-exploitative relationships 




Not taking the Coalition of Rainforest Nations’ proposal seriously is not just a matter 
of ignoring yet another idea – and one that appears to prefer the interests of developing 
nations – to combat climate change. It would reject the opportunity to institute a 
conservation incentive program designed on the right basis that could foster the sort of trust 
and cooperation among the community of nations that must characterize the next era of a 





Appendix B - Paying Leaders not to be Corrupt: The Mo Ibrahim Prize 
The Mo Ibrahim Foundation Prize is awarded to a democratically-elected African 
head of state who leaves office according to the country’s constitutional requirements and 
has contributed to the welfare of his or her nation. The prize is the largest in history – 
$500,000 per year for 10 years and $200,000 per year thereafter.145 The program is designed 
as an incentive for good governance. 
Skeptics of the prize are primarily concerned that it is misdirected - in terms of the 
actual causes of corruption and poor governance146, or in terms of the urgency of the problem 
as it relates to development.147 Some are concerned that it “fuel[s] the public perception that 
African leaders are so corrupt they will leave power only when offered a monetary 
incentive.”146 Arguments against it are thus limited to the concern that it is a suboptimal or 
inefficient approach to promoting development in Africa or that it reinforces prejudices from 
the outside, but it is otherwise harmless. This is not the case – like other material incentives 
directed at promoting “optimal behavior”, the prize threatens the integrity of the intrinsic 
purpose of governance and public service. It formalizes and lends legitimacy to the tragic 
misconception underpinning corruption around the world – what Richard A. Joseph called 
“prebendalism”.148 It is the notion that the very purpose of holding public office is "to 
generate material benefits for themselves and their constituents and kin groups."149 
The logic underpinning such “performance-based incentive programs for LDC public 
officials” is fundamentally economic: “Corruption may lead to terribly inefficient economic 




government whose public officials expect to be well compensated for good performance over 
a poorly functioning, corrupt government whose public officials simply steal whatever they 
can get away with…What is of utmost importance is to establish clean governance conducive 
to sustained economic growth.”150 This reasoning not only reinforces the idea that the 
primary purpose of public office is to enrich oneself, it also deprives the function of 
governance of the intrinsic value of public service.  
Those who advocate for such incentives are somehow oblivious to the materialistic 
foundation of corruption: “While it is most likely that any intensified competition for 
political power brought about by the introduction of an incentive program would drive 
current politicians to clean up their act and might also lead to more capable and honest 
individuals deciding to enter politics, it is possible that no such beneficial effects would come 
to pass. Instead, the incentives might attract those who would try to manipulate the political 
process in their favor…[but it is a] slim potentiality.”150 Not only would stripping governance 
of its intrinsic value to society render this argument completely erroneous, but the 
demonstrated impacts incentives have on preferences is particularly worrying in this context 
as well. The intrinsic value argument diverges here. Are more “capable and honest 
individuals” those who would only decide to enter politics in the context of financial 
incentives?  
The qualitative difference of work pursued in service to one’s society cannot be 
affected by mere materialistic inducements, nor is it equivalent to a thin veneer of good 




the individuals who would promote good governance are intrinsically different from those 
who would be successfully motivated primarily by materialistic incentives – the two are 
incompatible. Research on the circumplex of values affirms this. In the model, goals directed 
toward financial success (to be wealthy and materially successful”) are consistently opposed 
to goals directed at community (“to improve the world through activism or generativity”), 
meaning that these two sets of motivations are incompatible or in direct conflict with each 
other.69 This suggests that stimulating materialistic motivation does not allow for the pursuit 
of goals directed at the common good, the primary function of governance. Kasser explains 
this incompatibility in greater detail:  
…acceptance of others as equals and concern for their welfare interferes with 
the pursuit of one’s own relative success and dominance over others…When 
powerful people hold strong material values, the whole of society bears some 
of the costs. Research [shows] that materialistic values are associated with 
making more antisocial and self-centered decisions involving getting ahead 
rather than cooperating. As a result, others in the community are treated as 
objects to be manipulated and used. Materialistic values also conflict with 
concern for making the world a better place, and the desire to contribute to 
equality, justice, and other aspects of civil society.77 
Therefore it is reasonable to believe that the desirable deciding factor for “honest and 
capable” people who go into public service over some similarly-compensating profession is a 
non-material one. This makes a case for offering slightly less (than market) material 
compensation for such professions that benefit from its workers’ intrinsic motivation, so as to 
self-select those individuals who possess community-oriented goals (i.e. those who perceive 




compensation). The fact that society demonstrates its intrinsic value for professions in terms 
of wages does not go unacknowledged – what is more critical is that in order for society to 
reap the full benefit of these endeavors, the overriding motive for individuals in such 
professions must be that of contributing to the intrinsic well-being of society, not personal 
material benefit. By structuring public service in such a way that assumes the only value of 
these professions lies in the potential material benefit it poses to public servants does a 
disservice to both them and to society. Furthermore, psychologists have found that socially-
oriented rewards do not undermine intrinsic value (in this case, they constitute it). However, 
“social aspects of reward are fragile and a social reward can easily be made into a non-social 
extrinsic reward by merely mentioning monetary circumstances.”151 The very suggestion of a 
materialistic motive may therefore undermine those operating on the basis of intrinsic 
motivation. 
More so than employment generating primarily economic benefits to society, true 
governance is impossible without transcending materialistic considerations. In fact, society 
would probably do better to have leaders for whom materialistic considerations were totally 
irrelevant, and who were motivated exclusively by service to the common good. John Ruskin 
offered a similar sentiment: “I strongly suspect that in a well-organized state, the possession 
of wealth ought to incapacitate for public office,” and “one of the most important conditions 
of a healthy system of social economy, would be the restraint of the properties and incomes 




Even for something so widely understood to have its roots in materialism as the 
problem of corruption, the Mo Ibrahim prize is yet another demonstration of the motive-
indifferent, materialism-promoting approach currently supported in development discourse. 
Paying heads of state to leave office reinforces the idea that stepping down is against their 
(narrowly-defined) self-interest and requires additional inducements. This implies inherent 
acceptance and reinforcement of the idea that public office is for personal enrichment and 
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